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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Thorsten Leemhuis" <linux@leemhuis.info>,
	"Joan Bruguera Micó" <joanbrugueram@gmail.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Nick Desaulniers" <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
	"Masahiro Yamada" <masahiroy@kernel.org>,
	"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"Alyssa Ross" <hi@alyssa.is>,
	"Sami Tolvanen" <samitolvanen@google.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] x86/purgatory: Do not use fortified string functions
Date: Tue, 30 May 2023 17:33:48 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230531003345.never.325-kees@kernel.org> (raw)

With the addition of -fstrict-flex-arrays=3, struct sha256_state's
trailing array is no longer ignored by CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE:

struct sha256_state {
        u32 state[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE / 4];
        u64 count;
        u8 buf[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE];
};

This means that the memcpy() calls with "buf" as a destination in
sha256.c's code will attempt to perform run-time bounds checking, which
could lead to calling missing functions, specifically a potential
WARN_ONCE, which isn't callable from purgatory.

Reported-by: Thorsten Leemhuis <linux@leemhuis.info>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/175578ec-9dec-7a9c-8d3a-43f24ff86b92@leemhuis.info/
Bisected-by: "Joan Bruguera Micó" <joanbrugueram@gmail.com>
Fixes: df8fc4e934c1 ("kbuild: Enable -fstrict-flex-arrays=3")
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alyssa Ross <hi@alyssa.is>
Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile b/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
index 82fec66d46d2..005324d6c76b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ $(obj)/string.o: $(srctree)/arch/x86/boot/compressed/string.c FORCE
 $(obj)/sha256.o: $(srctree)/lib/crypto/sha256.c FORCE
 	$(call if_changed_rule,cc_o_c)
 
-CFLAGS_sha256.o := -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS
+CFLAGS_sha256.o := -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS -D__NO_FORTIFY
 
 # When linking purgatory.ro with -r unresolved symbols are not checked,
 # also link a purgatory.chk binary without -r to check for unresolved symbols.
-- 
2.34.1


             reply	other threads:[~2023-05-31  0:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-05-31  0:33 Kees Cook [this message]
2023-05-31  7:51 ` [PATCH] x86/purgatory: Do not use fortified string functions Thorsten Leemhuis
2023-06-01 16:45 ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-01 16:50   ` Kees Cook
2023-06-01 16:57 ` Kees Cook

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