From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/8] security: keys: trusted: flush the key handle after use
Date: Mon, 09 Dec 2019 08:31:35 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <89e3c7c531b228673089ad892d5e6390642ced85.camel@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1575781659.14069.9.camel@HansenPartnership.com>
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On Sat, 2019-12-07 at 21:07 -0800, James Bottomley wrote:
> The trusted keys code currently loads a blob into the TPM and unseals
> on the handle. However, it never flushes the handle meaning that
> volatile contexts build up until the TPM becomes unusable. Fix this
> by flushing the handle after the unseal.
>
> Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
> ---
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 1 -
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 1 +
> include/linux/tpm.h | 1 +
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 1 +
> 4 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
> index b9e1547be6b5..5620747da0cf 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
> @@ -218,7 +218,6 @@ int tpm2_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
> int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
> struct tpm_digest *digests);
> int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max);
> -void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle);
> ssize_t tpm2_get_tpm_pt(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 property_id,
> u32 *value, const char *desc);
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
> index fdb457704aa7..b87592f4a6c7 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
> @@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle)
> tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "flushing context");
> tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
> }
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_flush_context);
Everything else is EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(). Why EXPORT_SYMBOL() here?
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-12-09 8:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-12-08 5:06 [PATCH 0/8] Fix TPM 2.0 trusted keys James Bottomley
2019-12-08 5:07 ` [PATCH 1/8] security: keys: trusted: flush the key handle after use James Bottomley
2019-12-09 8:31 ` David Woodhouse [this message]
2019-12-09 15:38 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-08 5:08 ` [PATCH 2/8] lib: add asn.1 encoder James Bottomley
2019-12-09 8:50 ` David Woodhouse
2019-12-09 15:46 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-09 22:05 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-12-09 22:43 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-08 5:09 ` [PATCH 3/8] oid_registry: Add TCG defined OIDS for TPM keys James Bottomley
2019-12-09 8:55 ` David Woodhouse
2019-12-09 16:21 ` James Bottomley
2020-06-19 20:45 ` Wiseman, Monty (GE Research, US)
2020-06-19 22:50 ` Jerry Snitselaar
2020-06-20 15:36 ` James Bottomley
2020-06-23 1:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-12-08 5:10 ` [PATCH 4/8] security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 tpm2 key format for the blobs James Bottomley
2019-12-09 10:04 ` David Woodhouse
2019-12-09 16:31 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-08 5:11 ` [PATCH 5/8] security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable James Bottomley
2019-12-09 10:09 ` David Woodhouse
2019-12-09 17:23 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-08 5:12 ` [PATCH 6/8] security: keys: trusted: add PCR policy to TPM2 keys James Bottomley
2019-12-09 10:18 ` David Woodhouse
2019-12-09 18:03 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-09 18:44 ` David Woodhouse
2019-12-09 19:11 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-25 17:08 ` Ken Goldman
2019-12-08 5:13 ` [PATCH 7/8] security: keys: trusted: add ability to specify arbitrary policy James Bottomley
2019-12-08 5:14 ` [PATCH 8/8] security: keys: trusted: implement counter/timer policy James Bottomley
2019-12-09 20:20 ` [PATCH 0/8] Fix TPM 2.0 trusted keys Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-12-09 20:57 ` James Bottomley
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