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From: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
To: linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: Barani Muthukumaran <bmuthuku@qti.qualcomm.com>,
	Kuohong Wang <kuohong.wang@mediatek.com>,
	Kim Boojin <boojin.kim@samsung.com>,
	Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v6 2/9] block: Add encryption context to struct bio
Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2019 06:51:29 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191218145136.172774-3-satyat@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191218145136.172774-1-satyat@google.com>

We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what
encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However,
it's the filesystem/fscrypt that knows about and manages encryption
contexts. As such, when the filesystem layer submits a bio to the block
layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for
inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the
encryption context for that bio.

We want to communicate the encryption context from the filesystem layer
to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the
block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which
can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private
field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass
information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various
functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging
logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx.

Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
---
 block/Makefile                |   2 +-
 block/bio-crypt-ctx.c         | 131 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 block/bio.c                   |  16 ++--
 block/blk-core.c              |   3 +
 block/blk-merge.c             |  11 +++
 block/bounce.c                |  12 ++-
 drivers/md/dm.c               |   3 +-
 include/linux/bio-crypt-ctx.h | 146 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 include/linux/blk_types.h     |   6 ++
 9 files changed, 312 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 block/bio-crypt-ctx.c

diff --git a/block/Makefile b/block/Makefile
index 7c603669f216..79f2b8b3fc5d 100644
--- a/block/Makefile
+++ b/block/Makefile
@@ -37,4 +37,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_BLK_DEBUG_FS)	+= blk-mq-debugfs.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_BLK_DEBUG_FS_ZONED)+= blk-mq-debugfs-zoned.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_BLK_SED_OPAL)	+= sed-opal.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_BLK_PM)		+= blk-pm.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION)	+= keyslot-manager.o
\ No newline at end of file
+obj-$(CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION)	+= keyslot-manager.o bio-crypt-ctx.o
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/block/bio-crypt-ctx.c b/block/bio-crypt-ctx.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..dadf0da3c21b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/block/bio-crypt-ctx.c
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright 2019 Google LLC
+ */
+
+#include <linux/bio.h>
+#include <linux/blkdev.h>
+#include <linux/keyslot-manager.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+
+static int num_prealloc_crypt_ctxs = 128;
+
+module_param(num_prealloc_crypt_ctxs, int, 0444);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(num_prealloc_crypt_ctxs,
+		"Number of bio crypto contexts to preallocate");
+
+static struct kmem_cache *bio_crypt_ctx_cache;
+static mempool_t *bio_crypt_ctx_pool;
+
+int __init bio_crypt_ctx_init(void)
+{
+	bio_crypt_ctx_cache = KMEM_CACHE(bio_crypt_ctx, 0);
+	if (!bio_crypt_ctx_cache)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	bio_crypt_ctx_pool = mempool_create_slab_pool(num_prealloc_crypt_ctxs,
+						      bio_crypt_ctx_cache);
+	if (!bio_crypt_ctx_pool)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* This is assumed in various places. */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID != 0);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct bio_crypt_ctx *bio_crypt_alloc_ctx(gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+	return mempool_alloc(bio_crypt_ctx_pool, gfp_mask);
+}
+
+void bio_crypt_free_ctx(struct bio *bio)
+{
+	mempool_free(bio->bi_crypt_context, bio_crypt_ctx_pool);
+	bio->bi_crypt_context = NULL;
+}
+
+void bio_crypt_clone(struct bio *dst, struct bio *src, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+	const struct bio_crypt_ctx *src_bc = src->bi_crypt_context;
+
+	/*
+	 * If a bio is swhandled, then it will be decrypted when bio_endio
+	 * is called. As we only want the data to be decrypted once, copies
+	 * of the bio must not have have a crypt context.
+	 */
+	if (!src_bc)
+		return;
+
+	dst->bi_crypt_context = bio_crypt_alloc_ctx(gfp_mask);
+	*dst->bi_crypt_context = *src_bc;
+
+	if (src_bc->bc_keyslot >= 0)
+		keyslot_manager_get_slot(src_bc->bc_ksm, src_bc->bc_keyslot);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bio_crypt_clone);
+
+bool bio_crypt_should_process(struct request *rq)
+{
+	struct bio *bio = rq->bio;
+
+	if (!bio || !bio->bi_crypt_context)
+		return false;
+
+	return rq->q->ksm == bio->bi_crypt_context->bc_ksm;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bio_crypt_should_process);
+
+/*
+ * Checks that two bio crypt contexts are compatible - i.e. that
+ * they are mergeable except for data_unit_num continuity.
+ */
+bool bio_crypt_ctx_compatible(struct bio *b_1, struct bio *b_2)
+{
+	struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc1 = b_1->bi_crypt_context;
+	struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc2 = b_2->bi_crypt_context;
+
+	if (bc1 != bc2)
+		return false;
+
+	return !bc1 || bc1->bc_key == bc2->bc_key;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks that two bio crypt contexts are compatible, and also
+ * that their data_unit_nums are continuous (and can hence be merged)
+ * in the order b_1 followed by b_2.
+ */
+bool bio_crypt_ctx_mergeable(struct bio *b_1, unsigned int b1_bytes,
+			     struct bio *b_2)
+{
+	struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc1 = b_1->bi_crypt_context;
+	struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc2 = b_2->bi_crypt_context;
+
+	if (!bio_crypt_ctx_compatible(b_1, b_2))
+		return false;
+
+	return !bc1 || bio_crypt_dun_is_contiguous(bc1, b1_bytes, bc2->bc_dun);
+}
+
+void bio_crypt_ctx_release_keyslot(struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc)
+{
+	keyslot_manager_put_slot(bc->bc_ksm, bc->bc_keyslot);
+	bc->bc_ksm = NULL;
+	bc->bc_keyslot = -1;
+}
+
+int bio_crypt_ctx_acquire_keyslot(struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc,
+				  struct keyslot_manager *ksm)
+{
+	int slot = keyslot_manager_get_slot_for_key(ksm, bc->bc_key);
+
+	if (slot < 0)
+		return slot;
+
+	bc->bc_keyslot = slot;
+	bc->bc_ksm = ksm;
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/block/bio.c b/block/bio.c
index a5d75f6bf4c7..c99e054d56ef 100644
--- a/block/bio.c
+++ b/block/bio.c
@@ -236,6 +236,8 @@ void bio_uninit(struct bio *bio)
 
