Re: [PATCH v5] Randomized slab caches for kmalloc()

[Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>]

On Fri, Jul 14, 2023 at 3:40 PM GONG, Ruiqi <gongruiqi@huaweicloud.com> wrote:
>
> When exploiting memory vulnerabilities, "heap spraying" is a common
> technique targeting those related to dynamic memory allocation (i.e. the
> "heap"), and it plays an important role in a successful exploitation.
> Basically, it is to overwrite the memory area of vulnerable object by
> triggering allocation in other subsystems or modules and therefore
> getting a reference to the targeted memory location. It's usable on
> various types of vulnerablity including use after free (UAF), heap out-
> of-bound write and etc.
>
> There are (at least) two reasons why the heap can be sprayed: 1) generic
> slab caches are shared among different subsystems and modules, and
> 2) dedicated slab caches could be merged with the generic ones.
> Currently these two factors cannot be prevented at a low cost: the first
> one is a widely used memory allocation mechanism, and shutting down slab
> merging completely via `slub_nomerge` would be overkill.
>
> To efficiently prevent heap spraying, we propose the following approach:
> to create multiple copies of generic slab caches that will never be
> merged, and random one of them will be used at allocation. The random
> selection is based on the address of code that calls `kmalloc()`, which
> means it is static at runtime (rather than dynamically determined at
> each time of allocation, which could be bypassed by repeatedly spraying
> in brute force). In other words, the randomness of cache selection will
> be with respect to the code address rather than time, i.e. allocations
> in different code paths would most likely pick different caches,
> although kmalloc() at each place would use the same cache copy whenever
> it is executed. In this way, the vulnerable object and memory allocated
> in other subsystems and modules will (most probably) be on different
> slab caches, which prevents the object from being sprayed.
>
> Meanwhile, the static random selection is further enhanced with a
> per-boot random seed, which prevents the attacker from finding a usable
> kmalloc that happens to pick the same cache with the vulnerable
> subsystem/module by analyzing the open source code. In other words, with
> the per-boot seed, the random selection is static during each time the
> system starts and runs, but not across different system startups.
>
> The overhead of performance has been tested on a 40-core x86 server by
> comparing the results of `perf bench all` between the kernels with and
> without this patch based on the latest linux-next kernel, which shows
> minor difference. A subset of benchmarks are listed below:
>
>                 sched/  sched/  syscall/       mem/       mem/
>              messaging    pipe     basic     memcpy     memset
>                  (sec)   (sec)     (sec)   (GB/sec)   (GB/sec)
>
> control1         0.019   5.459     0.733  15.258789  51.398026
> control2         0.019   5.439     0.730  16.009221  48.828125
> control3         0.019   5.282     0.735  16.009221  48.828125
> control_avg      0.019   5.393     0.733  15.759077  49.684759
>
> experiment1      0.019   5.374     0.741  15.500992  46.502976
> experiment2      0.019   5.440     0.746  16.276042  51.398026
> experiment3      0.019   5.242     0.752  15.258789  51.398026
> experiment_avg   0.019   5.352     0.746  15.678608  49.766343
>
> The overhead of memory usage was measured by executing `free` after boot
> on a QEMU VM with 1GB total memory, and as expected, it's positively
> correlated with # of cache copies:
>
>            control  4 copies  8 copies  16 copies
>
> total       969.8M    968.2M    968.2M     968.2M
> used         20.0M     21.9M     24.1M      26.7M
> free        936.9M    933.6M    931.4M     928.6M
> available   932.2M    928.8M    926.6M     923.9M
>
> Co-developed-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
> Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
> Signed-off-by: GONG, Ruiqi <gongruiqi@huaweicloud.com>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> ---
>
> v5:
>   - Rebase to the latest linux-next.
>   - Make CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES depends on !SLUB_TINY.
>   - Rephrase parts of CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES's help paragraph.
>   - Pass 0 as caller at places where the real caller is not needed.
>   - Restore KMALLOC_NORMAL to 0, and move KMALLOC_RANDOM_* after it.
>   - Change RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR to 15, and adjust the kmalloc rnd
>     name accordingly.
>   - Replace RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_BITS via ilog2(..._NR + 1).
