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From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
To: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
	Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>,
	Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>,
	Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>,
	Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>,
	Nikolai Merinov <n.merinov@inango-systems.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 23/28] efi: fix a race and a buffer overflow while reading efivars via sysfs
Date: Sun,  8 Mar 2020 09:08:54 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200308080859.21568-24-ardb@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200308080859.21568-1-ardb@kernel.org>

From: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>

There is a race and a buffer overflow corrupting a kernel memory while
reading an efi variable with a size more than 1024 bytes via the older
sysfs method. This happens because accessing struct efi_variable in
efivar_{attr,size,data}_read() and friends is not protected from
a concurrent access leading to a kernel memory corruption and, at best,
to a crash. The race scenario is the following:

CPU0:                                CPU1:
efivar_attr_read()
  var->DataSize = 1024;
  efivar_entry_get(... &var->DataSize)
    down_interruptible(&efivars_lock)
                                     efivar_attr_read() // same efi var
                                       var->DataSize = 1024;
                                       efivar_entry_get(... &var->DataSize)
                                         down_interruptible(&efivars_lock)
    virt_efi_get_variable()
    // returns EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL but
    // var->DataSize is set to a real
    // var size more than 1024 bytes
    up(&efivars_lock)
                                         virt_efi_get_variable()
                                         // called with var->DataSize set
                                         // to a real var size, returns
                                         // successfully and overwrites
                                         // a 1024-bytes kernel buffer
                                         up(&efivars_lock)

This can be reproduced by concurrent reading of an efi variable which size
is more than 1024 bytes:

ts# for cpu in $(seq 0 $(nproc --ignore=1)); do ( taskset -c $cpu \
cat /sys/firmware/efi/vars/KEKDefault*/size & ) ; done

Fix this by using a local variable for a var's data buffer size so it
does not get overwritten.

Fixes: e14ab23dde12b80d ("efivars: efivar_entry API")
Reported-by: Bob Sanders <bob.sanders@hpe.com> and the LTP testsuite
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200305084041.24053-2-vdronov@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c
index d309abca5091..485c592d7990 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c
@@ -83,13 +83,16 @@ static ssize_t
 efivar_attr_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf)
 {
 	struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var;
+	unsigned long size = sizeof(var->Data);
 	char *str = buf;
+	int ret;
 
 	if (!entry || !buf)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	var->DataSize = 1024;
-	if (efivar_entry_get(entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data))
+	ret = efivar_entry_get(entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data);
+	var->DataSize = size;
+	if (ret)
 		return -EIO;
 
 	if (var->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE)
@@ -116,13 +119,16 @@ static ssize_t
 efivar_size_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf)
 {
 	struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var;
+	unsigned long size = sizeof(var->Data);
 	char *str = buf;
+	int ret;
 
 	if (!entry || !buf)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	var->DataSize = 1024;
-	if (efivar_entry_get(entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data))
+	ret = efivar_entry_get(entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data);
+	var->DataSize = size;
+	if (ret)
 		return -EIO;
 
 	str += sprintf(str, "0x%lx\n", var->DataSize);
@@ -133,12 +139,15 @@ static ssize_t
 efivar_data_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf)
 {
 	struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var;
+	unsigned long size = sizeof(var->Data);
+	int ret;
 
 	if (!entry || !buf)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	var->DataSize = 1024;
-	if (efivar_entry_get(entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data))
+	ret = efivar_entry_get(entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data);
+	var->DataSize = size;
+	if (ret)
 		return -EIO;
 
 	memcpy(buf, var->Data, var->DataSize);
@@ -250,14 +259,16 @@ efivar_show_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf)
 {
 	struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var;
 	struct compat_efi_variable *compat;
+	unsigned long datasize = sizeof(var->Data);
 	size_t size;
+	int ret;
 
 	if (!entry || !buf)
 		return 0;
 
