From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: CVE-2024-26588: LoongArch: BPF: Prevent out-of-bounds memory access
Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2024 17:13:56 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2024022256-CVE-2024-26588-d6d5@gregkh> (raw)
Description
===========
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: BPF: Prevent out-of-bounds memory access
The test_tag test triggers an unhandled page fault:
# ./test_tag
[ 130.640218] CPU 0 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff80001b898004, era == 9000000003137f7c, ra == 9000000003139e70
[ 130.640501] Oops[#3]:
[ 130.640553] CPU: 0 PID: 1326 Comm: test_tag Tainted: G D O 6.7.0-rc4-loong-devel-gb62ab1a397cf #47 61985c1d94084daa2432f771daa45b56b10d8d2a
[ 130.640764] Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022
[ 130.640874] pc 9000000003137f7c ra 9000000003139e70 tp 9000000104cb4000 sp 9000000104cb7a40
[ 130.641001] a0 ffff80001b894000 a1 ffff80001b897ff8 a2 000000006ba210be a3 0000000000000000
[ 130.641128] a4 000000006ba210be a5 00000000000000f1 a6 00000000000000b3 a7 0000000000000000
[ 130.641256] t0 0000000000000000 t1 00000000000007f6 t2 0000000000000000 t3 9000000004091b70
[ 130.641387] t4 000000006ba210be t5 0000000000000004 t6 fffffffffffffff0 t7 90000000040913e0
[ 130.641512] t8 0000000000000005 u0 0000000000000dc0 s9 0000000000000009 s0 9000000104cb7ae0
[ 130.641641] s1 00000000000007f6 s2 0000000000000009 s3 0000000000000095 s4 0000000000000000
[ 130.641771] s5 ffff80001b894000 s6 ffff80001b897fb0 s7 9000000004090c50 s8 0000000000000000
[ 130.641900] ra: 9000000003139e70 build_body+0x1fcc/0x4988
[ 130.642007] ERA: 9000000003137f7c build_body+0xd8/0x4988
[ 130.642112] CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE)
[ 130.642261] PRMD: 00000004 (PPLV0 +PIE -PWE)
[ 130.642353] EUEN: 00000003 (+FPE +SXE -ASXE -BTE)
[ 130.642458] ECFG: 00071c1c (LIE=2-4,10-12 VS=7)
[ 130.642554] ESTAT: 00010000 [PIL] (IS= ECode=1 EsubCode=0)
[ 130.642658] BADV: ffff80001b898004
[ 130.642719] PRID: 0014c010 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3A5000)
[ 130.642815] Modules linked in: [last unloaded: bpf_testmod(O)]
[ 130.642924] Process test_tag (pid: 1326, threadinfo=00000000f7f4015f, task=000000006499f9fd)
[ 130.643062] Stack : 0000000000000000 9000000003380724 0000000000000000 0000000104cb7be8
[ 130.643213] 0000000000000000 25af8d9b6e600558 9000000106250ea0 9000000104cb7ae0
[ 130.643378] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 9000000104cb7be8 90000000049f6000
[ 130.643538] 0000000000000090 9000000106250ea0 ffff80001b894000 ffff80001b894000
[ 130.643685] 00007ffffb917790 900000000313ca94 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 130.643831] ffff80001b894000 0000000000000ff7 0000000000000000 9000000100468000
[ 130.643983] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000040 25af8d9b6e600558
[ 130.644131] 0000000000000bb7 ffff80001b894048 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 130.644276] 9000000104cb7be8 90000000049f6000 0000000000000090 9000000104cb7bdc
[ 130.644423] ffff80001b894000 0000000000000000 00007ffffb917790 90000000032acfb0
[ 130.644572] ...
[ 130.644629] Call Trace:
[ 130.644641] [<9000000003137f7c>] build_body+0xd8/0x4988
[ 130.644785] [<900000000313ca94>] bpf_int_jit_compile+0x228/0x4ec
[ 130.644891] [<90000000032acfb0>] bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x158/0x1b0
[ 130.645003] [<90000000032b3504>] bpf_prog_load+0x760/0xb44
[ 130.645089] [<90000000032b6744>] __sys_bpf+0xbb8/0x2588
[ 130.645175] [<90000000032b8388>] sys_bpf+0x20/0x2c
[ 130.645259] [<9000000003f6ab38>] do_syscall+0x7c/0x94
[ 130.645369] [<9000000003121c5c>] handle_syscall+0xbc/0x158
[ 130.645507]
[ 130.645539] Code: 380839f6 380831f9 28412bae <24000ca6> 004081ad 0014cb50 004083e8 02bff34c 58008e91
[ 130.645729]
[ 130.646418] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
On my machine, which has CONFIG_PAGE_SIZE_16KB=y, the test failed at
loading a BPF prog with 2039 instructions:
prog = (struct bpf_prog *)ffff80001b894000
insn = (struct bpf_insn *)(prog->insnsi)ffff80001b894048
insn + 2039 = (struct bpf_insn *)ffff80001b898000 <- end of the page
In the build_insn() function, we are trying to access next instruction
unconditionally, i.e. `(insn + 1)->imm`. The address lies in the next
page and can be not owned by the current process, thus an page fault is
inevitable and then segfault.
So, let's access next instruction only under `dst = imm64` context.
With this fix, we have:
# ./test_tag
test_tag: OK (40945 tests)
The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2024-26588 to this issue.
Affected and fixed versions
===========================
Issue introduced in 6.1 with commit bbfddb904df6f82 and fixed in 6.1.75 with commit 4631c2dd69d9
Issue introduced in 6.1 with commit bbfddb904df6f82 and fixed in 6.6.14 with commit 9aeb09f4d85a
Issue introduced in 6.1 with commit bbfddb904df6f82 and fixed in 6.7.2 with commit 7924ade13a49
Issue introduced in 6.1 with commit bbfddb904df6f82 and fixed in 6.8-rc1 with commit 36a87385e31c
Please see https://www.kernel.org or a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.
Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions. The official CVE entry at
https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2024-26588
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.
Affected files
==============
The file(s) affected by this issue are:
arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c
Mitigation
==========
The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes. Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release. Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all. If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4631c2dd69d928bca396f9f58baeddf85e14ced5
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9aeb09f4d85a87bac46c010d75a2ea299d462f28
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7924ade13a49c0067da6ea13e398102979c0654a
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/36a87385e31c9343af9a4756598e704741250a67
reply other threads:[~2024-02-22 16:14 UTC|newest]
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