>
> v4:
>   - Set # of caches to 16 and remove config selection.
>   - Shorten "kmalloc-random-" to "kmalloc-rnd-".
>   - Update commit log and config's help paragraph.
>   - Fine-tune PERCPU_DYNAMIC_SIZE_SHIFT to 12 instead of 13 (enough to
>     pass compilation with allmodconfig and CONFIG_SLUB_TINY=n).
>   - Some cleanup and typo fixing.
>   - Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230626031835.2279738-1-gongruiqi@huaweicloud.com/
>
> v3:
>   - Replace SLAB_RANDOMSLAB with the new existing SLAB_NO_MERGE flag.
>   - Shorten long code lines by wrapping and renaming.
>   - Update commit message with latest perf benchmark and additional
>     theorectical explanation.
>   - Remove "RFC" from patch title and make it a formal patch
>   - Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230616111843.3677378-1-gongruiqi@huaweicloud.com/
>
> v2:
>   - Use hash_64() and a per-boot random seed to select kmalloc() caches.
>   - Change acceptable # of caches from [4,16] to {2,4,8,16}, which is
>     more compatible with hashing.
>   - Supplement results of performance and memory overhead tests.
>   - Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230508075507.1720950-1-gongruiqi1@huawei.com/
>
> v1:
>   - Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230315095459.186113-1-gongruiqi1@huawei.com/
>
>  include/linux/percpu.h  | 12 +++++++---
>  include/linux/slab.h    | 23 ++++++++++++++++---
>  mm/Kconfig              | 17 ++++++++++++++
>  mm/kfence/kfence_test.c |  7 ++++--
>  mm/slab.c               |  2 +-
>  mm/slab.h               |  2 +-
>  mm/slab_common.c        | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
>  7 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/percpu.h b/include/linux/percpu.h
> index b3b458442330..68fac2e7cbe6 100644
> --- a/include/linux/percpu.h
> +++ b/include/linux/percpu.h
> @@ -35,6 +35,12 @@
>  #define PCPU_BITMAP_BLOCK_BITS         (PCPU_BITMAP_BLOCK_SIZE >>      \
>                                          PCPU_MIN_ALLOC_SHIFT)
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES
> +#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_SIZE_SHIFT      12
> +#else
> +#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_SIZE_SHIFT      10
> +#endif
> +
>  /*
>   * Percpu allocator can serve percpu allocations before slab is
>   * initialized which allows slab to depend on the percpu allocator.
> @@ -42,7 +48,7 @@
>   * for this.  Keep PERCPU_DYNAMIC_RESERVE equal to or larger than
>   * PERCPU_DYNAMIC_EARLY_SIZE.
>   */
> -#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_EARLY_SIZE      (20 << 10)
> +#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_EARLY_SIZE      (20 << PERCPU_DYNAMIC_SIZE_SHIFT)
>
>  /*
>   * PERCPU_DYNAMIC_RESERVE indicates the amount of free area to piggy
> @@ -56,9 +62,9 @@
>   * intelligent way to determine this would be nice.
>   */
>  #if BITS_PER_LONG > 32
> -#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_RESERVE         (28 << 10)
> +#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_RESERVE         (28 << PERCPU_DYNAMIC_SIZE_SHIFT)
>  #else
> -#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_RESERVE         (20 << 10)
> +#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_RESERVE         (20 << PERCPU_DYNAMIC_SIZE_SHIFT)
>  #endif
>
>  extern void *pcpu_base_addr;
> diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h
> index 848c7c82ad5a..8228d1276a2f 100644
> --- a/include/linux/slab.h
> +++ b/include/linux/slab.h
> @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
>  #include <linux/workqueue.h>
>  #include <linux/percpu-refcount.h>
>  #include <linux/cleanup.h>
> +#include <linux/hash.h>
>
>
>  /*
> @@ -345,6 +346,12 @@ static inline unsigned int arch_slab_minalign(void)
>  #define SLAB_OBJ_MIN_SIZE      (KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE < 16 ? \
>                                 (KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE) : 16)
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES
> +#define RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR       15 // # of cache copies
> +#else
> +#define RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR       0
> +#endif
> +
>  /*
>   * Whenever changing this, take care of that kmalloc_type() and
>   * create_kmalloc_caches() still work as intended.
