From: Howard Chung <howardchung@google.com>
To: linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org, marcel@holtmann.org
Cc: chromeos-bluetooth-upstreaming@chromium.org,
Howard Chung <howardchung@google.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [Bluez PATCH v5] bluetooth: secure bluetooth stack from bluedump attack
Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2020 19:16:41 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200214191609.Bluez.v5.1.Ia71869d2f3e19a76a6a352c61088a085a1d41ba6@changeid> (raw)
Attack scenario:
1. A Chromebook (let's call this device A) is paired to a legitimate
Bluetooth classic device (e.g. a speaker) (let's call this device
B).
2. A malicious device (let's call this device C) pretends to be the
Bluetooth speaker by using the same BT address.
3. If device A is not currently connected to device B, device A will
be ready to accept connection from device B in the background
(technically, doing Page Scan).
4. Therefore, device C can initiate connection to device A
(because device A is doing Page Scan) and device A will accept the
connection because device A trusts device C's address which is the
same as device B's address.
5. Device C won't be able to communicate at any high level Bluetooth
profile with device A because device A enforces that device C is
encrypted with their common Link Key, which device C doesn't have.
But device C can initiate pairing with device A with just-works
model without requiring user interaction (there is only pairing
notification). After pairing, device A now trusts device C with a
new different link key, common between device A and C.
6. From now on, device A trusts device C, so device C can at anytime
connect to device A to do any kind of high-level hijacking, e.g.
speaker hijack or mouse/keyboard hijack.
Since we don't know whether the repairing is legitimate or not,
leave the decision to user space if all the conditions below are met.
- the pairing is initialized by peer
- the authorization method is just-work
- host already had the link key to the peer
Signed-off-by: Howard Chung <howardchung@google.com>
---
Changes in v5:
- Rephrase the comment
Changes in v4:
- optimise the check in smp.c.
Changes in v3:
- Change confirm_hint from 2 to 1
- Fix coding style (declaration order)
Changes in v2:
- Remove the HCI_PERMIT_JUST_WORK_REPAIR debugfs option
- Fix the added code in classic
- Add a similar fix for LE
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 10 ++++++++++
net/bluetooth/smp.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
index 2c833dae9366..e6982f4f51ea 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
@@ -4571,6 +4571,16 @@ static void hci_user_confirm_request_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev,
goto confirm;
}
+ /* If there already exists link key in local host, leave the
+ * decision to user space since the remote device could be
+ * legitimate or malicious.
+ */
+ if (hci_find_link_key(hdev, &ev->bdaddr)) {
+ bt_dev_warn(hdev, "Local host already has link key");
+ confirm_hint = 1;
+ goto confirm;
+ }
+
BT_DBG("Auto-accept of user confirmation with %ums delay",
hdev->auto_accept_delay);
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 2cba6e07c02b..25dbf77d216b 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -2192,6 +2192,25 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
smp->prnd);
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+
+ /* Only Just-Works pairing requires extra checks */
+ if (smp->method != JUST_WORKS)
+ goto mackey_and_ltk;
+
+ /* If there already exists link key in local host, leave the
+ * decision to user space since the remote device could be
+ * legitimate or malicious.
+ */
+ if (hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
+ hcon->role)) {
+ err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
+ hcon->type,
+ hcon->dst_type, passkey,
+ 1);
+ if (err)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
+ }
}
mackey_and_ltk:
--
2.25.0.265.gbab2e86ba0-goog
next reply other threads:[~2020-02-14 11:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-02-14 11:16 Howard Chung [this message]
2020-02-14 14:58 ` [Bluez PATCH v5] bluetooth: secure bluetooth stack from bluedump attack Marcel Holtmann
2020-02-16 0:50 ` Nathan Chancellor
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