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From: Claire Chang <tientzu@chromium.org>
To: Rob Herring <robh+dt@kernel.org>,
	frowand.list@gmail.com,  Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	m.szyprowski@samsung.com, Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Cc: devicetree@vger.kernel.org, heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com,
	Saravana Kannan <saravanak@google.com>,
	suzuki.poulose@arm.com, Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	bgolaszewski@baylibre.com, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	Nicolas Boichat <drinkcat@chromium.org>,
	dan.j.williams@intel.com, treding@nvidia.com
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 0/5] Restricted DMA
Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2020 19:59:12 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALiNf28XXGpJ=hV-S3dLyq1U18_trr4e4rr6OPr5W5DxHD9XcA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200728050140.996974-1-tientzu@chromium.org>

It seems that I didn't rebase the patchset properly. There are some
build test errors.
Sorry about that. Please kindly ignore those rebase issues. I'll fix
them in the next version.


On Tue, Jul 28, 2020 at 1:01 PM Claire Chang <tientzu@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> This series implements mitigations for lack of DMA access control on
> systems without an IOMMU, which could result in the DMA accessing the
> system memory at unexpected times and/or unexpected addresses, possibly
> leading to data leakage or corruption.
>
> For example, we plan to use the PCI-e bus for Wi-Fi on one MTK platform and
> that PCI-e bus is not behind an IOMMU. As PCI-e, by design, gives the
> device full access to system memory, a vulnerability in the Wi-Fi firmware
> could easily escalate to a full system exploit (remote wifi exploits: [1a],
> [1b] that shows a full chain of exploits; [2], [3]).
>
> To mitigate the security concerns, we introduce restricted DMA. The
> restricted DMA is implemented by per-device swiotlb and coherent memory
> pools. The feature on its own provides a basic level of protection against
> the DMA overwriting buffer contents at unexpected times. However, to
> protect against general data leakage and system memory corruption, the
> system needs to provide a way to restrict the DMA to a predefined memory
> region (this is usually done at firmware level, e.g. in ATF on some ARM
> platforms).
>
> [1a] https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2017/04/over-air-exploiting-broadcoms-wi-fi_4.html
> [1b] https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2017/04/over-air-exploiting-broadcoms-wi-fi_11.html
> [2] https://blade.tencent.com/en/advisories/qualpwn/
> [3] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/vulnerabilities-found-in-highly-popular-firmware-for-wifi-chips/
>
>
> Claire Chang (5):
>   swiotlb: Add io_tlb_mem struct
>   swiotlb: Add device swiotlb pool
>   swiotlb: Use device swiotlb pool if available
>   dt-bindings: of: Add plumbing for restricted DMA pool
>   of: Add plumbing for restricted DMA pool
>
>  .../reserved-memory/reserved-memory.txt       |  35 ++
>  drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c                   |   8 +-
>  drivers/of/address.c                          |  39 ++
>  drivers/of/device.c                           |   3 +
>  drivers/of/of_private.h                       |   6 +
>  drivers/xen/swiotlb-xen.c                     |   4 +-
>  include/linux/device.h                        |   4 +
>  include/linux/dma-direct.h                    |   8 +-
>  include/linux/swiotlb.h                       |  49 +-
>  kernel/dma/direct.c                           |   8 +-
>  kernel/dma/swiotlb.c                          | 418 +++++++++++-------
>  11 files changed, 393 insertions(+), 189 deletions(-)
>
> --
> v1: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/cover/1271660/
> Changes in v2:
> - build on top of swiotlb
>
> 2.28.0.rc0.142.g3c755180ce-goog
>
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      parent reply	other threads:[~2020-07-28 11:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-07-28  5:01 [RFC v2 0/5] Restricted DMA Claire Chang
2020-07-28  5:01 ` [RFC v2 1/5] swiotlb: Add io_tlb_mem struct Claire Chang
2020-07-28  5:01 ` [RFC v2 2/5] swiotlb: Add device swiotlb pool Claire Chang
2020-07-28  5:01 ` [RFC v2 3/5] swiotlb: Use device swiotlb pool if available Claire Chang
2020-07-28  5:01 ` [RFC v2 4/5] dt-bindings: of: Add plumbing for restricted DMA pool Claire Chang
2020-07-31 20:58   ` Rob Herring
2020-08-03 14:26     ` Claire Chang
2020-08-03 15:15       ` Tomasz Figa
2020-08-11  9:15         ` Tomasz Figa
2020-08-24 17:24           ` Tomasz Figa
2020-09-08  9:49             ` Claire Chang
2020-07-28  5:01 ` [RFC v2 5/5] " Claire Chang
2020-07-28 11:59 ` Claire Chang [this message]

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