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From: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	Julien Thierry <Julien.Thierry@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>,
	Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, mark.brown@arm.com,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Subject: [PATCH v4.4 22/45] arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for suspicious interrupts from EL0
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 08:38:05 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <f63b1037760ac07b1dab75685d20e32c3c5b8396.1560480942.git.viresh.kumar@linaro.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1560480942.git.viresh.kumar@linaro.org>

From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>

commit 30d88c0e3ace625a92eead9ca0ad94093a8f59fe upstream.

It is possible to take an IRQ from EL0 following a branch to a kernel
address in such a way that the IRQ is prioritised over the instruction
abort. Whilst an attacker would need to get the stars to align here,
it might be sufficient with enough calibration so perform BP hardening
in the rare case that we see a kernel address in the ELR when handling
an IRQ from EL0.

Reported-by: Dan Hettena <dhettena@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 5 +++++
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c     | 6 ++++++
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
index 42a141f01f3b..1548be9732ce 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
@@ -582,6 +582,11 @@ ENDPROC(el0_sync)
 #endif
 
 	ct_user_exit
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+	tbz	x22, #55, 1f
+	bl	do_el0_irq_bp_hardening
+1:
+#endif
 	irq_handler
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
index 082f385b6592..9ff48d083c4c 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
@@ -535,6 +535,12 @@ asmlinkage void __exception do_mem_abort(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
 	arm64_notify_die("", regs, &info, esr);
 }
 
+asmlinkage void __exception do_el0_irq_bp_hardening(void)
+{
+	/* PC has already been checked in entry.S */
+	arm64_apply_bp_hardening();
+}
+
 asmlinkage void __exception do_el0_ia_bp_hardening(unsigned long addr,
 						   unsigned int esr,
 						   struct pt_regs *regs)
-- 
2.21.0.rc0.269.g1a574e7a288b


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  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-06-14  3:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-06-14  3:07 [PATCH v4.4 00/45] V4.4 backport of arm64 Spectre patches Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:07 ` [PATCH v4.4 01/45] arm64: barrier: Add CSDB macros to control data-value prediction Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:07 ` [PATCH v4.4 02/45] arm64: Implement array_index_mask_nospec() Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:07 ` [PATCH v4.4 03/45] arm64: remove duplicate macro __KERNEL__ check Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:07 ` [PATCH v4.4 04/45] arm64: move TASK_* definitions to <asm/processor.h> Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:07 ` [PATCH v4.4 05/45] arm64: Make USER_DS an inclusive limit Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:07 ` [PATCH v4.4 06/45] arm64: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculation Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:07 ` [PATCH v4.4 07/45] arm64: entry: Ensure branch through syscall table is bounded under speculation Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:07 ` [PATCH v4.4 08/45] arm64: uaccess: Prevent speculative use of the current addr_limit Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:07 ` [PATCH v4.4 09/45] arm64: uaccess: Don't bother eliding access_ok checks in __{get, put}_user Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:07 ` [PATCH v4.4 10/45] mm/kasan: add API to check memory regions Viresh Kumar
2019-07-04 14:15   ` Julien Thierry
2019-07-05  3:13     ` Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:07 ` [PATCH v4.4 11/45] arm64: kasan: instrument user memory access API Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:07 ` [PATCH v4.4 12/45] arm64: uaccess: Mask __user pointers for __arch_{clear, copy_*}_user Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:07 ` [PATCH v4.4 13/45] arm64: cpufeature: Pass capability structure to ->enable callback Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:07 ` [PATCH v4.4 14/45] drivers/firmware: Expose psci_get_version through psci_ops structure Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:07 ` [PATCH v4.4 15/45] arm64: Factor out TTBR0_EL1 post-update workaround into a specific asm macro Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:07 ` [PATCH v4.4 16/45] arm64: Move post_ttbr_update_workaround to C code Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:08 ` [PATCH v4.4 17/45] arm64: cpufeature: Add scope for capability check Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:08 ` [PATCH v4.4 18/45] arm64: Add skeleton to harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:08 ` [PATCH v4.4 19/45] arm64: Move BP hardening to check_and_switch_context Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:08 ` [PATCH v4.4 20/45] mm: Introduce lm_alias Viresh Kumar
2019-06-17 12:33   ` Julien Thierry
2019-06-18  5:00     ` Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:08 ` [PATCH v4.4 21/45] arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for high-priority synchronous exceptions Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:08 ` Viresh Kumar [this message]
2019-06-14  3:08 ` [PATCH v4.4 23/45] arm64: cputype: Add missing MIDR values for Cortex-A72 and Cortex-A75 Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:08 ` [PATCH v4.4 24/45] arm64: cpu_errata: Allow an erratum to be match for all revisions of a core Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:08 ` [PATCH v4.4 25/45] arm64: Implement branch predictor hardening for affected Cortex-A CPUs Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:08 ` [PATCH v4.4 26/45] arm64: cputype info for Broadcom Vulcan Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:08 ` [PATCH v4.4 27/45] arm64: cputype: Add MIDR values for Cavium ThunderX2 CPUs Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:08 ` [PATCH v4.4 28/45] arm64: Branch predictor hardening for Cavium ThunderX2 Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:08 ` [PATCH v4.4 29/45] arm64: KVM: Increment PC after handling an SMC trap Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:08 ` [PATCH v4.4 30/45] arm/arm64: KVM: Consolidate the PSCI include files Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:08 ` [PATCH v4.4 31/45] arm/arm64: KVM: Add PSCI_VERSION helper Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:08 ` [PATCH v4.4 32/45] arm/arm64: KVM: Add smccc accessors to PSCI code Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:08 ` [PATCH v4.4 33/45] ARM: 8478/2: arm/arm64: add arm-smccc Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:08 ` [PATCH v4.4 34/45] arm/arm64: KVM: Implement PSCI 1.0 support Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:08 ` [PATCH v4.4 35/45] arm/arm64: KVM: Advertise SMCCC v1.1 Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:08 ` [PATCH v4.4 36/45] arm/arm64: KVM: Turn kvm_psci_version into a static inline Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:08 ` [PATCH v4.4 37/45] arm64: KVM: Report SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 BP hardening support Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:08 ` [PATCH v4.4 38/45] arm64: KVM: Add SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 fast handling Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:08 ` [PATCH v4.4 39/45] firmware/psci: Expose PSCI conduit Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:08 ` [PATCH v4.4 40/45] firmware/psci: Expose SMCCC version through psci_ops Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:08 ` [PATCH v4.4 41/45] arm/arm64: smccc: Make function identifiers an unsigned quantity Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:08 ` [PATCH v4.4 42/45] arm/arm64: smccc: Implement SMCCC v1.1 inline primitive Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:08 ` [PATCH v4.4 43/45] arm64: Add ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 BP hardening support Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:08 ` [PATCH v4.4 44/45] arm64: Kill PSCI_GET_VERSION as a variant-2 workaround Viresh Kumar
2019-06-14  3:08 ` [PATCH v4.4 45/45] arm64: futex: Mask __user pointers prior to dereference Viresh Kumar
2019-06-17 12:10 ` [PATCH v4.4 00/45] V4.4 backport of arm64 Spectre patches Greg KH
2019-06-17 16:03 ` Julien Thierry
2019-06-18 10:21   ` Viresh Kumar
2019-06-19 11:03     ` Julien Thierry
2019-06-19 11:20       ` Viresh Kumar
2019-06-17 16:30 ` Julien Thierry
2019-07-11 13:57 ` Julien Thierry

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