 	if (bio_integrity(bio))
 		bio_integrity_free(bio);
+
+	bio_crypt_free_ctx(bio);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(bio_uninit);
 
@@ -615,15 +617,12 @@ struct bio *bio_clone_fast(struct bio *bio, gfp_t gfp_mask, struct bio_set *bs)
 
 	__bio_clone_fast(b, bio);
 
-	if (bio_integrity(bio)) {
-		int ret;
-
-		ret = bio_integrity_clone(b, bio, gfp_mask);
+	bio_crypt_clone(b, bio, gfp_mask);
 
-		if (ret < 0) {
-			bio_put(b);
-			return NULL;
-		}
+	if (bio_integrity(bio) &&
+	    bio_integrity_clone(b, bio, gfp_mask) < 0) {
+		bio_put(b);
+		return NULL;
 	}
 
 	return b;
@@ -997,6 +996,7 @@ void bio_advance(struct bio *bio, unsigned bytes)
 	if (bio_integrity(bio))
 		bio_integrity_advance(bio, bytes);
 
+	bio_crypt_advance(bio, bytes);
 	bio_advance_iter(bio, &bio->bi_iter, bytes);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(bio_advance);
diff --git a/block/blk-core.c b/block/blk-core.c
index e0a094fddee5..5200f4d1fed4 100644
--- a/block/blk-core.c
+++ b/block/blk-core.c
@@ -1810,5 +1810,8 @@ int __init blk_dev_init(void)
 	blk_debugfs_root = debugfs_create_dir("block", NULL);
 #endif
 