> @@ -361,6 +368,8 @@ enum kmalloc_cache_type {
>  #ifndef CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM
>         KMALLOC_CGROUP = KMALLOC_NORMAL,
>  #endif
> +       KMALLOC_RANDOM_START = KMALLOC_NORMAL,
> +       KMALLOC_RANDOM_END = KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR,
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SLUB_TINY
>         KMALLOC_RECLAIM = KMALLOC_NORMAL,
>  #else
> @@ -386,14 +395,22 @@ kmalloc_caches[NR_KMALLOC_TYPES][KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH + 1];
>         (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ZONE_DMA)   ? __GFP_DMA : 0) |       \
>         (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM) ? __GFP_ACCOUNT : 0))
>
> -static __always_inline enum kmalloc_cache_type kmalloc_type(gfp_t flags)
> +extern unsigned long random_kmalloc_seed;
> +
> +static __always_inline enum kmalloc_cache_type kmalloc_type(gfp_t flags, unsigned long caller)
>  {
>         /*
>          * The most common case is KMALLOC_NORMAL, so test for it
>          * with a single branch for all the relevant flags.
>          */
>         if (likely((flags & KMALLOC_NOT_NORMAL_BITS) == 0))
> +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES
> +               /* RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR (=15) copies + the KMALLOC_NORMAL */
> +               return KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + hash_64(caller ^ random_kmalloc_seed,
> +                                                     ilog2(RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR + 1));
> +#else
>                 return KMALLOC_NORMAL;
> +#endif
>
>         /*
>          * At least one of the flags has to be set. Their priorities in
> @@ -580,7 +597,7 @@ static __always_inline __alloc_size(1) void *kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
>
>                 index = kmalloc_index(size);
>                 return kmalloc_trace(
> -                               kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags)][index],
> +                               kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags, _RET_IP_)][index],
>                                 flags, size);
>         }
>         return __kmalloc(size, flags);
> @@ -596,7 +613,7 @@ static __always_inline __alloc_size(1) void *kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t fla
>
>                 index = kmalloc_index(size);
>                 return kmalloc_node_trace(
> -                               kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags)][index],
> +                               kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags, _RET_IP_)][index],
>                                 flags, node, size);
>         }
>         return __kmalloc_node(size, flags, node);
> diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig
> index 22acffd9009d..989ab72bbecc 100644
> --- a/mm/Kconfig
> +++ b/mm/Kconfig
> @@ -337,6 +337,23 @@ config SLUB_CPU_PARTIAL
>           which requires the taking of locks that may cause latency spikes.
>           Typically one would choose no for a realtime system.
>
> +config RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES
> +       default n
> +       depends on SLUB && !SLUB_TINY
> +       bool "Randomize slab caches for normal kmalloc"
> +       help
> +         A hardening feature that creates multiple copies of slab caches for
> +         normal kmalloc allocation and makes kmalloc randomly pick one based
> +         on code address, which makes the attackers more difficult to spray
> +         vulnerable memory objects on the heap for the purpose of exploiting
> +         memory vulnerabilities.
> +
> +         Currently the number of copies is set to 16, a reasonably large value
> +         that effectively diverges the memory objects allocated for different
> +         subsystems or modules into different caches, at the expense of a
> +         limited degree of memory and CPU overhead that relates to hardware and
> +         system workload.
