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From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
	platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-efi <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>,
	Andy Shevchenko <andy@infradead.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Add additional efi tables for unencrypted mapping checks
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2020 17:09:12 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAKv+Gu_3=u1S1dgmjMH+0-7GhD+v3YvgQvqEUx7QSDjPMW1HVw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <9b52495a2d8adfc8f2d731a0236c945196143ef4.1582644865.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

On Tue, 25 Feb 2020 at 16:34, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> wrote:
>
> When booting with SME active, EFI tables must be mapped unencrypted since
> they were built by UEFI in unencrypted memory. Update the list of tables
> to be checked during early_memremap() processing to account for new EFI
> tables.
>
> This fixes a bug where an EFI TPM log table has been created by UEFI, but
> it lives in memory that has been marked as usable rather than reserved.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

Thanks Tom

Mind respinning this on top of efi/next?

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi.git/

Thanks,


> ---
>  arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 3 +++
>  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
> index ae923ee8e2b4..eba5038c7a44 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
> @@ -85,6 +85,9 @@ static const unsigned long * const efi_tables[] = {
>  #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_RCI2_TABLE
>         &rci2_table_phys,
>  #endif
> +       &efi.rng_seed,
> +       &efi.tpm_log,
> +       &efi.tpm_final_log,
>  };
>
>  u64 efi_setup;         /* efi setup_data physical address */
> --
> 2.17.1
>

  reply	other threads:[~2020-02-25 16:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-02-25 15:34 [PATCH] x86/efi: Add additional efi tables for unencrypted mapping checks Tom Lendacky
2020-02-25 16:09 ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2020-02-25 17:40   ` Tom Lendacky

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