From: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>,
Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>,
Mike Anderson <andmike@linux.ibm.com>,
Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>,
Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] fs/core/vmcore: Move sev_active() reference to x86 arch code
Date: Sat, 13 Jul 2019 01:45:54 -0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190713044554.28719-4-bauerman@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190713044554.28719-1-bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Secure Encrypted Virtualization is an x86-specific feature, so it shouldn't
appear in generic kernel code because it forces non-x86 architectures to
define the sev_active() function, which doesn't make a lot of sense.
To solve this problem, add an x86 elfcorehdr_read() function to override
the generic weak implementation. To do that, it's necessary to make
read_from_oldmem() public so that it can be used outside of vmcore.c.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c | 5 +++++
fs/proc/vmcore.c | 8 ++++----
include/linux/crash_dump.h | 14 ++++++++++++++
include/linux/mem_encrypt.h | 1 -
4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c
index 22369dd5de3b..045e82e8945b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c
@@ -70,3 +70,8 @@ ssize_t copy_oldmem_page_encrypted(unsigned long pfn, char *buf, size_t csize,
{
return __copy_oldmem_page(pfn, buf, csize, offset, userbuf, true);
}
+
+ssize_t elfcorehdr_read(char *buf, size_t count, u64 *ppos)
+{
+ return read_from_oldmem(buf, count, ppos, 0, sev_active());
+}
diff --git a/fs/proc/vmcore.c b/fs/proc/vmcore.c
index 57957c91c6df..ca1f20bedd8c 100644
--- a/fs/proc/vmcore.c
+++ b/fs/proc/vmcore.c
@@ -100,9 +100,9 @@ static int pfn_is_ram(unsigned long pfn)
}
/* Reads a page from the oldmem device from given offset. */
-static ssize_t read_from_oldmem(char *buf, size_t count,
- u64 *ppos, int userbuf,
- bool encrypted)
+ssize_t read_from_oldmem(char *buf, size_t count,
+ u64 *ppos, int userbuf,
+ bool encrypted)
{
unsigned long pfn, offset;
size_t nr_bytes;
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ void __weak elfcorehdr_free(unsigned long long addr)
*/
ssize_t __weak elfcorehdr_read(char *buf, size_t count, u64 *ppos)
{
- return read_from_oldmem(buf, count, ppos, 0, sev_active());
+ return read_from_oldmem(buf, count, ppos, 0, false);
}
/*
diff --git a/include/linux/crash_dump.h b/include/linux/crash_dump.h
index f774c5eb9e3c..4664fc1871de 100644
--- a/include/linux/crash_dump.h
+++ b/include/linux/crash_dump.h
@@ -115,4 +115,18 @@ static inline int vmcore_add_device_dump(struct vmcoredd_data *data)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_PROC_VMCORE_DEVICE_DUMP */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_VMCORE
+ssize_t read_from_oldmem(char *buf, size_t count,
+ u64 *ppos, int userbuf,
+ bool encrypted);
+#else
+static inline ssize_t read_from_oldmem(char *buf, size_t count,
+ u64 *ppos, int userbuf,
+ bool encrypted)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_PROC_VMCORE */
+
#endif /* LINUX_CRASHDUMP_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h b/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h
index 0c5b0ff9eb29..5c4a18a91f89 100644
--- a/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@
#else /* !CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT */
static inline bool mem_encrypt_active(void) { return false; }
-static inline bool sev_active(void) { return false; }
#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT */
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-07-13 4:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-07-13 4:45 [PATCH 0/3] Remove x86-specific code from generic headers Thiago Jung Bauermann
2019-07-13 4:45 ` [PATCH 1/3] x86,s390: Move ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT definition to arch/Kconfig Thiago Jung Bauermann
2019-07-13 7:27 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-07-15 15:23 ` [PATCH 1/3] x86, s390: " janani
2019-07-15 20:00 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2019-07-13 4:45 ` [PATCH 2/3] DMA mapping: Move SME handling to x86-specific files Thiago Jung Bauermann
2019-07-13 7:29 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-07-13 4:45 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann [this message]
2019-07-13 5:08 ` [PATCH 0/3] Remove x86-specific code from generic headers Thiago Jung Bauermann
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2019-07-12 5:36 Thiago Jung Bauermann
2019-07-12 5:36 ` [PATCH 3/3] fs/core/vmcore: Move sev_active() reference to x86 arch code Thiago Jung Bauermann
2019-07-12 13:09 ` Halil Pasic
2019-07-12 14:08 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-07-12 14:51 ` Halil Pasic
2019-07-12 15:11 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-07-12 15:42 ` Halil Pasic
2019-07-13 8:08 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-07-12 21:55 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2019-07-15 14:03 ` Halil Pasic
2019-07-15 14:30 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-07-15 15:44 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2019-07-15 20:14 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20190713044554.28719-4-bauerman@linux.ibm.com \
--to=bauerman@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com \
--cc=adobriyan@gmail.com \
--cc=andmike@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=hch@lst.de \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org \
--cc=konrad.wilk@oracle.com \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-s390@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org \
--cc=linuxram@us.ibm.com \
--cc=m.szyprowski@samsung.com \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=pasic@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=robin.murphy@arm.com \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).