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From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
To: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
	herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net,
	jarkko@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
	keescook@chromium.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, scott.branden@broadcom.com,
	weiyongjun1@huawei.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com, ebiggers@google.com,
	ardb@kernel.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, lszubowi@redhat.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, pjones@redhat.com,
	glin@suse.com, "konrad.wilk@oracle.com" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 00/12] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
Date: Wed, 7 Jul 2021 17:28:41 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YOXWOaPma2dMf6fk@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <E4A6A4E2-F9CB-4996-965A-772B3CA15555@oracle.com>

On Wed, Jul 07, 2021 at 10:23:04AM -0600, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> 
> > On Jul 7, 2021, at 12:46 AM, Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> wrote:
> > 
> > On Tue, Jul 06, 2021 at 10:43:51PM -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> >> This is a follow up to the "Add additional MOK vars" [1] series I 
> >> previously sent.  This series incorporates the feedback given 
> >> both publicly on the mailing list and privately from Mimi. This 
> >> series just focuses on getting end-user keys into the kernel trust 
> >> boundary.
> > 
> > WTF is MOK?
> 
> MOK stands for Machine Owner Key.   The MOK facility can be used to 
> import keys that you use to sign your own development kernel build, 
> so that it is able to boot with UEFI Secure Boot enabled. Many Linux 
> distributions have implemented UEFI Secure Boot using these keys 
> as well as the ones Secure Boot provides.  It allows the end-user 
> a choice, instead of locking them into only being able to use keys 
> their hardware manufacture provided, or forcing them to enroll keys 
> through their BIOS.

Please spell this out in your cover letters and commit logs.

  reply	other threads:[~2021-07-07 16:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-07-07  2:43 [PATCH RFC 00/12] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Eric Snowberg
2021-07-07  2:43 ` [PATCH RFC 01/12] KEYS: Add KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION option to key_move Eric Snowberg
2021-07-07  2:43 ` [PATCH RFC 02/12] KEYS: Allow unrestricted keys to be moved to the secondary keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-07-07  2:43 ` [PATCH RFC 03/12] KEYS: CA link restriction Eric Snowberg
2021-07-07  2:43 ` [PATCH RFC 04/12] integrity: add integrity_destroy_keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-07-07  2:43 ` [PATCH RFC 05/12] integrity: Introduce mok keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-07-07 19:31   ` Linus Torvalds
2021-07-07 21:26     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-07-07 22:32       ` Eric Snowberg
2021-07-07  2:43 ` [PATCH RFC 06/12] integrity: Trust mok keys if MokListTrustedRT found Eric Snowberg
2021-07-07  2:43 ` [PATCH RFC 07/12] integrity: add add_to_mok_keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-07-07  2:43 ` [PATCH RFC 08/12] integrity: restrict INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MOK to restrict_link_by_secondary_trusted_or_ca Eric Snowberg
2021-07-07  2:44 ` [PATCH RFC 09/12] integrity: accessor function to get trust_moklist Eric Snowberg
2021-07-07  2:44 ` [PATCH RFC 10/12] integrity: add new keyring handler Eric Snowberg
2021-07-07  2:44 ` [PATCH RFC 11/12] integrity: move keys from the mok keyring into the secondary keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-07-07  2:44 ` [PATCH RFC 12/12] integrity: Suppress error message for keys added to the mok keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-07-07  6:46 ` [PATCH RFC 00/12] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Christoph Hellwig
2021-07-07 16:23   ` Eric Snowberg
2021-07-07 16:28     ` Christoph Hellwig [this message]
2021-07-07 16:45       ` Eric Snowberg
2021-07-07 12:39 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-07-07 16:28   ` Eric Snowberg
2021-07-07 17:00     ` Mimi Zohar
2021-07-07 22:10       ` Eric Snowberg
2021-07-08 13:56         ` Mimi Zohar
2021-07-08 17:59           ` Eric Snowberg
2021-07-08 19:31             ` Mimi Zohar
2021-07-08 23:17               ` Eric Snowberg
2021-07-09  1:10                 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-07-09 15:59                   ` Nayna

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