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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, xen-devel@lists.xen.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Boris Ostrovsky" <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
	"Juergen Gross" <jgross@suse.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v8 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2017 10:00:56 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170627150056.15908.79730.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170627145607.15908.26571.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

The IOMMU is programmed with physical addresses for the various tables
and buffers that are used to communicate between the device and the
driver. When the driver allocates this memory it is encrypted. In order
for the IOMMU to access the memory as encrypted the encryption mask needs
to be included in these physical addresses during configuration.

The PTE entries created by the IOMMU should also include the encryption
mask so that when the device behind the IOMMU performs a DMA, the DMA
will be performed to encrypted memory.

Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c       |   30 ++++++++++++++++--------------
 drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c  |   34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_proto.h |   10 ++++++++++
 drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_types.h |    2 +-
 4 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c
index 503849d..16cc54b 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c
@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ static void dump_dte_entry(u16 devid)
 
 static void dump_command(unsigned long phys_addr)
 {
-	struct iommu_cmd *cmd = phys_to_virt(phys_addr);
+	struct iommu_cmd *cmd = iommu_phys_to_virt(phys_addr);
 	int i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i)
@@ -865,11 +865,13 @@ static void copy_cmd_to_buffer(struct amd_iommu *iommu,
 
 static void build_completion_wait(struct iommu_cmd *cmd, u64 address)
 {
+	u64 paddr = iommu_virt_to_phys((void *)address);
+
 	WARN_ON(address & 0x7ULL);
 
 	memset(cmd, 0, sizeof(*cmd));
-	cmd->data[0] = lower_32_bits(__pa(address)) | CMD_COMPL_WAIT_STORE_MASK;
-	cmd->data[1] = upper_32_bits(__pa(address));
+	cmd->data[0] = lower_32_bits(paddr) | CMD_COMPL_WAIT_STORE_MASK;
+	cmd->data[1] = upper_32_bits(paddr);
 	cmd->data[2] = 1;
 	CMD_SET_TYPE(cmd, CMD_COMPL_WAIT);
 }
@@ -1328,7 +1330,7 @@ static bool increase_address_space(struct protection_domain *domain,
 		return false;
 
 	*pte             = PM_LEVEL_PDE(domain->mode,
-					virt_to_phys(domain->pt_root));
+					iommu_virt_to_phys(domain->pt_root));
 	domain->pt_root  = pte;
 	domain->mode    += 1;
 	domain->updated  = true;
@@ -1365,7 +1367,7 @@ static u64 *alloc_pte(struct protection_domain *domain,
 			if (!page)
 				return NULL;
 
-			__npte = PM_LEVEL_PDE(level, virt_to_phys(page));
+			__npte = PM_LEVEL_PDE(level, iommu_virt_to_phys(page));
 
 			/* pte could have been changed somewhere. */
 			if (cmpxchg64(pte, __pte, __npte) != __pte) {
@@ -1481,10 +1483,10 @@ static int iommu_map_page(struct protection_domain *dom,
 			return -EBUSY;
 
 	if (count > 1) {
-		__pte = PAGE_SIZE_PTE(phys_addr, page_size);
+		__pte = PAGE_SIZE_PTE(__sme_set(phys_addr), page_size);
 		__pte |= PM_LEVEL_ENC(7) | IOMMU_PTE_P | IOMMU_PTE_FC;
 	} else
-		__pte = phys_addr | IOMMU_PTE_P | IOMMU_PTE_FC;
+		__pte = __sme_set(phys_addr) | IOMMU_PTE_P | IOMMU_PTE_FC;
 
 	if (prot & IOMMU_PROT_IR)
 		__pte |= IOMMU_PTE_IR;
@@ -1700,7 +1702,7 @@ static void free_gcr3_tbl_level1(u64 *tbl)
 		if (!(tbl[i] & GCR3_VALID))
 			continue;
 
-		ptr = __va(tbl[i] & PAGE_MASK);
+		ptr = iommu_phys_to_virt(tbl[i] & PAGE_MASK);
 
 		free_page((unsigned long)ptr);
 	}
@@ -1715,7 +1717,7 @@ static void free_gcr3_tbl_level2(u64 *tbl)
 		if (!(tbl[i] & GCR3_VALID))
 			continue;
 
