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From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	jmorris@namei.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	dhowells@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 15/24] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down
Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2018 17:26:17 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <152346397696.4030.2692221040490871671.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <152346387861.4030.4408662483445703127.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

From: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>

ACPI provides an error injection mechanism, EINJ, for debugging and testing
the ACPI Platform Error Interface (APEI) and other RAS features.  If
supported by the firmware, ACPI specification 5.0 and later provide for a
way to specify a physical memory address to which to inject the error.

Injecting errors through EINJ can produce errors which to the platform are
indistinguishable from real hardware errors.  This can have undesirable
side-effects, such as causing the platform to mark hardware as needing
replacement.

While it does not provide a method to load unauthenticated privileged code,
the effect of these errors may persist across reboots and affect trust in
the underlying hardware, so disable error injection through EINJ if
the kernel is locked down.

Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
---

 drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c
index b38737c83a24..6d71e1e97b20 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c
@@ -518,6 +518,9 @@ static int einj_error_inject(u32 type, u32 flags, u64 param1, u64 param2,
 	int rc;
 	u64 base_addr, size;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down("ACPI error injection"))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	/* If user manually set "flags", make sure it is legal */
 	if (flags && (flags &
 		~(SETWA_FLAGS_APICID|SETWA_FLAGS_MEM|SETWA_FLAGS_PCIE_SBDF)))

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-04-11 16:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 63+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-04-11 16:24 [PATCH 00/24] security: Add kernel lockdown David Howells
2018-04-11 16:24 ` [PATCH 01/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells
2018-04-11 16:44   ` Jann Horn
2018-04-11 17:37   ` Randy Dunlap
2018-04-11 18:50     ` Miguel Ojeda
2018-04-11 19:56       ` Greg KH
2018-04-11 17:49   ` David Howells
2018-04-11 18:09   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-11 18:35     ` Justin Forbes
2018-04-11 21:05     ` Jordan Glover
2018-04-11 22:38       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-12 13:09         ` Justin Forbes
2018-04-12 16:52           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-12  2:57   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-11 16:24 ` [PATCH 02/24] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown David Howells
2018-04-11 17:05   ` Jann Horn
2018-04-13 20:22   ` Pavel Machek
2018-04-11 16:24 ` [PATCH 03/24] ima: require secure_boot rules in lockdown mode David Howells
2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/{mem, kmem, port} when " David Howells
2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 06/24] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " David Howells
2018-04-11 19:00   ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-04-11 20:09     ` Mimi Zohar
2018-04-12 11:38       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-04-11 20:05   ` David Howells
2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 07/24] hibernate: Disable when " David Howells
2018-04-13 20:22   ` Pavel Machek
2018-04-19 14:38   ` David Howells
2018-04-22 14:34     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-26  7:26     ` Pavel Machek
2018-04-26  7:34       ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2018-04-26  8:20       ` Jiri Kosina
2018-05-23  8:46         ` joeyli
2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 08/24] uswsusp: " David Howells
2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 09/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells
2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 10/24] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells
2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 11/24] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " David Howells
2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 12/24] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells
2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 13/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells
2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 14/24] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " David Howells
2018-04-11 16:26 ` David Howells [this message]
2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 16/24] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " David Howells
2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 17/24] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL David Howells
2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 18/24] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) David Howells
2018-04-11 17:22   ` Randy Dunlap
2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 19/24] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module David Howells
2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 20/24] Lock down /proc/kcore David Howells
2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 21/24] Lock down kprobes David Howells
2018-04-11 16:27 ` [PATCH 22/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2018-04-11 16:27 ` [PATCH 23/24] Lock down perf David Howells
2018-04-11 16:27 ` [PATCH 24/24] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2018-04-11 17:26   ` Randy Dunlap
2018-04-11 18:50   ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-04-11 19:54   ` Greg KH
2018-04-11 20:08   ` David Howells
2018-04-11 20:09   ` David Howells
2018-04-11 20:33     ` Greg KH
2018-04-12  2:54       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-12  8:23         ` Greg KH
2018-04-12 14:19           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-13 20:22   ` Pavel Machek
2018-04-19 14:35   ` David Howells
2018-05-10 11:01     ` Pavel Machek

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