> +
>  endmenu # SLAB allocator options
>
>  config SHUFFLE_PAGE_ALLOCATOR
> diff --git a/mm/kfence/kfence_test.c b/mm/kfence/kfence_test.c
> index 9e008a336d9f..95b2b84c296d 100644
> --- a/mm/kfence/kfence_test.c
> +++ b/mm/kfence/kfence_test.c
> @@ -212,7 +212,9 @@ static void test_cache_destroy(void)
>
>  static inline size_t kmalloc_cache_alignment(size_t size)
>  {
> -       return kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(GFP_KERNEL)][__kmalloc_index(size, false)]->align;
> +       /* just to get ->align so no need to pass in the real caller */
> +       enum kmalloc_cache_type type = kmalloc_type(GFP_KERNEL, 0);
> +       return kmalloc_caches[type][__kmalloc_index(size, false)]->align;
>  }
>
>  /* Must always inline to match stack trace against caller. */
> @@ -282,8 +284,9 @@ static void *test_alloc(struct kunit *test, size_t size, gfp_t gfp, enum allocat
>
>                 if (is_kfence_address(alloc)) {
>                         struct slab *slab = virt_to_slab(alloc);
> +                       enum kmalloc_cache_type type = kmalloc_type(GFP_KERNEL, _RET_IP_);
>                         struct kmem_cache *s = test_cache ?:
> -                                       kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(GFP_KERNEL)][__kmalloc_index(size, false)];
> +                                       kmalloc_caches[type][__kmalloc_index(size, false)];
>
>                         /*
>                          * Verify that various helpers return the right values
> diff --git a/mm/slab.c b/mm/slab.c
> index 88194391d553..9ad3d0f2d1a5 100644
> --- a/mm/slab.c
> +++ b/mm/slab.c
> @@ -1670,7 +1670,7 @@ static size_t calculate_slab_order(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
>                         if (freelist_size > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE) {
>                                 freelist_cache_size = PAGE_SIZE << get_order(freelist_size);
>                         } else {
> -                               freelist_cache = kmalloc_slab(freelist_size, 0u);
> +                               freelist_cache = kmalloc_slab(freelist_size, 0u, _RET_IP_);
>                                 if (!freelist_cache)
>                                         continue;
>                                 freelist_cache_size = freelist_cache->size;
> diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h
> index 9c0e09d0f81f..799a315695c6 100644
> --- a/mm/slab.h
> +++ b/mm/slab.h
> @@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ void setup_kmalloc_cache_index_table(void);
>  void create_kmalloc_caches(slab_flags_t);
>
>  /* Find the kmalloc slab corresponding for a certain size */
> -struct kmem_cache *kmalloc_slab(size_t, gfp_t);
> +struct kmem_cache *kmalloc_slab(size_t size, gfp_t flags, unsigned long caller);
>
>  void *__kmem_cache_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t gfpflags,
>                               int node, size_t orig_size,
> diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
> index d1555ea2981a..01cdbf122463 100644
> --- a/mm/slab_common.c
> +++ b/mm/slab_common.c
> @@ -678,6 +678,11 @@ kmalloc_caches[NR_KMALLOC_TYPES][KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH + 1] __ro_after_init =
>  { /* initialization for https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=42570 */ };
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmalloc_caches);
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES
> +unsigned long random_kmalloc_seed __ro_after_init;
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(random_kmalloc_seed);
> +#endif
> +
>  /*
>   * Conversion table for small slabs sizes / 8 to the index in the
>   * kmalloc array. This is necessary for slabs < 192 since we have non power
> @@ -720,7 +725,7 @@ static inline unsigned int size_index_elem(unsigned int bytes)
>   * Find the kmem_cache structure that serves a given size of
>   * allocation
>   */
> -struct kmem_cache *kmalloc_slab(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
> +struct kmem_cache *kmalloc_slab(size_t size, gfp_t flags, unsigned long caller)
>  {
>         unsigned int index;
>
> @@ -735,7 +740,7 @@ struct kmem_cache *kmalloc_slab(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
>                 index = fls(size - 1);
>         }
>
> -       return kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags)][index];
> +       return kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags, caller)][index];
>  }
>
>  size_t kmalloc_size_roundup(size_t size)
> @@ -752,8 +757,11 @@ size_t kmalloc_size_roundup(size_t size)
>         if (size > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE)
>                 return PAGE_SIZE << get_order(size);
>
> -       /* The flags don't matter since size_index is common to all. */
> -       c = kmalloc_slab(size, GFP_KERNEL);
> +       /*
> +        * The flags don't matter since size_index is common to all.
> +        * Neither does the caller for just getting ->object_size.