-		ptr = __va(tbl[i] & PAGE_MASK);
+		ptr = iommu_phys_to_virt(tbl[i] & PAGE_MASK);
 
 		free_gcr3_tbl_level1(ptr);
 	}
@@ -1807,7 +1809,7 @@ static void set_dte_entry(u16 devid, struct protection_domain *domain, bool ats)
 	u64 flags = 0;
 
 	if (domain->mode != PAGE_MODE_NONE)
-		pte_root = virt_to_phys(domain->pt_root);
+		pte_root = iommu_virt_to_phys(domain->pt_root);
 
 	pte_root |= (domain->mode & DEV_ENTRY_MODE_MASK)
 		    << DEV_ENTRY_MODE_SHIFT;
@@ -1819,7 +1821,7 @@ static void set_dte_entry(u16 devid, struct protection_domain *domain, bool ats)
 		flags |= DTE_FLAG_IOTLB;
 
 	if (domain->flags & PD_IOMMUV2_MASK) {
-		u64 gcr3 = __pa(domain->gcr3_tbl);
+		u64 gcr3 = iommu_virt_to_phys(domain->gcr3_tbl);
 		u64 glx  = domain->glx;
 		u64 tmp;
 
@@ -3470,10 +3472,10 @@ static u64 *__get_gcr3_pte(u64 *root, int level, int pasid, bool alloc)
 			if (root == NULL)
 				return NULL;
 
-			*pte = __pa(root) | GCR3_VALID;
+			*pte = iommu_virt_to_phys(root) | GCR3_VALID;
 		}
 
-		root = __va(*pte & PAGE_MASK);
+		root = iommu_phys_to_virt(*pte & PAGE_MASK);
 
 		level -= 1;
 	}
@@ -3652,7 +3654,7 @@ static void set_dte_irq_entry(u16 devid, struct irq_remap_table *table)
 
 	dte	= amd_iommu_dev_table[devid].data[2];
 	dte	&= ~DTE_IRQ_PHYS_ADDR_MASK;
-	dte	|= virt_to_phys(table->table);
+	dte	|= iommu_virt_to_phys(table->table);
 	dte	|= DTE_IRQ_REMAP_INTCTL;
 	dte	|= DTE_IRQ_TABLE_LEN;
 	dte	|= DTE_IRQ_REMAP_ENABLE;
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c
index 5a11328..26862f1 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/iommu.h>
 #include <linux/kmemleak.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
 #include <asm/pci-direct.h>
 #include <asm/iommu.h>
 #include <asm/gart.h>
@@ -346,7 +347,7 @@ static void iommu_set_device_table(struct amd_iommu *iommu)
 
 	BUG_ON(iommu->mmio_base == NULL);
 
-	entry = virt_to_phys(amd_iommu_dev_table);
+	entry = iommu_virt_to_phys(amd_iommu_dev_table);
 	entry |= (dev_table_size >> 12) - 1;
 	memcpy_toio(iommu->mmio_base + MMIO_DEV_TABLE_OFFSET,
 			&entry, sizeof(entry));
@@ -602,7 +603,7 @@ static void iommu_enable_command_buffer(struct amd_iommu *iommu)
 
 	BUG_ON(iommu->cmd_buf == NULL);
 
-	entry = (u64)virt_to_phys(iommu->cmd_buf);
+	entry = iommu_virt_to_phys(iommu->cmd_buf);
 	entry |= MMIO_CMD_SIZE_512;
 
 	memcpy_toio(iommu->mmio_base + MMIO_CMD_BUF_OFFSET,
@@ -631,7 +632,7 @@ static void iommu_enable_event_buffer(struct amd_iommu *iommu)
 
 	BUG_ON(iommu->evt_buf == NULL);
 
-	entry = (u64)virt_to_phys(iommu->evt_buf) | EVT_LEN_MASK;
+	entry = iommu_virt_to_phys(iommu->evt_buf) | EVT_LEN_MASK;
 
 	memcpy_toio(iommu->mmio_base + MMIO_EVT_BUF_OFFSET,
 		    &entry, sizeof(entry));
@@ -664,7 +665,7 @@ static void iommu_enable_ppr_log(struct amd_iommu *iommu)
 	if (iommu->ppr_log == NULL)
 		return;
 
-	entry = (u64)virt_to_phys(iommu->ppr_log) | PPR_LOG_SIZE_512;
+	entry = iommu_virt_to_phys(iommu->ppr_log) | PPR_LOG_SIZE_512;
 
 	memcpy_toio(iommu->mmio_base + MMIO_PPR_LOG_OFFSET,
 		    &entry, sizeof(entry));
@@ -744,10 +745,10 @@ static int iommu_init_ga_log(struct amd_iommu *iommu)
 	if (!iommu->ga_log_tail)
 		goto err_out;
 
