From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-lf0-f66.google.com ([209.85.215.66]:37842 "EHLO mail-lf0-f66.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752586AbeDSAqr (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Apr 2018 20:46:47 -0400 Received: by mail-lf0-f66.google.com with SMTP id b23-v6so5242424lfg.4 for ; Wed, 18 Apr 2018 17:46:47 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <32d3e7a6-36f0-571a-bb91-67f746c7eafa@schaufler-ca.com> References: <32d3e7a6-36f0-571a-bb91-67f746c7eafa@schaufler-ca.com> From: Paul Moore Date: Wed, 18 Apr 2018 20:46:45 -0400 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH ghak32 V2 01/13] audit: add container id To: Casey Schaufler Cc: Richard Guy Briggs , cgroups@vger.kernel.org, containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Linux-Audit Mailing List , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, LKML , netdev@vger.kernel.org, ebiederm@xmission.com, luto@kernel.org, jlayton@redhat.com, carlos@redhat.com, dhowells@redhat.com, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, simo@redhat.com, Eric Paris , serge@hallyn.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-fsdevel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On Wed, Apr 18, 2018 at 8:41 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote: > On 4/18/2018 4:47 PM, Paul Moore wrote: >> On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 5:00 AM, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: >>> Implement the proc fs write to set the audit container ID of a process, >>> emitting an AUDIT_CONTAINER record to document the event. >>> ... >>> >>> diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h >>> index d258826..1b82191 100644 >>> --- a/include/linux/sched.h >>> +++ b/include/linux/sched.h >>> @@ -796,6 +796,7 @@ struct task_struct { >>> #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL >>> kuid_t loginuid; >>> unsigned int sessionid; >>> + u64 containerid; >> This one line addition to the task_struct scares me the most of >> anything in this patchset. Why? It's a field named "containerid" in >> a perhaps one of the most widely used core kernel structures; the >> possibilities for abuse are endless, and it's foolish to think we >> would ever be able to adequately police this. > > If we can get the LSM infrastructure managed task blobs from > module stacking in ahead of this we could create a trivial security > module to manage this. It's not as if there aren't all sorts of > interactions between security modules and the audit system already. While yes, there are plenty of interactions between the two, it is possible to use audit without the LSMs and I would like to preserve that. Further, I don't want to entangle two very complicated code changes or make the audit container ID effort dependent on LSM stacking. You're a good salesman Casey, but you're not that good ;) -- paul moore www.paul-moore.com