From: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
hpa@zytor.com, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Cfir Cohen <cfir@google.com>, Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
Mike Stunes <mstunes@vmware.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Martin Radev <martin.b.radev@gmail.com>,
Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>,
linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 1/7] x86/ioremap: Map efi_mem_reserve() memory as encrypted for SEV
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 2021 11:54:33 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210608095439.12668-2-joro@8bytes.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210608095439.12668-1-joro@8bytes.org>
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Some drivers require memory that is marked as EFI boot services data. So that
this memory is not re-used by the kernel after ExitBootServices(),
efi_mem_reserve() is used to preserve it by inserting a new EFI memory
descriptor and marking it with the EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME attribute.
Under SEV, memory marked with the EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME attribute needs to
be mapped encrypted by Linux, otherwise the kernel might crash at boot
like below:
EFI Variables Facility v0.08 2004-May-17
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x3597688770a868b2: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 13 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.12.4-2-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:efi_mokvar_entry_next+0x34/0x40
Code: c5 01 48 8b 17 48 c7 07 00 00 00 00 48 85 c0 74 24 48 85 d2 74 14 80 3a 00 74 18 48 8b 82 00 01 00 00 48 8d 84 02 08 01 00 00 <80> 38 00 74 04 48 89 07 c3 31 c0 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 4c 8b 25
[...]
Call Trace:
efi_mokvar_sysfs_init
? efi_mokvar_table_init
do_one_initcall
? __kmalloc
kernel_init_freeable
? rest_init
kernel_init
ret_from_fork
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0de27ecc25d41b73 ]---
Expand the __ioremap_check_other() function to additionally check for this
other type of "runtime" data and indicate that it should be mapped encrypted
for an SEV guest.
Fixes: 58c909022a5a ("efi: Support for MOK variable config table")
Reported-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Tested-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index 12c686c65ea9..60ade7dd71bd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -118,7 +118,9 @@ static void __ioremap_check_other(resource_size_t addr, struct ioremap_desc *des
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI))
return;
- if (efi_mem_type(addr) == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA)
+ if (efi_mem_type(addr) == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA ||
+ (efi_mem_type(addr) == EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA &&
+ efi_mem_attributes(addr) & EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME))
desc->flags |= IORES_MAP_ENCRYPTED;
}
--
2.31.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-06-08 9:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-06-08 9:54 [PATCH v3 0/7] x86/sev-es: Fixes for SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
2021-06-08 9:54 ` Joerg Roedel [this message]
2021-06-08 9:54 ` [PATCH v3 2/7] x86/sev-es: Fix error message in runtime #VC handler Joerg Roedel
2021-06-08 9:54 ` [PATCH v3 3/7] x86/sev-es: Disable IRQs while GHCB is active Joerg Roedel
2021-06-08 9:54 ` [PATCH v3 4/7] x86/sev-es: Run #VC handler in plain IRQ state Joerg Roedel
2021-06-08 11:58 ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-06-08 13:25 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-06-08 9:54 ` [PATCH v3 5/7] x86/insn-eval: Make 0 a valid RIP for insn_get_effective_ip() Joerg Roedel
2021-06-08 9:54 ` [PATCH v3 6/7] x86/insn: Extend error reporting from insn_fetch_from_user[_inatomic]() Joerg Roedel
2021-06-08 9:54 ` [PATCH v3 7/7] x86/sev-es: Propagate #GP if getting linear instruction address failed Joerg Roedel
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20210608095439.12668-2-joro@8bytes.org \
--to=joro@8bytes.org \
--cc=cfir@google.com \
--cc=dan.j.williams@intel.com \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=erdemaktas@google.com \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=jgross@suse.com \
--cc=jroedel@suse.de \
--cc=jslaby@suse.cz \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-coco@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=martin.b.radev@gmail.com \
--cc=mhiramat@kernel.org \
--cc=mstunes@vmware.com \
--cc=nivedita@alum.mit.edu \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=rientjes@google.com \
--cc=seanjc@google.com \
--cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
--cc=virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).