-	entry = (u64)virt_to_phys(iommu->ga_log) | GA_LOG_SIZE_512;
+	entry = iommu_virt_to_phys(iommu->ga_log) | GA_LOG_SIZE_512;
 	memcpy_toio(iommu->mmio_base + MMIO_GA_LOG_BASE_OFFSET,
 		    &entry, sizeof(entry));
-	entry = ((u64)virt_to_phys(iommu->ga_log) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) & ~7ULL;
+	entry = (iommu_virt_to_phys(iommu->ga_log) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) & ~7ULL;
 	memcpy_toio(iommu->mmio_base + MMIO_GA_LOG_TAIL_OFFSET,
 		    &entry, sizeof(entry));
 	writel(0x00, iommu->mmio_base + MMIO_GA_HEAD_OFFSET);
@@ -2535,6 +2536,24 @@ static int __init amd_iommu_init(void)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static bool amd_iommu_supports_sme(void)
+{
+	if (!sme_active() || (boot_cpu_data.x86 != 0x17))
+		return true;
+
+	/* For Fam17h, a specific level of support is required */
+	if (boot_cpu_data.microcode >= 0x08001205)
+		return true;
+
+	if ((boot_cpu_data.microcode >= 0x08001126) &&
+	    (boot_cpu_data.microcode <= 0x080011ff))
+		return true;
+
+	pr_notice("AMD-Vi: IOMMU not currently supported when SME is active\n");
+
+	return false;
+}
+
 /****************************************************************************
  *
  * Early detect code. This code runs at IOMMU detection time in the DMA
@@ -2552,6 +2571,9 @@ int __init amd_iommu_detect(void)
 	if (amd_iommu_disabled)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
+	if (!amd_iommu_supports_sme())
+		return -ENODEV;
+
 	ret = iommu_go_to_state(IOMMU_IVRS_DETECTED);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_proto.h b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_proto.h
index 466260f..3f12fb2 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_proto.h
+++ b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_proto.h
@@ -87,4 +87,14 @@ static inline bool iommu_feature(struct amd_iommu *iommu, u64 f)
 	return !!(iommu->features & f);
 }
 
+static inline u64 iommu_virt_to_phys(void *vaddr)
+{
+	return (u64)__sme_set(virt_to_phys(vaddr));
+}
+
+static inline void *iommu_phys_to_virt(unsigned long paddr)
+{
+	return phys_to_virt(__sme_clr(paddr));
+}
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_AMD_IOMMU_PROTO_H  */
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_types.h b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_types.h
index 4de8f41..3ce587d 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_types.h
+++ b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_types.h
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@
 
 #define IOMMU_PAGE_MASK (((1ULL << 52) - 1) & ~0xfffULL)
 #define IOMMU_PTE_PRESENT(pte) ((pte) & IOMMU_PTE_P)
-#define IOMMU_PTE_PAGE(pte) (phys_to_virt((pte) & IOMMU_PAGE_MASK))
+#define IOMMU_PTE_PAGE(pte) (iommu_phys_to_virt((pte) & IOMMU_PAGE_MASK))
 #define IOMMU_PTE_MODE(pte) (((pte) >> 9) & 0x07)
 
 #define IOMMU_PROT_MASK 0x03

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-06-27 15:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-06-27 14:56 [PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 14:56 ` [PATCH v8 01/38] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 14:56 ` [PATCH v8 02/38] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 14:56 ` [PATCH v8 03/38] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 14:56 ` [PATCH v8 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 14:57 ` [PATCH v8 05/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 14:57 ` [PATCH v8 06/38] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 14:57 ` [PATCH v8 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap() Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 14:57 ` [PATCH v8 08/38] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 14:57 ` [PATCH v8 09/38] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 14:58 ` [PATCH v8 10/38] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 14:58 ` [PATCH v8 11/38] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa() Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 14:58 ` [PATCH v8 12/38] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 14:58 ` [PATCH v8 13/38] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 14:58 ` [PATCH v8 14/38] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 14:58 ` [PATCH v8 15/38] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 14:59 ` [PATCH v8 16/38] efi: Add an EFI table address match function Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 14:59 ` [PATCH v8 17/38] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0 Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 14:59 ` [PATCH v8 18/38] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 14:59 ` [PATCH v8 19/38] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 14:59 ` [PATCH v8 20/38] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 14:59 ` [PATCH v8 21/38] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:00 ` [PATCH v8 22/38] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:00 ` [PATCH v8 23/38] x86/realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:00 ` [PATCH v8 24/38] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:00 ` [PATCH v8 25/38] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:00 ` [PATCH v8 26/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:00 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-06-27 15:01 ` [PATCH v8 28/38] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:01 ` [PATCH v8 29/38] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:01 ` [PATCH v8 30/38] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM Tom Lendacky

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