From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
To: Andrew Scull <ascull@google.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-efi <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>, Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@linux.ibm.com>,
Jim Cadden <jcadden@ibm.com>,
linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] virt: Add sev_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 2021 21:36:46 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b3c65f9d-5fd3-22c5-cd23-481774d92222@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CADcWuH0mP+e6GxkUGN3ni_Yu0z8YTn-mo677obH+p-OFCL+wOQ@mail.gmail.com>
On 19/08/2021 16:02, Andrew Scull wrote:
> On Mon, 16 Aug 2021 at 10:57, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> wrote:
>>
>> On Fri, 13 Aug 2021 at 15:05, Andrew Scull <ascull@google.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Mon, Aug 09, 2021 at 07:01:57PM +0000, Dov Murik wrote:
[...]
>>>
>>>> +static int sev_secret_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
>>>> +{
>>>> + struct sev_secret *s = sev_secret_get();
>>>> + struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
>>>> + struct secret_entry *e = (struct secret_entry *)inode->i_private;
>>>> + int i;
>>>> +
>>>> + if (e) {
>>>> + /* Zero out the secret data */
>>>> + memzero_explicit(e->data, secret_entry_data_len(e));
>>>
>>> Would there be a benefit in flushing these zeros?
>>>
>>
>> Do you mean cache clean+invalidate? Better to be precise here.
>
> At least a clean, to have the zeros written back to memory from the
> cache, in order to overwrite the secret.
>
I agree, but not sure how to implement this:
I see there's an arch_wb_cache_pmem exported function which internally
(in arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c) calls clean_cache_range which seems to
do what we want (assume the secret can be longer than the cache line).
But arch_wb_cache_pmem is declared in include/linux/libnvdimm.h and
guarded with #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PMEM_API -- both seem not related to
what I'm trying to do.
I see there's an exported clflush_cache_range for x86 -- but that's a
clean+flush if I understand correctly.
Suggestions on how to approach? I can copy the clean_cache_range
implementation into the sev_secret module but hopefully there's a better
way to reuse. Maybe export clean_cache_range in x86?
Since this is for SEV the solution can be x86-specific, but if there's a
generic way I guess it's better (I think all of sev_secret module
doesn't have x86-specific stuff).
-Dov
>>
>>>> + e->guid = NULL_GUID;
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> + inode->i_private = NULL;
>>>> +
>>>> + for (i = 0; i < SEV_SECRET_NUM_FILES; i++)
>>>> + if (s->fs_files[i] == dentry)
>>>> + s->fs_files[i] = NULL;
>>>> +
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * securityfs_remove tries to lock the directory's inode, but we reach
>>>> + * the unlink callback when it's already locked
>>>> + */
>>>> + inode_unlock(dir);
>>>> + securityfs_remove(dentry);
>>>> + inode_lock(dir);
>>>> +
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> +}
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-08-20 18:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-08-09 19:01 [PATCH 0/3] Allow access to confidential computing secret area in SEV guests Dov Murik
2021-08-09 19:01 ` [PATCH 1/3] efi/libstub: Copy confidential computing secret area Dov Murik
2021-08-09 19:01 ` [PATCH 2/3] efi: Reserve " Dov Murik
2021-08-09 19:01 ` [PATCH 3/3] virt: Add sev_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets Dov Murik
2021-08-13 13:05 ` Andrew Scull
2021-08-16 9:56 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2021-08-19 13:02 ` Andrew Scull
2021-08-20 18:36 ` Dov Murik [this message]
2021-08-23 19:21 ` Andrew Scull
2021-09-02 12:59 ` Greg KH
2021-09-02 18:14 ` Dov Murik
2021-09-02 12:57 ` [PATCH 0/3] Allow access to confidential computing secret area in SEV guests Greg KH
2021-09-02 14:35 ` James Bottomley
2021-09-02 15:05 ` Greg KH
2021-09-02 15:19 ` James Bottomley
2021-09-02 16:09 ` Greg KH
2021-09-02 16:19 ` James Bottomley
2021-09-02 16:31 ` Greg KH
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