From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Subject: Re: [RFC/RFT PATCH 0/2] crypto: add CTS output IVs for arm64 and testmgr
Date: Fri, 29 May 2020 22:02:16 +1000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200529120216.GA3752@gondor.apana.org.au> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAMj1kXFFPKWwwSpLnPmNa_Up1syMb7T5STG7Tw8mRuRqSzc9vw@mail.gmail.com>
On Fri, May 29, 2020 at 02:00:14PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>
> Even if this is the case, it requires that an skcipher implementation
> stores an output IV in the buffer that skcipher request's IV field
> points to. Currently, we only check whether this is the case for CBC
> implementations, and so it is quite likely that lots of h/w
> accelerators or arch code don't adhere to this today.
They are and have always been broken because algif_skcipher has
always relied on this.
> This might be feasible for the generic CTS driver wrapping h/w
> accelerated CBC. But how is this supposed to work, e.g., for the two
> existing h/w implementations of cts(cbc(aes)) that currently ignore
> this?
They'll have to disable chaining.
The way I'm doing this would allow some implementations to allow
chaining while others of the same algorithm can disable chaining
and require the whole request to be presented together.
Cheers,
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-05-29 12:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-05-19 19:02 [RFC/RFT PATCH 0/2] crypto: add CTS output IVs for arm64 and testmgr Ard Biesheuvel
2020-05-19 19:02 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 1/2] crypto: arm64/aes - align output IV with generic CBC-CTS driver Ard Biesheuvel
2020-05-19 19:02 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 2/2] crypto: testmgr - add output IVs for AES-CBC with ciphertext stealing Ard Biesheuvel
2020-05-19 19:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 0/2] crypto: add CTS output IVs for arm64 and testmgr Ard Biesheuvel
2020-05-20 6:03 ` Stephan Mueller
2020-05-20 6:40 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-05-20 6:47 ` Stephan Mueller
2020-05-20 6:54 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-05-20 7:01 ` Stephan Mueller
2020-05-20 7:09 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-05-21 13:01 ` Gilad Ben-Yossef
2020-05-21 13:23 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-05-23 18:52 ` Stephan Müller
2020-05-23 22:40 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-05-28 7:33 ` Herbert Xu
2020-05-28 8:33 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-05-29 8:05 ` Herbert Xu
2020-05-29 8:20 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-05-29 11:51 ` Herbert Xu
2020-05-29 12:00 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-05-29 12:02 ` Herbert Xu [this message]
2020-05-29 13:10 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-05-29 13:19 ` Herbert Xu
2020-05-29 13:41 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-05-29 13:42 ` Herbert Xu
2020-06-12 12:06 ` [PATCH 0/3] crypto: skcipher - Add support for no chaining and partial chaining Herbert Xu
2020-06-12 12:07 ` [PATCH 1/3] crypto: skcipher - Add final chunk size field for chaining Herbert Xu
2020-06-12 12:15 ` Stephan Mueller
2020-06-12 12:16 ` Herbert Xu
2020-06-12 12:21 ` [v2 PATCH 0/3] crypto: skcipher - Add support for no chaining and partial chaining Herbert Xu
2020-06-12 12:21 ` [v2 PATCH 1/3] crypto: skcipher - Add final chunk size field for chaining Herbert Xu
2020-06-12 12:21 ` [v2 PATCH 2/3] crypto: algif_skcipher - Add support for fcsize Herbert Xu
2020-06-12 12:21 ` [v2 PATCH 3/3] crypto: cts - Add support for chaining Herbert Xu
2020-06-12 16:10 ` [v2 PATCH 0/3] crypto: skcipher - Add support for no chaining and partial chaining Ard Biesheuvel
2020-06-15 7:30 ` Herbert Xu
2020-06-15 7:50 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-06-15 18:50 ` Eric Biggers
2020-06-15 23:18 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-06-16 11:04 ` Herbert Xu
2020-06-16 16:53 ` Eric Biggers
2020-06-12 12:07 ` [PATCH 2/3] crypto: algif_skcipher - Add support for fcsize Herbert Xu
2020-06-12 12:07 ` [PATCH 3/3] crypto: cts - Add support for chaining Herbert Xu
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