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Shutemov" To: Yu-cheng Yu Cc: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann , Andy Lutomirski , Balbir Singh , Borislav Petkov , Cyrill Gorcunov , Dave Hansen , Eugene Syromiatnikov , Florian Weimer , "H.J. Lu" , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Mike Kravetz , Nadav Amit , Oleg Nesterov , Pavel Machek , Peter Zijlstra , Randy Dunlap , "Ravi V. Shankar" , Vedvyas Shanbhogue , Dave Martin , Weijiang Yang , Pengfei Xu , Haitao Huang , "Kirill A . Shutemov" Subject: Re: [PATCH v25 30/30] mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK for shadow stack Message-ID: <20210426065243.ozh6doz6q5xonrqe@box.shutemov.name> References: <20210415221419.31835-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> <20210415221419.31835-31-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20210415221419.31835-31-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-api@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at 03:14:19PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote: > There are three possible options to create a shadow stack allocation API: > an arch_prctl, a new syscall, or adding PROT_SHSTK to mmap()/mprotect(). > Each has its advantages and compromises. > > An arch_prctl() is the least intrusive. However, the existing x86 > arch_prctl() takes only two parameters. Multiple parameters must be > passed in a memory buffer. There is a proposal to pass more parameters in > registers [1], but no active discussion on that. > > A new syscall minimizes compatibility issues and offers an extensible frame > work to other architectures, but this will likely result in some overlap of > mmap()/mprotect(). > > The introduction of PROT_SHSTK to mmap()/mprotect() takes advantage of Maybe PROT_SHADOW_STACK? > existing APIs. The x86-specific PROT_SHSTK is translated to > VM_SHADOW_STACK and a shadow stack mapping is created without reinventing > the wheel. There are potential pitfalls though. The most obvious one > would be using this as a bypass to shadow stack protection. However, the > attacker would have to get to the syscall first. > > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200828121624.108243-1-hjl.tools@gmail.com/ > > Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu > Cc: Kees Cook > Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov > --- > v24: > - Update arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(), leave PROT* checking to > arch_validate_prot(). > - Update arch_validate_prot(), leave vma flags checking to > arch_validate_flags(). > - Add arch_validate_flags(). > > arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 1 + > include/linux/mm.h | 1 + > 3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h > index 629f6c81263a..1821c179f35d 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h > @@ -20,11 +20,68 @@ > ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ > ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) > > -#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) ( \ > +#define pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) ( \ > ((key) & 0x1 ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \ > ((key) & 0x2 ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \ > ((key) & 0x4 ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ > ((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) > +#else > +#define pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) (0) > #endif > > +static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(unsigned long prot, > + unsigned long pkey) > +{ > + unsigned long vm_prot_bits = pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey); > + > + if (prot & PROT_SHSTK) > + vm_prot_bits |= VM_SHADOW_STACK; > + > + return vm_prot_bits; > +} > + > +#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK > +static inline bool arch_validate_prot(unsigned long prot, unsigned long addr) > +{ > + unsigned long valid = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC | PROT_SEM | > + PROT_SHSTK; > + > + if (prot & ~valid) > + return false; > + > + if (prot & PROT_SHSTK) { > + if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_size) > + return false; > + > + /* > + * A shadow stack mapping is indirectly writable by only > + * the CALL and WRUSS instructions, but not other write > + * instructions). PROT_SHSTK and PROT_WRITE are mutually > + * exclusive. > + */ > + if (prot & PROT_WRITE) > + return false; > + } > + > + return true; > +} > + > +#define arch_validate_prot arch_validate_prot > + > +static inline bool arch_validate_flags(unsigned long vm_flags, bool is_anon) > +{ > + if (vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK) { > + if ((vm_flags & VM_SHARED) || !is_anon) VM_SHARED check is redundant. vma_is_anonymous() should be enough. Anonymous shared mappings would fail vma_is_anonymous(). > + return false; > + } > + > + return true; > +} > + > +#define arch_validate_flags(vm_flags, is_anon) arch_validate_flags(vm_flags, is_anon) > + > +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK */ > + > #endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */ > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h > index 3ce1923e6ed9..39bb7db344a6 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h > @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ > > #define MAP_32BIT 0x40 /* only give out 32bit addresses */ > > +#define PROT_SHSTK 0x10 /* shadow stack pages */ > > #include > > diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h > index 1ccec5cc399b..9a7652eea207 100644 > --- a/include/linux/mm.h > +++ b/include/linux/mm.h > @@ -342,6 +342,7 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp); > > #if defined(CONFIG_X86) > # define VM_PAT VM_ARCH_1 /* PAT reserves whole VMA at once (x86) */ > +# define VM_ARCH_CLEAR VM_SHADOW_STACK > #elif defined(CONFIG_PPC) > # define VM_SAO VM_ARCH_1 /* Strong Access Ordering (powerpc) */ > #elif defined(CONFIG_PARISC) > -- > 2.21.0 > > -- Kirill A. Shutemov