From: Rob Landley <rob@landley.net>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arvind Sankar <niveditas98@gmail.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
initramfs@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] initramfs: add support for xattrs in the initial ram disk
Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 18:39:16 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4da3dbda-bb76-5d71-d5c5-c03d98350ab0@landley.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1557861511.3378.19.camel@HansenPartnership.com>
On 5/14/19 2:18 PM, James Bottomley wrote:
>> I think Rob is right here. If /init was statically built into the
>> kernel image, it has no more ability to compromise the kernel than
>> anything else in the kernel. What's the problem here?
>
> The specific problem is that unless you own the kernel signing key,
> which is really untrue for most distribution consumers because the
> distro owns the key, you cannot build the initrd statically into the
> kernel. You can take the distro signed kernel, link it with the initrd
> then resign the combination with your key, provided you insert your key
> into the MoK variables as a trusted secure boot key, but the distros
> have been unhappy recommending this as standard practice.
>
> If our model for security is going to be to link the kernel and the
> initrd statically to give signature protection over the aggregate then
> we need to figure out how to execute this via the distros. If we
> accept that the split model, where the distro owns and signs the kernel
> but the machine owner builds and is responsible for the initrd, then we
> need to explore split security models like this proposal.
You can have a built-in and an external initrd? The second extracts over the
first? (I know because once upon a time conflicting files would append. It
sounds like the desired behavior here is O_EXCL fail and move on.)
Rob
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-05-14 23:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-05-09 11:24 [PATCH v2 0/3] initramfs: add support for xattrs in the initial ram disk Roberto Sassu
2019-05-09 11:24 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] fs: add ksys_lsetxattr() wrapper Roberto Sassu
2019-05-10 21:28 ` Jann Horn
2019-05-09 11:24 ` [PATCH v2 2/3] initramfs: set extended attributes Roberto Sassu
2019-05-09 11:24 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] initramfs: introduce do_readxattrs() Roberto Sassu
2019-05-10 21:33 ` Jann Horn
2019-05-13 13:03 ` Roberto Sassu
2019-05-09 18:34 ` [PATCH v2 0/3] initramfs: add support for xattrs in the initial ram disk Rob Landley
2019-05-10 6:56 ` Roberto Sassu
2019-05-10 11:49 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-05-10 20:46 ` Rob Landley
2019-05-10 22:38 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-05-11 22:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-12 4:04 ` Rob Landley
2019-05-12 4:12 ` Rob Landley
2019-05-12 9:17 ` Dominik Brodowski
2019-05-12 10:18 ` hpa
2019-05-12 15:31 ` Dominik Brodowski
2019-05-13 0:02 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-05-13 0:21 ` hpa
2019-05-13 0:23 ` hpa
2019-05-12 12:52 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-05-12 17:05 ` Rob Landley
2019-05-12 19:43 ` Arvind Sankar
2019-05-13 7:49 ` Roberto Sassu
2019-05-13 9:07 ` Rob Landley
2019-05-13 12:08 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-05-13 12:47 ` Roberto Sassu
2019-05-13 17:20 ` Arvind Sankar
2019-05-13 17:51 ` Arvind Sankar
2019-05-13 17:52 ` Arvind Sankar
2019-05-13 18:36 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-05-13 18:47 ` Arvind Sankar
2019-05-13 22:09 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-05-14 6:06 ` Rob Landley
2019-05-14 14:44 ` Arvind Sankar
2019-05-14 6:06 ` Rob Landley
2019-05-14 11:52 ` Roberto Sassu
2019-05-14 15:12 ` Rob Landley
2019-05-14 15:27 ` Arvind Sankar
2019-05-14 15:57 ` Arvind Sankar
2019-05-14 17:44 ` Roberto Sassu
2019-05-15 1:00 ` Arvind Sankar
2019-05-14 15:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-14 16:33 ` Roberto Sassu
2019-05-14 16:58 ` Greg KH
2019-05-14 17:20 ` Roberto Sassu
2019-05-15 0:25 ` Arvind Sankar
2019-05-14 19:18 ` James Bottomley
2019-05-14 23:39 ` Rob Landley [this message]
2019-05-14 23:54 ` James Bottomley
2019-05-15 0:52 ` Arvind Sankar
2019-05-15 11:19 ` Roberto Sassu
2019-05-15 16:08 ` Arvind Sankar
2019-05-15 17:06 ` Roberto Sassu
2019-05-16 5:29 ` Arvind Sankar
2019-05-16 11:42 ` Roberto Sassu
2019-05-16 13:31 ` Mimi Zohar
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=4da3dbda-bb76-5d71-d5c5-c03d98350ab0@landley.net \
--to=rob@landley.net \
--cc=James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com \
--cc=initramfs@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=niveditas98@gmail.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).