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From: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
To: Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@linaro.org>
Cc: alex.williamson@redhat.com, ashok.raj@intel.com,
	linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, robin.murphy@arm.com,
	hch@infradead.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	bhelgaas@google.com, will@kernel.org, dwmw2@infradead.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] PCI, iommu: Factor 'untrusted' check for ATS enablement
Date: Wed, 27 May 2020 14:36:22 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200527123622.GI5221@8bytes.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200520152201.3309416-1-jean-philippe@linaro.org>

On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 05:21:59PM +0200, Jean-Philippe Brucker wrote:
> IOMMU drivers currently check themselves if a device is untrusted
> (plugged into an external-facing port) before enabling ATS. Move the
> check to drivers/pci. The only functional change should be to the AMD
> IOMMU driver. With this change all IOMMU drivers block 'Translated' PCIe
> transactions and Translation Requests from untrusted devices.
> 
> Since v1 [1] I added tags, addressed comments on patches 1 and 3, and
> fixed a regression in patch 3.
> 
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-iommu/20200515104359.1178606-1-jean-philippe@linaro.org/
> 
> Jean-Philippe Brucker (4):
>   PCI/ATS: Only enable ATS for trusted devices
>   iommu/amd: Use pci_ats_supported()
>   iommu/arm-smmu-v3: Use pci_ats_supported()
>   iommu/vt-d: Use pci_ats_supported()
> 
>  include/linux/pci-ats.h     |  3 +++
>  drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c   | 12 ++++--------
>  drivers/iommu/arm-smmu-v3.c | 20 +++++++-------------
>  drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c |  9 +++------
>  drivers/pci/ats.c           | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
>  5 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

Applied, thanks.
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      parent reply	other threads:[~2020-05-27 12:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-05-20 15:21 [PATCH v2 0/4] PCI, iommu: Factor 'untrusted' check for ATS enablement Jean-Philippe Brucker
2020-05-20 15:22 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] PCI/ATS: Only enable ATS for trusted devices Jean-Philippe Brucker
2020-05-20 15:22 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] iommu/amd: Use pci_ats_supported() Jean-Philippe Brucker
2020-05-20 15:22 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] iommu/arm-smmu-v3: " Jean-Philippe Brucker
2020-05-21 10:29   ` Will Deacon
2020-05-20 15:22 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] iommu/vt-d: " Jean-Philippe Brucker
2020-05-27  9:38 ` [PATCH v2 0/4] PCI, iommu: Factor 'untrusted' check for ATS enablement Jean-Philippe Brucker
2020-05-27 12:36 ` Joerg Roedel [this message]

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