From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
"Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>,
Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
"Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@gmail.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
Ext4 Developers List <linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-man <linux-man@vger.kernel.org>,
Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v3 5/8] random: Make /dev/random be almost like /dev/urandom
Date: Mon, 23 Dec 2019 00:20:48 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5e6ac8831c6cf2e56a7a4b39616d1732b2bdd06c.1577088521.git.luto@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1577088521.git.luto@kernel.org>
This patch changes the read semantics of /dev/random to be the same
as /dev/urandom except that reads will block until the CRNG is
ready.
None of the cleanups that this enables have been done yet. As a
result, this gives a warning about an unused function.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 55 +++++++++++--------------------------------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index c0a3032b30ca..cf131f5989a1 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -354,7 +354,6 @@
#define INPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (INPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5))
#define OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT 10
#define OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5))
-#define SEC_XFER_SIZE 512
#define EXTRACT_SIZE 10
@@ -803,7 +802,6 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
if (entropy_bits >= random_read_wakeup_bits &&
wq_has_sleeper(&random_read_wait)) {
wake_up_interruptible(&random_read_wait);
- kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
}
/* If the input pool is getting full, and the blocking
* pool has room, send some entropy to the blocking
@@ -1031,6 +1029,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r)
crng_init = 2;
process_random_ready_list();
wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
+ kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
pr_notice("random: crng init done\n");
if (unseeded_warning.missed) {
pr_notice("random: %d get_random_xx warning(s) missed "
@@ -1981,43 +1980,6 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
}
#endif
-static ssize_t
-_random_read(int nonblock, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
-{
- ssize_t n;
-
- if (nbytes == 0)
- return 0;
-
- nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, SEC_XFER_SIZE);
- while (1) {
- n = extract_entropy_user(&blocking_pool, buf, nbytes);
- if (n < 0)
- return n;
- trace_random_read(n*8, (nbytes-n)*8,
- ENTROPY_BITS(&blocking_pool),
- ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool));
- if (n > 0)
- return n;
-
- /* Pool is (near) empty. Maybe wait and retry. */
- if (nonblock)
- return -EAGAIN;
-
- wait_event_interruptible(random_read_wait,
- blocking_pool.initialized &&
- (ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) >= random_read_wakeup_bits));
- if (signal_pending(current))
- return -ERESTARTSYS;
- }
-}
-
-static ssize_t
-random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
-{
- return _random_read(file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK, buf, nbytes);
-}
-
static ssize_t
urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
loff_t *ppos)
@@ -2050,15 +2012,26 @@ urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
return urandom_read_nowarn(file, buf, nbytes, ppos);
}
+static ssize_t
+random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
+ return urandom_read_nowarn(file, buf, nbytes, ppos);
+}
+
static __poll_t
random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait)
{
__poll_t mask;
- poll_wait(file, &random_read_wait, wait);
+ poll_wait(file, &crng_init_wait, wait);
poll_wait(file, &random_write_wait, wait);
mask = 0;
- if (ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) >= random_read_wakeup_bits)
+ if (crng_ready())
mask |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
if (ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) < random_write_wakeup_bits)
mask |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
--
2.23.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-12-23 8:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-12-23 8:20 [PATCH v3 0/8] Rework random blocking Andy Lutomirski
2019-12-23 8:20 ` [PATCH v3 1/8] random: Don't wake crng_init_wait when crng_init == 1 Andy Lutomirski
2020-01-07 20:42 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-23 8:20 ` [PATCH v3 2/8] random: Add a urandom_read_nowait() for random APIs that don't warn Andy Lutomirski
2020-01-07 20:43 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-23 8:20 ` [PATCH v3 3/8] random: Add GRND_INSECURE to return best-effort non-cryptographic bytes Andy Lutomirski
2020-01-07 20:44 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-23 8:20 ` [PATCH v3 4/8] random: Ignore GRND_RANDOM in getentropy(2) Andy Lutomirski
2020-01-07 20:44 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-23 8:20 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2020-01-07 21:02 ` [PATCH v3 5/8] random: Make /dev/random be almost like /dev/urandom Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-23 8:20 ` [PATCH v3 6/8] random: Remove the blocking pool Andy Lutomirski
2020-01-07 21:03 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-23 8:20 ` [PATCH v3 7/8] random: Delete code to pull data into pools Andy Lutomirski
2020-01-07 21:03 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-23 8:20 ` [PATCH v3 8/8] random: Remove kernel.random.read_wakeup_threshold Andy Lutomirski
2020-01-07 21:04 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-26 9:29 ` [PATCH v3 0/8] Rework random blocking Stephan Müller
2019-12-26 10:03 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-12-26 11:40 ` Stephan Mueller
2019-12-26 11:12 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-12-26 12:03 ` Stephan Mueller
2019-12-26 12:46 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-12-27 9:55 ` Stephan Mueller
2019-12-26 14:04 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-26 23:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-12-27 10:29 ` Stephan Mueller
2019-12-27 13:04 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-27 21:22 ` Stephan Mueller
2019-12-27 22:08 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-28 2:06 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-12-29 14:49 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-29 15:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-12-28 7:01 ` Willy Tarreau
2020-01-09 22:02 ` Kurt Roeckx
2020-01-09 22:40 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2020-01-09 23:02 ` Kurt Roeckx
2020-01-10 7:53 ` Stephan Mueller
2020-01-10 0:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
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