From: jarkko@kernel.org
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
"James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>,
Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: [PATCH v5 3/3] KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2021 01:56:21 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210128235621.127925-4-jarkko@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210128235621.127925-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
When TPM 2.0 trusted keys code was moved to the trusted keys subsystem,
the operations were unwrapped from tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops(),
which are used to take temporarily the ownership of the TPM chip. The
ownership is only taken inside tpm_send(), but this is not sufficient,
as in the key load TPM2_CC_LOAD, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL and TPM2_FLUSH_CONTEXT
need to be done as a one single atom.
Take the TPM chip ownership before sending anything with
tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops(), and use tpm_transmit_cmd() to send
TPM commands instead of tpm_send(), reverting back to the old behaviour.
Fixes: 2e19e10131a0 ("KEYS: trusted: Move TPM2 trusted keys code")
Reported-by: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 4 ----
include/linux/tpm.h | 5 ++++-
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++-----
3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
index 947d1db0a5cc..283f78211c3a 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
@@ -164,8 +164,6 @@ extern const struct file_operations tpmrm_fops;
extern struct idr dev_nums_idr;
ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz);
-ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
- size_t min_rsp_body_length, const char *desc);
int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *);
int tpm_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip);
@@ -194,8 +192,6 @@ static inline void tpm_msleep(unsigned int delay_msec)
int tpm_chip_start(struct tpm_chip *chip);
void tpm_chip_stop(struct tpm_chip *chip);
struct tpm_chip *tpm_find_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip);
-__must_check int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip);
-void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip);
struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc(struct device *dev,
const struct tpm_class_ops *ops);
diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
index ae2482510f8c..543aa3b1dedc 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
@@ -404,6 +404,10 @@ static inline u32 tpm2_rc_value(u32 rc)
#if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) || defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM_MODULE)
extern int tpm_is_tpm2(struct tpm_chip *chip);
+extern __must_check int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip);
+extern void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip);
+extern ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
+ size_t min_rsp_body_length, const char *desc);
extern int tpm_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
struct tpm_digest *digest);
extern int tpm_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
@@ -417,7 +421,6 @@ static inline int tpm_is_tpm2(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
return -ENODEV;
}
-
static inline int tpm_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx,
struct tpm_digest *digest)
{
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index 08ec7f48f01d..c87c4df8703d 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -79,10 +79,16 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map))
return -EINVAL;
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE);
+ rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
if (rc)
return rc;
+ rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE);
+ if (rc) {
+ tpm_put_ops(chip);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, options->keyhandle);
tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW,
NULL /* nonce */, 0,
@@ -130,7 +136,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
goto out;
}
- rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf));
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "sealing data");
if (rc)
goto out;
@@ -157,6 +163,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
rc = -EPERM;
}
+ tpm_put_ops(chip);
return rc;
}
@@ -211,7 +218,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
goto out;
}
- rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf));
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "loading blob");
if (!rc)
*blob_handle = be32_to_cpup(
(__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
@@ -260,7 +267,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
options->blobauth /* hmac */,
TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
- rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf));
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "unsealing");
if (rc > 0)
rc = -EPERM;
@@ -304,12 +311,19 @@ int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
u32 blob_handle;
int rc;
- rc = tpm2_load_cmd(chip, payload, options, &blob_handle);
+ rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
if (rc)
return rc;
+ rc = tpm2_load_cmd(chip, payload, options, &blob_handle);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
rc = tpm2_unseal_cmd(chip, payload, options, blob_handle);
tpm2_flush_context(chip, blob_handle);
+out:
+ tpm_put_ops(chip);
+
return rc;
}
--
2.30.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-01-28 23:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-01-28 23:56 [PATCH v5 0/3] KEYS, trusted: a bunch of bug fixes jarkko
2021-01-28 23:56 ` [PATCH v5 1/3] KEYS: trusted: Fix incorrect handling of tpm_get_random() jarkko
2021-01-31 12:45 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-01-28 23:56 ` [PATCH v5 2/3] KEYS: trusted: Fix migratable=1 failing jarkko
2021-01-28 23:56 ` jarkko [this message]
[not found] ` <CAFA6WYOAbHV=sOxuUdJq91sZbKDMbo6D5KXcSp9ix0PWLpSdaA@mail.gmail.com>
2021-01-30 21:27 ` [PATCH v5 3/3] KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations Jarkko Sakkinen
[not found] ` <6459b955f8cb05dae7d15a233f26ff9c9501b839.camel@linux.ibm.com>
2021-01-30 21:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-31 12:52 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-02-02 16:29 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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