From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.8 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3C36CC4360C for ; Fri, 27 Sep 2019 14:27:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1796C21850 for ; Fri, 27 Sep 2019 14:27:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727963AbfI0O07 (ORCPT ); Fri, 27 Sep 2019 10:26:59 -0400 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:41278 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727734AbfI0O06 (ORCPT ); Fri, 27 Sep 2019 10:26:58 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098399.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x8REMLGY070724 for ; Fri, 27 Sep 2019 10:26:58 -0400 Received: from e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.101]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2v9juquj18-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Fri, 27 Sep 2019 10:26:58 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Fri, 27 Sep 2019 15:26:51 +0100 Received: from b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.160]) by b06cxnps4074.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x8REQntR8192070 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Fri, 27 Sep 2019 14:26:49 GMT Received: from b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7AD1BA405F; Fri, 27 Sep 2019 14:26:49 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id A7FC7A4054; Fri, 27 Sep 2019 14:26:45 +0000 (GMT) Received: from swastik.ibm.com (unknown [9.80.207.173]) by b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Fri, 27 Sep 2019 14:26:45 +0000 (GMT) From: Nayna Jain To: linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Michael Ellerman , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Paul Mackerras , Ard Biesheuvel , Jeremy Kerr , Matthew Garret , Mimi Zohar , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Claudio Carvalho , George Wilson , Elaine Palmer , Eric Ricther , "Oliver O'Halloran" , Rob Herring , Mark Rutland , Nayna Jain Subject: [PATCH v6 5/9] powerpc/ima: add measurement rules to ima arch specific policy Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2019 10:25:56 -0400 X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1569594360-7141-1-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> References: <1569594360-7141-1-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19092714-0020-0000-0000-000003725418 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19092714-0021-0000-0000-000021C8257D Message-Id: <1569594360-7141-6-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-09-27_06:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1908290000 definitions=main-1909270134 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org This patch adds the measurement rules to the arch specific policies for the systems with trusted boot. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain --- arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c index 39401b67f19e..77c61b142042 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c @@ -12,8 +12,18 @@ bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void) return is_powerpc_os_secureboot_enabled(); } -/* Defines IMA appraise rules for secureboot */ +/* + * The "arch_rules" contains both the securebot and trustedboot rules for adding + * the kexec kernel image and kernel modules file hashes to the IMA measurement + * list and verifying the file signatures against known good values. + * + * The "appraise_type=imasig|modsig" option allows the good signature to be + * stored as an xattr or as an appended signature. The "template=ima-modsig" + * option includes the appended signature in the IMA measurement list. + */ static const char *const arch_rules[] = { + "measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK template=ima-modsig", + "measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig", "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig", #if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig", @@ -22,12 +32,40 @@ static const char *const arch_rules[] = { }; /* - * Returns the relevant IMA arch policies based on the system secureboot state. + * The "measure_rules" are enabled only on "trustedboot" enabled systems. + * These rules add the kexec kernel image and kernel modules file hashes to + * the IMA measurement list. + */ +static const char *const measure_rules[] = { + "measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK", + "measure func=MODULE_CHECK", + NULL +}; + +/* + * Returns the relevant IMA arch policies based on the system secureboot + * and trustedboot state. */ const char *const *arch_get_ima_policy(void) { - if (is_powerpc_os_secureboot_enabled()) + const char *const *rules; + int offset = 0; + + for (rules = arch_rules; *rules != NULL; rules++) { + if (strncmp(*rules, "appraise", 8) == 0) + break; + offset++; + } + + if (is_powerpc_os_secureboot_enabled() + && is_powerpc_trustedboot_enabled()) return arch_rules; + if (is_powerpc_os_secureboot_enabled()) + return arch_rules + offset; + + if (is_powerpc_trustedboot_enabled()) + return measure_rules; + return NULL; } -- 2.20.1