+	if (bio_crypt_ctx_init() < 0)
+		panic("Failed to allocate mem for bio crypt ctxs\n");
+
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/block/blk-merge.c b/block/blk-merge.c
index d783bdc4559b..5e53aad97da9 100644
--- a/block/blk-merge.c
+++ b/block/blk-merge.c
@@ -596,6 +596,8 @@ int ll_back_merge_fn(struct request *req, struct bio *bio, unsigned int nr_segs)
 		req_set_nomerge(req->q, req);
 		return 0;
 	}
+	if (!bio_crypt_ctx_mergeable(req->bio, blk_rq_bytes(req), bio))
+		return 0;
 
 	return ll_new_hw_segment(req, bio, nr_segs);
 }
@@ -612,6 +614,8 @@ int ll_front_merge_fn(struct request *req, struct bio *bio, unsigned int nr_segs
 		req_set_nomerge(req->q, req);
 		return 0;
 	}
+	if (!bio_crypt_ctx_mergeable(bio, bio->bi_iter.bi_size, req->bio))
+		return 0;
 
 	return ll_new_hw_segment(req, bio, nr_segs);
 }
@@ -656,6 +660,9 @@ static int ll_merge_requests_fn(struct request_queue *q, struct request *req,
 	if (blk_integrity_merge_rq(q, req, next) == false)
 		return 0;
 
+	if (!bio_crypt_ctx_mergeable(req->bio, blk_rq_bytes(req), next->bio))
+		return 0;
+
 	/* Merge is OK... */
 	req->nr_phys_segments = total_phys_segments;
 	return 1;
@@ -895,6 +902,10 @@ bool blk_rq_merge_ok(struct request *rq, struct bio *bio)
 	if (rq->ioprio != bio_prio(bio))
 		return false;
 
+	/* Only merge if the crypt contexts are compatible */
+	if (!bio_crypt_ctx_compatible(bio, rq->bio))
+		return false;
+
 	return true;
 }
 
diff --git a/block/bounce.c b/block/bounce.c
index f8ed677a1bf7..aa57ccc6ced3 100644
--- a/block/bounce.c
+++ b/block/bounce.c
@@ -267,14 +267,12 @@ static struct bio *bounce_clone_bio(struct bio *bio_src, gfp_t gfp_mask,
 		break;
 	}
 
-	if (bio_integrity(bio_src)) {
-		int ret;
+	bio_crypt_clone(bio, bio_src, gfp_mask);
 
-		ret = bio_integrity_clone(bio, bio_src, gfp_mask);
-		if (ret < 0) {
-			bio_put(bio);
-			return NULL;
-		}
+	if (bio_integrity(bio_src) &&
+	    bio_integrity_clone(bio, bio_src, gfp_mask) < 0) {
+		bio_put(bio);
+		return NULL;
 	}
 
 	bio_clone_blkg_association(bio, bio_src);
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm.c b/drivers/md/dm.c
index e8f9661a10a1..783e0d5fd130 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm.c
@@ -1304,9 +1304,10 @@ static int clone_bio(struct dm_target_io *tio, struct bio *bio,
 
 	__bio_clone_fast(clone, bio);
 
+	bio_crypt_clone(clone, bio, GFP_NOIO);
+
 	if (bio_integrity(bio)) {
 		int r;
-
 		if (unlikely(!dm_target_has_integrity(tio->ti->type) &&
 			     !dm_target_passes_integrity(tio->ti->type))) {
 			DMWARN("%s: the target %s doesn't support integrity data.",
diff --git a/include/linux/bio-crypt-ctx.h b/include/linux/bio-crypt-ctx.h
index dd4ac9d95428..4535df0a6349 100644
--- a/include/linux/bio-crypt-ctx.h
+++ b/include/linux/bio-crypt-ctx.h
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 enum blk_crypto_mode_num {
 	BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID,
 	BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS,
-	BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CBC,
+	BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CBC_ESSIV,
 	BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_ADIANTUM,
 	BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_MAX,
 };
@@ -44,6 +44,150 @@ struct blk_crypto_key {
 	u8 raw[BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
 };
 
