From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
To: <zohar@linux.ibm.com>, <jmorris@namei.org>, <paul@paul-moore.com>,
<casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
<reiserfs-devel@vger.kernel.org>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4/5] evm: Align evm_inode_init_security() definition with LSM infrastructure
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 2021 12:04:34 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210415100435.18619-5-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210415100435.18619-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
This patch changes the evm_inode_init_security() definition to align with
the LSM infrastructure, in preparation for moving IMA and EVM to that
infrastructure.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
---
include/linux/evm.h | 21 ++++++++++++++-------
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 24 +++++++++++++++---------
security/security.c | 7 +++++--
3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h
index 8cad46bcec9d..5d8b29d80296 100644
--- a/include/linux/evm.h
+++ b/include/linux/evm.h
@@ -34,9 +34,11 @@ extern int evm_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name);
extern void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
const char *xattr_name);
-extern int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
- const struct xattr *xattr_array,
- struct xattr *evm);
+extern int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+ const struct qstr *qstr,
+ const char **name,
+ void **value, size_t *len,
+ struct xattr *lsm_xattrs);
extern bool evm_status_revalidate(const char *xattr_name);
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL
extern int posix_xattr_acl(const char *xattrname);
@@ -102,11 +104,16 @@ static inline void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
return;
}
-static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
- const struct xattr *xattr_array,
- struct xattr *evm)
+static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+ const struct qstr *qstr,
+ const char **name,
+ void **value, size_t *len,
+ struct xattr *lsm_xattrs)
{
- return 0;
+ if (!name || !value || !len || !lsm_xattrs)
+ return 0;
+
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static inline bool evm_status_revalidate(const char *xattr_name)
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 84a9b7a69b1f..a5069d69a893 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -706,29 +706,35 @@ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
/*
* evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm HMAC value
*/
-int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
- const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
- struct xattr *evm_xattr)
+int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+ const struct qstr *qstr,
+ const char **name,
+ void **value, size_t *len,
+ struct xattr *lsm_xattrs)
{
struct evm_xattr *xattr_data;
int rc;
- if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) ||
- !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name))
+ if (!name || !value || !len || !lsm_xattrs)
return 0;
+ if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) ||
+ !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattrs->name))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS);
if (!xattr_data)
return -ENOMEM;
xattr_data->data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
- rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, lsm_xattr, xattr_data->digest);
+ rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, lsm_xattrs, xattr_data->digest);
if (rc < 0)
goto out;
- evm_xattr->value = xattr_data;
- evm_xattr->value_len = hash_digest_size[evm_hash_algo] + 1;
- evm_xattr->name = XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX;
+ *name = XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX;
+ *value = xattr_data;
+ *len = hash_digest_size[evm_hash_algo] + 1;
+
return 0;
out:
kfree(xattr_data);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 8aabbc0f0dfc..e16ce150b111 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1080,8 +1080,11 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
goto out;
}
- ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, new_xattrs, lsm_xattr);
- if (ret)
+ ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr,
+ &lsm_xattr->name,
+ &lsm_xattr->value,
+ &lsm_xattr->value_len, new_xattrs);
+ if (ret && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
goto out;
ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data);
out:
--
2.26.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-04-15 10:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-04-15 10:04 [PATCH 0/5] evm: Prepare for moving to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
2021-04-15 10:04 ` [PATCH 1/5] xattr: Complete constify ->name member of "struct xattr" Roberto Sassu
2021-04-15 11:20 ` Tetsuo Handa
2021-04-15 12:25 ` Roberto Sassu
2021-04-15 10:04 ` [PATCH 2/5] security: Support multiple LSMs implementing the inode_init_security hook Roberto Sassu
2021-04-15 10:04 ` [PATCH 3/5] security: Pass xattrs allocated by LSMs to " Roberto Sassu
2021-04-15 10:04 ` Roberto Sassu [this message]
2021-04-15 10:04 ` [PATCH 5/5] evm: Support multiple LSMs providing an xattr Roberto Sassu
2021-04-15 20:43 ` [PATCH 0/5] evm: Prepare for moving to the LSM infrastructure Casey Schaufler
2021-04-16 16:37 ` Roberto Sassu
2021-04-16 21:25 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-04-20 16:09 ` Roberto Sassu
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