> +        */
> +       c = kmalloc_slab(size, GFP_KERNEL, 0);
>         return c ? c->object_size : 0;
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmalloc_size_roundup);
> @@ -776,12 +784,35 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmalloc_size_roundup);
>  #define KMALLOC_RCL_NAME(sz)
>  #endif
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES
> +#define __KMALLOC_RANDOM_CONCAT(a, b) a ## b
> +#define KMALLOC_RANDOM_NAME(N, sz) __KMALLOC_RANDOM_CONCAT(KMA_RAND_, N)(sz)
> +#define KMA_RAND_1(sz)                  .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START +  1] = "kmalloc-rnd-01-" #sz,
> +#define KMA_RAND_2(sz)  KMA_RAND_1(sz)  .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START +  2] = "kmalloc-rnd-02-" #sz,
> +#define KMA_RAND_3(sz)  KMA_RAND_2(sz)  .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START +  3] = "kmalloc-rnd-03-" #sz,
> +#define KMA_RAND_4(sz)  KMA_RAND_3(sz)  .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START +  4] = "kmalloc-rnd-04-" #sz,
> +#define KMA_RAND_5(sz)  KMA_RAND_4(sz)  .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START +  5] = "kmalloc-rnd-05-" #sz,
> +#define KMA_RAND_6(sz)  KMA_RAND_5(sz)  .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START +  6] = "kmalloc-rnd-06-" #sz,
> +#define KMA_RAND_7(sz)  KMA_RAND_6(sz)  .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START +  7] = "kmalloc-rnd-07-" #sz,
> +#define KMA_RAND_8(sz)  KMA_RAND_7(sz)  .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START +  8] = "kmalloc-rnd-08-" #sz,
> +#define KMA_RAND_9(sz)  KMA_RAND_8(sz)  .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START +  9] = "kmalloc-rnd-09-" #sz,
> +#define KMA_RAND_10(sz) KMA_RAND_9(sz)  .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 10] = "kmalloc-rnd-10-" #sz,
> +#define KMA_RAND_11(sz) KMA_RAND_10(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 11] = "kmalloc-rnd-11-" #sz,
> +#define KMA_RAND_12(sz) KMA_RAND_11(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 12] = "kmalloc-rnd-12-" #sz,
> +#define KMA_RAND_13(sz) KMA_RAND_12(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 13] = "kmalloc-rnd-13-" #sz,
> +#define KMA_RAND_14(sz) KMA_RAND_13(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 14] = "kmalloc-rnd-14-" #sz,
> +#define KMA_RAND_15(sz) KMA_RAND_14(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 15] = "kmalloc-rnd-15-" #sz,
> +#else // CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES
> +#define KMALLOC_RANDOM_NAME(N, sz)
> +#endif
> +
>  #define INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(__size, __short_size)                        \
>  {                                                              \
>         .name[KMALLOC_NORMAL]  = "kmalloc-" #__short_size,      \
>         KMALLOC_RCL_NAME(__short_size)                          \
>         KMALLOC_CGROUP_NAME(__short_size)                       \
>         KMALLOC_DMA_NAME(__short_size)                          \
> +       KMALLOC_RANDOM_NAME(RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR, __short_size)     \
>         .size = __size,                                         \
>  }
>
> @@ -890,6 +921,11 @@ new_kmalloc_cache(int idx, enum kmalloc_cache_type type, slab_flags_t flags)
>                 flags |= SLAB_CACHE_DMA;
>         }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES
> +       if (type >= KMALLOC_RANDOM_START && type <= KMALLOC_RANDOM_END)
> +               flags |= SLAB_NO_MERGE;
> +#endif
> +
>         /*
>          * If CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM is enabled, disable cache merging for
>          * KMALLOC_NORMAL caches.
> @@ -941,6 +977,9 @@ void __init create_kmalloc_caches(slab_flags_t flags)
>                                 new_kmalloc_cache(2, type, flags);
>                 }
>         }
> +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES
> +       random_kmalloc_seed = get_random_u64();
> +#endif
>
>         /* Kmalloc array is now usable */
>         slab_state = UP;
> @@ -976,7 +1015,7 @@ void *__do_kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node, unsigned long caller
>                 return ret;
>         }
>
> -       s = kmalloc_slab(size, flags);
> +       s = kmalloc_slab(size, flags, caller);
>
>         if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(s)))
>                 return s;
> --
> 2.25.1

Looks good to me,
Reviewed-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>

Thanks,
Hyeonggon