From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: john.johansen@canonical.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-audit@redhat.com, bpf@vger.kernel.org, sds@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: [PATCH v23 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
Date: Mon, 28 Dec 2020 11:22:09 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <c88bc01f-3b65-f320-b42b-5ecde3e29448@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <903c37e9036d167958165ab700e646c1622a9c40.camel@linux.ibm.com>
On 12/28/2020 9:54 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Hi Casey,
>
> On Fri, 2020-11-20 at 12:14 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> When more than one security module is exporting data to
>> audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer
>> is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a
>> structure to be used instead.
>>
>> The lsmblob structure is currently an array of
>> u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the
>> security modules built into the system that would
>> use secids if active. The system assigns the module
>> a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are
>> compiled in but not registered there will be unused
>> slots.
>>
>> A new lsm_id structure, which contains the name
>> of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There
>> is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name
>> and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.
>>
>> The audit rules data is expanded to use an array of
>> security module data rather than a single instance.
>> Because IMA uses the audit rule functions it is
>> affected as well.
> This patch is quite large, even without the audit rule change. I would
> limit this patch to the new lsm_id structure changes. The audit rule
> change should be broken out as a separate patch so that the audit
> changes aren't hidden.
Breaking up the patch in any meaningful way would require
scaffolding code that is as extensive and invasive as the
final change. I can do that if you really need it, but it
won't be any easier to read.
> In addition, here are a few high level nits:
> - The (patch description) body of the explanation, line wrapped at 75
> columns, which will be copied to the permanent changelog to describe
> this patch. (Refer Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst.)
Will fix.
> - The brief kernel-doc descriptions should not have a trailing period.
> Nor should kernel-doc variable definitions have a trailing period.
> Example(s) inline below. (The existing kernel-doc is mostly correct.)
Will fix.
> - For some reason existing comments that span multiple lines aren't
> formatted properly. In those cases, where there is another change,
> please fix the comment and function description.
Can you give an example? There are multiple comment styles
used in the various components.
> thanks,
>
> Mimi
I don't see any comments on the ima code changes. I really
don't want to spin a new patch set that does nothing but change
two periods in comments only to find out two months from now
that the code changes are completely borked. I really don't
want to go through the process of breaking up the patch that has
been widely Acked if there's no reason to expect it would require
significant work otherwise.
>
>> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
>> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
>> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>> Cc: <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
>> Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
>> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
>> Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
>> ---
>> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
>> index bc2725491560..fdb6e95c98e8 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/security.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
>> @@ -132,6 +132,65 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
>>
>> extern const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1];
>>
>> +/*
>> + * Data exported by the security modules
>> + *
>> + * Any LSM that provides secid or secctx based hooks must be included.
>> + */
>> +#define LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ( \
>> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \
>> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) + \
>> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) ? 1 : 0) + \
>> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0))
>> +
>> +struct lsmblob {
>> + u32 secid[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
>> +};
>> +
>> +#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1 /* Not a valid LSM slot number */
>> +#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2 /* Slot requested on initialization */
>> +#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3 /* Slot not requested */
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure.
> Only this kernel-doc brief description is suffixed with a period.
> Please remove.
>
>> + * @blob: Pointer to the data to initialize
>> + * @secid: The initial secid value
>> + *
>> + * Set all secid for all modules to the specified value.
>> + */
>> +static inline void lsmblob_init(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 secid)
>> +{
>> + int i;
>> +
>> + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
>> + blob->secid[i] = secid;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * lsmblob_is_set - report if there is an value in the lsmblob
>> + * @blob: Pointer to the exported LSM data
>> + *
>> + * Returns true if there is a secid set, false otherwise
>> + */
>> +static inline bool lsmblob_is_set(struct lsmblob *blob)
>> +{
>> + struct lsmblob empty = {};
>> +
>> + return !!memcmp(blob, &empty, sizeof(*blob));
>> +}
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * lsmblob_equal - report if the two lsmblob's are equal
>> + * @bloba: Pointer to one LSM data
>> + * @blobb: Pointer to the other LSM data
>> + *
>> + * Returns true if all entries in the two are equal, false otherwise
>> + */
>> +static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)
>> +{
>> + return !memcmp(bloba, blobb, sizeof(*bloba));
>> +}
>> +
>> /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
>> extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> index 9b5adeaa47fc..cd393aaa17d5 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
>> @@ -88,6 +88,22 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
>> struct ima_template_desc *template;
>> };
>>
>> +/**
>> + * ima_lsm_isset - Is a rule set for any of the active security modules
>> + * @rules: The set of IMA rules to check.
> Nor do kernel-doc variable definitions have a trailing period.
>
>> + *
>> + * If a rule is set for any LSM return true, otherwise return false.
>> + */
>> +static inline bool ima_lsm_isset(void *rules[])
>> +{
>> + int i;
>> +
>> + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
>> + if (rules[i])
>> + return true;
>> + return false;
>> +}
>> +
>> /*
>> * Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
>> * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, and .fowner
--
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-12-28 19:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20201120201507.11993-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v22 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler
2020-12-28 17:54 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-12-28 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2020-12-28 19:43 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-12-28 19:24 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-12-28 20:06 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-12-28 22:14 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-12-28 23:20 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-12-29 1:53 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-12-29 13:53 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-12-29 18:46 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-12-29 19:16 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 04/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 05/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 06/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 07/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 11/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 12/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 13/23] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 14/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 15/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 16/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 17/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 18/23] LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 19/23] audit: add support for non-syscall auxiliary records Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 23:06 ` kernel test robot
2020-11-21 0:36 ` kernel test robot
2020-11-21 7:36 ` kernel test robot
2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 20/23] Audit: Add new record for multiple process LSM attributes Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 22:51 ` kernel test robot
2020-11-21 0:02 ` kernel test robot
2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 21/23] Audit: Add a new record for multiple object " Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
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