+#define BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_IV_SIZE		32
+#define BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE	(BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_IV_SIZE/sizeof(u64))
+
+/**
+ * struct bio_crypt_ctx - an inline encryption context
+ * @bc_key: the key, algorithm, and data unit size to use
+ * @bc_keyslot: the keyslot that has been assigned for this key in @bc_ksm,
+ *		or -1 if no keyslot has been assigned yet.
+ * @bc_dun: the data unit number (starting IV) to use
+ * @bc_ksm: the keyslot manager into which the key has been programmed with
+ *	    @bc_keyslot, or NULL if this key hasn't yet been programmed.
+ *
+ * A bio_crypt_ctx specifies that the contents of the bio will be encrypted (for
+ * write requests) or decrypted (for read requests) inline by the storage device
+ * or controller, or by the crypto API fallback.
+ */
+struct bio_crypt_ctx {
+	const struct blk_crypto_key	*bc_key;
+	int				bc_keyslot;
+
+	/* Data unit number */
+	u64				bc_dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE];
+
+	/*
+	 * The keyslot manager where the key has been programmed
+	 * with keyslot.
+	 */
+	struct keyslot_manager		*bc_ksm;
+};
+
+int bio_crypt_ctx_init(void);
+
+struct bio_crypt_ctx *bio_crypt_alloc_ctx(gfp_t gfp_mask);
+
+void bio_crypt_free_ctx(struct bio *bio);
+
+static inline bool bio_has_crypt_ctx(struct bio *bio)
+{
+	return bio->bi_crypt_context;
+}
+
+void bio_crypt_clone(struct bio *dst, struct bio *src, gfp_t gfp_mask);
+
+static inline void bio_crypt_set_ctx(struct bio *bio,
+				     const struct blk_crypto_key *key,
+				     u64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE],
+				     gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+	struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc = bio_crypt_alloc_ctx(gfp_mask);
+
+	bc->bc_key = key;
+	memcpy(bc->bc_dun, dun, sizeof(bc->bc_dun));
+	bc->bc_ksm = NULL;
+	bc->bc_keyslot = -1;
+
+	bio->bi_crypt_context = bc;
+}
+
+void bio_crypt_ctx_release_keyslot(struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc);
+
+int bio_crypt_ctx_acquire_keyslot(struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc,
+				  struct keyslot_manager *ksm);
+
+struct request;
+bool bio_crypt_should_process(struct request *rq);
+
+static inline bool bio_crypt_dun_is_contiguous(const struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc,
+					       unsigned int bytes,
+					u64 next_dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE])
+{
+	int i = 0;
+	unsigned int inc = bytes >> bc->bc_key->data_unit_size_bits;
+
+	while (inc && i < BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE) {
+		if (bc->bc_dun[i] + inc != next_dun[i])
+			return false;
+		inc = ((bc->bc_dun[i] + inc)  < inc);
+		i++;
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+
+static inline void bio_crypt_dun_increment(u64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE],
+					   unsigned int inc)
+{
+	int i = 0;
+
+	while (inc && i < BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE) {
+		dun[i] += inc;
+		inc = (dun[i] < inc);
+		i++;
+	}
+}
+
+static inline void bio_crypt_advance(struct bio *bio, unsigned int bytes)
+{
+	struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc = bio->bi_crypt_context;
+
+	if (!bc)
+		return;
+
+	bio_crypt_dun_increment(bc->bc_dun,
+				bytes >> bc->bc_key->data_unit_size_bits);
+}
+
+bool bio_crypt_ctx_compatible(struct bio *b_1, struct bio *b_2);
+
+bool bio_crypt_ctx_mergeable(struct bio *b_1, unsigned int b1_bytes,
+			     struct bio *b_2);
+
+#else /* CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION */
+static inline int bio_crypt_ctx_init(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline bool bio_has_crypt_ctx(struct bio *bio)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+
+static inline void bio_crypt_clone(struct bio *dst, struct bio *src,
+				   gfp_t gfp_mask) { }
+
+static inline void bio_crypt_free_ctx(struct bio *bio) { }
+
+static inline void bio_crypt_advance(struct bio *bio, unsigned int bytes) { }
+
+static inline bool bio_crypt_ctx_compatible(struct bio *b_1, struct bio *b_2)
+{
+	return true;
+}
+
+static inline bool bio_crypt_ctx_mergeable(struct bio *b_1,
+					   unsigned int b1_bytes,
+					   struct bio *b_2)
+{
+	return true;
+}
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION */
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_BLOCK */
+
 #endif /* __LINUX_BIO_CRYPT_CTX_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/blk_types.h b/include/linux/blk_types.h
index 70254ae11769..1996689c51d3 100644
--- a/include/linux/blk_types.h
+++ b/include/linux/blk_types.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ struct block_device;
 struct io_context;
 struct cgroup_subsys_state;
 typedef void (bio_end_io_t) (struct bio *);
+struct bio_crypt_ctx;
 
