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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: CVE-2023-52587: IB/ipoib: Fix mcast list locking
Date: Wed,  6 Mar 2024 06:45:45 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2024030644-CVE-2023-52587-5479@gregkh> (raw)

Description
===========

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

IB/ipoib: Fix mcast list locking

Releasing the `priv->lock` while iterating the `priv->multicast_list` in
`ipoib_mcast_join_task()` opens a window for `ipoib_mcast_dev_flush()` to
remove the items while in the middle of iteration. If the mcast is removed
while the lock was dropped, the for loop spins forever resulting in a hard
lockup (as was reported on RHEL 4.18.0-372.75.1.el8_6 kernel):

    Task A (kworker/u72:2 below)       | Task B (kworker/u72:0 below)
    -----------------------------------+-----------------------------------
    ipoib_mcast_join_task(work)        | ipoib_ib_dev_flush_light(work)
      spin_lock_irq(&priv->lock)       | __ipoib_ib_dev_flush(priv, ...)
      list_for_each_entry(mcast,       | ipoib_mcast_dev_flush(dev = priv->dev)
          &priv->multicast_list, list) |
        ipoib_mcast_join(dev, mcast)   |
          spin_unlock_irq(&priv->lock) |
                                       |   spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->lock, flags)
                                       |   list_for_each_entry_safe(mcast, tmcast,
                                       |                  &priv->multicast_list, list)
                                       |     list_del(&mcast->list);
                                       |     list_add_tail(&mcast->list, &remove_list)
                                       |   spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->lock, flags)
          spin_lock_irq(&priv->lock)   |
                                       |   ipoib_mcast_remove_list(&remove_list)
   (Here, `mcast` is no longer on the  |     list_for_each_entry_safe(mcast, tmcast,
    `priv->multicast_list` and we keep |                            remove_list, list)
    spinning on the `remove_list` of   |  >>>  wait_for_completion(&mcast->done)
    the other thread which is blocked  |
    and the list is still valid on     |
    it's stack.)

Fix this by keeping the lock held and changing to GFP_ATOMIC to prevent
eventual sleeps.
Unfortunately we could not reproduce the lockup and confirm this fix but
based on the code review I think this fix should address such lockups.

crash> bc 31
PID: 747      TASK: ff1c6a1a007e8000  CPU: 31   COMMAND: "kworker/u72:2"
--
    [exception RIP: ipoib_mcast_join_task+0x1b1]
    RIP: ffffffffc0944ac1  RSP: ff646f199a8c7e00  RFLAGS: 00000002
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ff1c6a1a04dc82f8  RCX: 0000000000000000
                                  work (&priv->mcast_task{,.work})
    RDX: ff1c6a192d60ac68  RSI: 0000000000000286  RDI: ff1c6a1a04dc8000
           &mcast->list
    RBP: ff646f199a8c7e90   R8: ff1c699980019420   R9: ff1c6a1920c9a000
    R10: ff646f199a8c7e00  R11: ff1c6a191a7d9800  R12: ff1c6a192d60ac00
                                                         mcast
    R13: ff1c6a1d82200000  R14: ff1c6a1a04dc8000  R15: ff1c6a1a04dc82d8
           dev                    priv (&priv->lock)     &priv->multicast_list (aka head)
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
--- <NMI exception stack> ---
 #5 [ff646f199a8c7e00] ipoib_mcast_join_task+0x1b1 at ffffffffc0944ac1 [ib_ipoib]
 #6 [ff646f199a8c7e98] process_one_work+0x1a7 at ffffffff9bf10967

crash> rx ff646f199a8c7e68
ff646f199a8c7e68:  ff1c6a1a04dc82f8 <<< work = &priv->mcast_task.work

crash> list -hO ipoib_dev_priv.multicast_list ff1c6a1a04dc8000
(empty)

crash> ipoib_dev_priv.mcast_task.work.func,mcast_mutex.owner.counter ff1c6a1a04dc8000
  mcast_task.work.func = 0xffffffffc0944910 <ipoib_mcast_join_task>,
  mcast_mutex.owner.counter = 0xff1c69998efec000

crash> b 8
PID: 8        TASK: ff1c69998efec000  CPU: 33   COMMAND: "kworker/u72:0"
--
 #3 [ff646f1980153d50] wait_for_completion+0x96 at ffffffff9c7d7646
 #4 [ff646f1980153d90] ipoib_mcast_remove_list+0x56 at ffffffffc0944dc6 [ib_ipoib]
 #5 [ff646f1980153de8] ipoib_mcast_dev_flush+0x1a7 at ffffffffc09455a7 [ib_ipoib]
 #6 [ff646f1980153e58] __ipoib_ib_dev_flush+0x1a4 at ffffffffc09431a4 [ib_ipoib]
 #7 [ff646f1980153e98] process_one_work+0x1a7 at ffffffff9bf10967

crash> rx ff646f1980153e68
ff646f1980153e68:  ff1c6a1a04dc83f0 <<< work = &priv->flush_light

crash> ipoib_dev_priv.flush_light.func,broadcast ff1c6a1a04dc8000
  flush_light.func = 0xffffffffc0943820 <ipoib_ib_dev_flush_light>,
  broadcast = 0x0,

The mcast(s) on the `remove_list` (the remaining part of the ex `priv->multicast_list`):

crash> list -s ipoib_mcast.done.done ipoib_mcast.list -H ff646f1980153e10 | paste - -
ff1c6a192bd0c200          done.done = 0x0,
ff1c6a192d60ac00          done.done = 0x0,

The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2023-52587 to this issue.


Affected and fixed versions
===========================

	Fixed in 4.19.307 with commit 4c8922ae8eb8
	Fixed in 5.4.269 with commit 615e3adc2042
	Fixed in 5.10.210 with commit ac2630fd3c90
	Fixed in 5.15.149 with commit ed790bd0903e
	Fixed in 6.1.77 with commit 5108a2dc2db5
	Fixed in 6.6.16 with commit 342258fb46d6
	Fixed in 6.7.4 with commit 7c7bd4d561e9
	Fixed in 6.8-rc1 with commit 4f973e211b3b

Please see https://www.kernel.org or a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.

Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions.  The official CVE entry at
	https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2023-52587
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.


Affected files
==============

The file(s) affected by this issue are:
	drivers/infiniband/ulp/ipoib/ipoib_multicast.c


Mitigation
==========

The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes.  Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release.  Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all.  If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c8922ae8eb8dcc1e4b7d1059d97a8334288d825
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/615e3adc2042b7be4ad122a043fc9135e6342c90
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac2630fd3c90ffec34a0bfc4d413668538b0e8f2
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ed790bd0903ed3352ebf7f650d910f49b7319b34
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5108a2dc2db5630fb6cd58b8be80a0c134bc310a
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/342258fb46d66c1b4c7e2c3717ac01e10c03cf18
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7c7bd4d561e9dc6f5b7df9e184974915f6701a89
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4f973e211b3b1c6d36f7c6a19239d258856749f9

                 reply	other threads:[~2024-03-06  6:46 UTC|newest]

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