From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
To: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH] fanotify: introduce filesystem view mark
Date: Wed, 12 May 2021 15:34:15 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210512133415.GC2734@quack2.suse.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210512130705.cywde7v4z7ywjrag@wittgenstein>
On Wed 12-05-21 15:07:05, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Mon, May 10, 2021 at 06:08:31PM +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote:
> > > > > OK, so this feature would effectively allow sb-wide watching of events that
> > > > > are generated from within the container (or its descendants). That sounds
> > > > > useful. Just one question: If there's some part of a filesystem, that is
> > > > > accesible by multiple containers (and thus multiple namespaces), or if
> > > > > there's some change done to the filesystem say by container management SW,
> > > > > then event for this change won't be visible inside the container (despite
> > > > > that the fs change itself will be visible).
> > > >
> > > > That is correct.
> > > > FYI, a privileged user can already mount an overlayfs in order to indirectly
> > > > open and write to a file.
> > > >
> > > > Because overlayfs opens the underlying file FMODE_NONOTIFY this will
> > > > hide OPEN/ACCESS/MODIFY/CLOSE events also for inode/sb marks.
> > > > Since 459c7c565ac3 ("ovl: unprivieged mounts"), so can unprivileged users.
> > > >
> > > > I wonder if that is a problem that we need to fix...
> > >
> > > I assume you are speaking of the filesystem that is absorbing the changes?
> > > AFAIU usually you are not supposed to access that filesystem alone but
> > > always access it only through overlayfs and in that case you won't see the
> > > problem?
> > >
> >
> > Yes I am talking about the "backend" store for overlayfs.
> > Normally, that would be a subtree where changes are not expected
> > except through overlayfs and indeed it is documented that:
> > "If the underlying filesystem is changed, the behavior of the overlay
> > is undefined, though it will not result in a crash or deadlock."
> > Not reporting events falls well under "undefined".
> >
> > But that is not the problem.
> > The problem is that if user A is watching a directory D for changes, then
> > an adversary user B which has read/write access to D can:
> > - Clone a userns wherein user B id is 0
> > - Mount a private overlayfs instance using D as upperdir
> > - Open file in D indirectly via private overlayfs and edit it
> >
> > So it does not require any special privileges to circumvent generating
> > events. Unless I am missing something.
>
> No, I think you're right. That should work. I don't think that's
> necessarily a problem though. It's a bit unexpected and slightly
> unpleasant but it's documented already and it's not a security issue
> afaict.
fanotify(7) is used in applications (such as virus scanners or anti-malware
products) where they expect to see all filesystem changes. There are
products which implement access mediation policy based on fanotify
permission events. So a way for unpriviledged application to escape
notification is a "security" issue (not a kernel one but it defeats
protections userspace implements).
Honza
--
Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
SUSE Labs, CR
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-05-12 13:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-11-09 18:00 [RFC][PATCH] fanotify: introduce filesystem view mark Amir Goldstein
2020-11-10 5:07 ` Amir Goldstein
2020-11-17 7:09 ` [fanotify] a23a7dc576: unixbench.score -3.7% regression kernel test robot
2020-11-24 13:49 ` [RFC][PATCH] fanotify: introduce filesystem view mark Jan Kara
2020-11-24 14:47 ` Amir Goldstein
2020-11-25 11:01 ` Jan Kara
2020-11-25 12:34 ` Amir Goldstein
2020-11-26 11:10 ` Jan Kara
2020-11-26 11:50 ` Amir Goldstein
2020-11-26 3:42 ` Amir Goldstein
2020-11-26 11:17 ` Jan Kara
2021-04-28 18:28 ` Amir Goldstein
2021-05-03 16:53 ` Jan Kara
2021-05-03 18:44 ` Amir Goldstein
2021-05-05 12:28 ` Jan Kara
2021-05-05 14:24 ` Christian Brauner
2021-05-05 14:42 ` Amir Goldstein
2021-05-05 14:56 ` Christian Brauner
2021-05-10 10:13 ` Jan Kara
2021-05-10 11:37 ` Amir Goldstein
2021-05-10 14:21 ` Jan Kara
2021-05-10 15:08 ` Amir Goldstein
2021-05-10 15:27 ` Jan Kara
2021-05-12 13:07 ` Christian Brauner
2021-05-12 13:34 ` Jan Kara [this message]
2021-05-12 16:15 ` Christian Brauner
2021-05-12 15:26 ` Christian Brauner
2021-05-13 10:55 ` Jan Kara
2021-05-14 13:56 ` Christian Brauner
2021-05-15 14:28 ` Amir Goldstein
2021-05-17 9:09 ` Jan Kara
2021-05-17 12:45 ` Amir Goldstein
2021-05-17 13:07 ` Jan Kara
2021-05-18 10:11 ` Christian Brauner
2021-05-18 16:02 ` Amir Goldstein
2021-05-19 9:31 ` Christian Brauner
2021-05-12 16:11 ` Christian Brauner
2021-05-05 13:25 ` Christian Brauner
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