From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: cyphar@cyphar.com, "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
jlayton@kernel.org, Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
shuah@kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
christian@brauner.io, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, dev@opencontainers.org,
containers@lists.linux-foundation.org,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] namei: implement AT_THIS_ROOT chroot-like path resolution
Date: Sat, 29 Sep 2018 10:25:17 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <F0E08B90-F10B-4897-913D-CA18E99A987D@amacapital.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAG48ez30WJhbsro2HOc_DR7V91M+hNFzBP5ogRMZaxbAORvqzg@mail.gmail.com>
> On Sep 29, 2018, at 9:35 AM, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> wrote:
>
> +cc linux-api; please keep them in CC for future versions of the patch
>
>> On Sat, Sep 29, 2018 at 4:29 PM Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> wrote:
>> The primary motivation for the need for this flag is container runtimes
>> which have to interact with malicious root filesystems in the host
>> namespaces. One of the first requirements for a container runtime to be
>> secure against a malicious rootfs is that they correctly scope symlinks
>> (that is, they should be scoped as though they are chroot(2)ed into the
>> container's rootfs) and ".."-style paths. The already-existing AT_XDEV
>> and AT_NO_PROCLINKS help defend against other potential attacks in a
>> malicious rootfs scenario.
>
> So, I really like the concept for patch 1 of this series (but haven't
> read the code yet); but I dislike this patch because of its footgun
> potential.
>
The code could do it differently: do the path walk and then, before accepting the result, walk back up and make sure the result is under the starting point.
This is *not* a full solution, though, since a walk above the root gas side effects on timing, various caches, and possibly network traffic, so it’s open to Spectre-like attacks in which a malicious container could use a runtime-initiated AT_THIS_ROOT to infer the existence of directories outside the container.
But what’s the container usecase? Any sane container is based on pivot_root or similar, so the runtime can just do the walk in the container context. IOW I’m a bit confused as to the exact intended use of the whole series. Can you elaborate?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-09-29 17:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-09-29 10:34 [PATCH 0/3] namei: implement various scoping AT_* flags Aleksa Sarai
2018-09-29 10:34 ` [PATCH 1/3] namei: implement O_BENEATH-style " Aleksa Sarai
2018-09-29 14:48 ` Christian Brauner
2018-09-29 15:34 ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-09-30 4:38 ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-01 12:28 ` Jann Horn
2018-10-01 13:00 ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-01 16:04 ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-04 17:20 ` Christian Brauner
2018-09-29 13:15 ` [PATCH 2/3] namei: implement AT_THIS_ROOT chroot-like path resolution Aleksa Sarai
2018-09-29 13:15 ` [PATCH 3/3] selftests: vfs: add AT_* path resolution tests Aleksa Sarai
2018-09-29 16:35 ` [PATCH 2/3] namei: implement AT_THIS_ROOT chroot-like path resolution Jann Horn
2018-09-29 17:25 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2018-10-01 9:46 ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-01 5:44 ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-01 10:13 ` Jann Horn
2018-10-01 16:18 ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-04 17:27 ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-01 10:42 ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-01 11:29 ` Jann Horn
2018-10-01 12:35 ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-01 13:55 ` Bruce Fields
2018-10-01 14:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-10-02 7:32 ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-03 22:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-10-06 20:56 ` Florian Weimer
2018-10-06 21:49 ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-01 14:00 ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-04 16:26 ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-04 17:31 ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-04 18:26 ` Jann Horn
2018-10-05 15:07 ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-05 15:55 ` Jann Horn
2018-10-06 2:10 ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-08 10:50 ` Jann Horn
2018-09-29 14:25 ` [PATCH 0/3] namei: implement various scoping AT_* flags Andy Lutomirski
2018-09-29 15:45 ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-09-29 16:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-09-29 19:44 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-09-29 14:38 ` Christian Brauner
2018-09-30 4:44 ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-09-30 13:54 ` Alban Crequy
2018-09-30 14:02 ` Christian Brauner
2018-09-30 19:45 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-09-30 21:46 ` Jann Horn
2018-09-30 22:37 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-10-01 20:14 ` James Morris
2018-10-01 4:08 ` Dave Chinner
2018-10-01 5:47 ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-01 6:14 ` Dave Chinner
2018-10-01 13:28 ` David Laight
2018-10-01 16:15 ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-03 13:21 ` David Laight
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