 /*
  * Block error status values.  See block/blk-core:blk_errors for the details.
@@ -173,6 +174,11 @@ struct bio {
 	u64			bi_iocost_cost;
 #endif
 #endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION
+	struct bio_crypt_ctx	*bi_crypt_context;
+#endif
+
 	union {
 #if defined(CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INTEGRITY)
 		struct bio_integrity_payload *bi_integrity; /* data integrity */
-- 
2.24.1.735.g03f4e72817-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-12-18 14:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-12-18 14:51 [PATCH v6 0/9] Inline Encryption Support Satya Tangirala
2019-12-18 14:51 ` [PATCH v6 1/9] block: Keyslot Manager for Inline Encryption Satya Tangirala
2019-12-18 20:13   ` Eric Biggers
2020-01-17  9:10   ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-12-18 14:51 ` Satya Tangirala [this message]
2019-12-18 21:10   ` [PATCH v6 2/9] block: Add encryption context to struct bio Eric Biggers
2019-12-18 21:21   ` Darrick J. Wong
2019-12-18 21:25     ` Martin K. Petersen
2019-12-18 22:27       ` Eric Biggers
2019-12-19  0:47         ` Martin K. Petersen
2019-12-20  3:52           ` Eric Biggers
2020-01-07  4:35             ` Martin K. Petersen
2020-01-08 14:07           ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-01-08 17:26             ` Eric Biggers
2020-01-17  8:32               ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-01-18  5:11                 ` Eric Biggers
2020-01-21 22:05                   ` Satya Tangirala
2020-01-09  3:40             ` Martin K. Petersen
2020-01-14 21:24   ` Eric Biggers
2019-12-18 14:51 ` [PATCH v6 3/9] block: blk-crypto for Inline Encryption Satya Tangirala
2019-12-20  3:14   ` Eric Biggers
2019-12-20  5:10   ` Eric Biggers
2020-01-14 21:22   ` Eric Biggers
2019-12-18 14:51 ` [PATCH v6 4/9] scsi: ufs: UFS driver v2.1 spec crypto additions Satya Tangirala
2020-01-17 12:31   ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-12-18 14:51 ` [PATCH v6 5/9] scsi: ufs: UFS crypto API Satya Tangirala
2019-12-20  4:48   ` Eric Biggers
2020-01-14 21:16     ` Eric Biggers
2020-01-17 13:51   ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-12-18 14:51 ` [PATCH v6 6/9] scsi: ufs: Add inline encryption support to UFS Satya Tangirala
2019-12-20  5:44   ` Eric Biggers
2020-01-17 13:58   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-01-18  5:27     ` Eric Biggers
2020-02-05 18:07       ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-01-18  3:58   ` Eric Biggers
2020-02-05 20:47   ` Eric Biggers
2019-12-18 14:51 ` [PATCH v6 7/9] fscrypt: add inline encryption support Satya Tangirala
2020-01-14 21:12   ` Eric Biggers
2019-12-18 14:51 ` [PATCH v6 8/9] f2fs: " Satya Tangirala
2019-12-20  4:23   ` Eric Biggers
2019-12-18 14:51 ` [PATCH v6 9/9] ext4: " Satya Tangirala
2019-12-19  0:12   ` Eric Biggers
2019-12-19  0:31     ` Satya Tangirala
2019-12-22  0:16   ` Eric Biggers
2020-01-08 14:05 ` [PATCH v6 0/9] Inline Encryption Support Christoph Hellwig
2020-01-08 18:43   ` Satya Tangirala
2020-01-17  8:52     ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-02-01  0:53       ` Satya Tangirala
2020-02-03  9:15         ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-02-04  3:39           ` Satya Tangirala
2020-02-04 14:58             ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-02-04 21:21               ` Eric Biggers
2020-02-05  7:36                 ` Eric Biggers
2020-02-05 18:05                   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-02-21 12:30                     ` Satya Tangirala
2020-02-21 14:20                       ` Christoph Hellwig

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