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From: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2024-26629: nfsd: fix RELEASE_LOCKOWNER
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2024 14:01:57 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240313140155.1913910-4-lee@kernel.org> (raw)

Description
===========

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nfsd: fix RELEASE_LOCKOWNER

The test on so_count in nfsd4_release_lockowner() is nonsense and
harmful.  Revert to using check_for_locks(), changing that to not sleep.

First: harmful.
As is documented in the kdoc comment for nfsd4_release_lockowner(), the
test on so_count can transiently return a false positive resulting in a
return of NFS4ERR_LOCKS_HELD when in fact no locks are held.  This is
clearly a protocol violation and with the Linux NFS client it can cause
incorrect behaviour.

If RELEASE_LOCKOWNER is sent while some other thread is still
processing a LOCK request which failed because, at the time that request
was received, the given owner held a conflicting lock, then the nfsd
thread processing that LOCK request can hold a reference (conflock) to
the lock owner that causes nfsd4_release_lockowner() to return an
incorrect error.

The Linux NFS client ignores that NFS4ERR_LOCKS_HELD error because it
never sends NFS4_RELEASE_LOCKOWNER without first releasing any locks, so
it knows that the error is impossible.  It assumes the lock owner was in
fact released so it feels free to use the same lock owner identifier in
some later locking request.

When it does reuse a lock owner identifier for which a previous RELEASE
failed, it will naturally use a lock_seqid of zero.  However the server,
which didn't release the lock owner, will expect a larger lock_seqid and
so will respond with NFS4ERR_BAD_SEQID.

So clearly it is harmful to allow a false positive, which testing
so_count allows.

The test is nonsense because ... well... it doesn't mean anything.

so_count is the sum of three different counts.
1/ the set of states listed on so_stateids
2/ the set of active vfs locks owned by any of those states
3/ various transient counts such as for conflicting locks.

When it is tested against '2' it is clear that one of these is the
transient reference obtained by find_lockowner_str_locked().  It is not
clear what the other one is expected to be.

In practice, the count is often 2 because there is precisely one state
on so_stateids.  If there were more, this would fail.

In my testing I see two circumstances when RELEASE_LOCKOWNER is called.
In one case, CLOSE is called before RELEASE_LOCKOWNER.  That results in
all the lock states being removed, and so the lockowner being discarded
(it is removed when there are no more references which usually happens
when the lock state is discarded).  When nfsd4_release_lockowner() finds
that the lock owner doesn't exist, it returns success.

The other case shows an so_count of '2' and precisely one state listed
in so_stateid.  It appears that the Linux client uses a separate lock
owner for each file resulting in one lock state per lock owner, so this
test on '2' is safe.  For another client it might not be safe.

So this patch changes check_for_locks() to use the (newish)
find_any_file_locked() so that it doesn't take a reference on the
nfs4_file and so never calls nfsd_file_put(), and so never sleeps.  With
this check is it safe to restore the use of check_for_locks() rather
than testing so_count against the mysterious '2'.

The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2024-26629 to this issue.


Affected and fixed versions
===========================

	Issue introduced in 5.19 with commit ce3c4ad7f4ce and fixed in 6.1.79 with commit e4cf8941664c
	Issue introduced in 5.19 with commit ce3c4ad7f4ce and fixed in 6.6.15 with commit b7d2eee1f538
	Issue introduced in 5.19 with commit ce3c4ad7f4ce and fixed in 6.7.3 with commit 8f5b860de870
	Issue introduced in 5.19 with commit ce3c4ad7f4ce and fixed in 6.8-rc2 with commit edcf9725150e

Please see https://www.kernel.org or a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.

Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions.  The official CVE entry at
	https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2024-26629
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.


Affected files
==============

The file(s) affected by this issue are:
	fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c


Mitigation
==========

The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes.  Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release.  Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all.  If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e4cf8941664cae2f89f0189c29fe2ce8c6be0d03
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b7d2eee1f53899b53f069bba3a59a419fc3d331b
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f5b860de87039b007e84a28a5eefc888154e098
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/edcf9725150e42beeca42d085149f4c88fa97afd

                 reply	other threads:[~2024-03-13 14:02 UTC|newest]

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