-	var->DataSize = 1024;
-	if (efivar_entry_get(entry, &entry->var.Attributes,
-			     &entry->var.DataSize, entry->var.Data))
+	ret = efivar_entry_get(entry, &var->Attributes, &datasize, var->Data);
+	var->DataSize = datasize;
+	if (ret)
 		return -EIO;
 
 	if (in_compat_syscall()) {
-- 
2.17.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-03-08  8:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-03-08  8:08 [GIT PULL 00/28] More EFI fixes for v5.7 Ard Biesheuvel
2020-03-08  8:08 ` [PATCH 01/28] efi/x86: Add TPM related EFI tables to unencrypted mapping checks Ard Biesheuvel
2020-03-08  8:08 ` [PATCH 02/28] efi/x86: Add RNG seed EFI table to unencrypted mapping check Ard Biesheuvel
2020-03-08  8:08 ` [PATCH 03/28] efi: don't shadow i in efi_config_parse_tables() Ard Biesheuvel
2020-03-08  8:08 ` [PATCH 04/28] efi/arm: clean EFI stub exit code from cache instead of avoiding it Ard Biesheuvel
2020-03-08  8:08 ` [PATCH 05/28] efi/arm64: " Ard Biesheuvel
2020-03-08  8:08 ` [PATCH 06/28] efi: mark all EFI runtime services as unsupported on non-EFI boot Ard Biesheuvel
2020-03-08  8:08 ` [PATCH 07/28] MAINTAINERS: adjust EFI entry to removing eboot.c Ard Biesheuvel
2020-03-08  8:08 ` [PATCH 08/28] efi/libstub: add libstub/mem.c to documentation tree Ard Biesheuvel
2020-03-08  8:08 ` [PATCH 09/28] efi/x86: Annotate the LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL_GUID with SYM_DATA Ard Biesheuvel
2020-03-08  8:08 ` [PATCH 10/28] efi/x86: Respect 32-bit ABI in efi32_pe_entry Ard Biesheuvel
2020-03-08  8:08 ` [PATCH 11/28] efi/x86: Make efi32_pe_entry more readable Ard Biesheuvel
2020-03-08  8:08 ` [PATCH 12/28] efi/x86: Avoid using code32_start Ard Biesheuvel
2020-03-08  8:08 ` [PATCH 13/28] x86/boot: Use unsigned comparison for addresses Ard Biesheuvel
2020-03-08  8:08 ` [PATCH 14/28] efi/libstub/x86: deal with exit() boot service returning Ard Biesheuvel
2020-03-08  8:08 ` [PATCH 15/28] x86/boot/compressed/32: Save the output address instead of recalculating it Ard Biesheuvel
2020-03-08  8:08 ` [PATCH 16/28] efi/x86: Decompress at start of PE image load address Ard Biesheuvel
2020-03-08  8:08 ` [PATCH 17/28] efi/x86: Add kernel preferred address to PE header Ard Biesheuvel
2020-03-08  8:08 ` [PATCH 18/28] efi/x86: Remove extra headroom for setup block Ard Biesheuvel
2020-03-08  8:08 ` [PATCH 19/28] efi/x86: Don't relocate the kernel unless necessary Ard Biesheuvel
2020-03-08  8:08 ` [PATCH 20/28] efi/x86: ignore memory attributes table on i386 Ard Biesheuvel
2020-03-08  8:08 ` [PATCH 21/28] efi/x86: preserve %ebx correctly in efi_set_virtual_address_map() Ard Biesheuvel
2020-03-08  8:08 ` [PATCH 22/28] efi/libstub: avoid linking libstub/lib-ksyms.o into vmlinux Ard Biesheuvel
2020-03-08  8:08 ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2020-03-08  8:08 ` [PATCH 24/28] efi: add a sanity check to efivar_store_raw() Ard Biesheuvel
2020-03-08  8:08 ` [PATCH 25/28] efi: fix a mistype in comments mentioning efivar_entry_iter_begin() Ard Biesheuvel
2020-03-08  8:08 ` [PATCH 26/28] efi/libstub/x86: use ULONG_MAX as upper bound for all allocations Ard Biesheuvel
2020-03-08  8:08 ` [PATCH 27/28] efi/x86: Fix cast of image argument Ard Biesheuvel
2020-03-08  8:08 ` [PATCH 28/28] partitions/efi: Fix partition name parsing in GUID partition entry Ard Biesheuvel
2020-03-08  9:00 ` [GIT PULL 00/28] More EFI fixes for v5.7 Ingo Molnar

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