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From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
To: akpm@linux-foundation.org, ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net,
	hch@lst.de, hpa@zytor.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	mhiramat@kernel.org, mingo@elte.hu, mm-commits@vger.kernel.org,
	tglx@linutronix.de, torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Subject: [patch 85/93] bpf: rework the compat kernel probe handling
Date: Mon, 08 Jun 2020 21:34:40 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200609043440.wRw9CfaOr%akpm@linux-foundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200608212922.5b7fa74ca3f4e2444441b7f9@linux-foundation.org>

From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Subject: bpf: rework the compat kernel probe handling

Instead of using the dangerous probe_kernel_read and strncpy_from_unsafe
helpers, rework the compat probes to check if an address is a kernel or
userspace one, and then use the low-level kernel or user probe helper
shared by the proper kernel and user probe helpers.  This slightly
changes behavior as the compat probe on a user address doesn't check
the lockdown flags, just as the pure user probes do.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200521152301.2587579-14-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
---

 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c |  109 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 67 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c~bpf-rework-the-compat-kernel-probe-handling
+++ a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
@@ -136,17 +136,23 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_o
 };
 #endif
 
-BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_user, void *, dst, u32, size,
-	   const void __user *, unsafe_ptr)
+static __always_inline int
+bpf_probe_read_user_common(void *dst, u32 size, const void __user *unsafe_ptr)
 {
-	int ret = probe_user_read(dst, unsafe_ptr, size);
+	int ret;
 
+	ret = probe_user_read(dst, unsafe_ptr, size);
 	if (unlikely(ret < 0))
 		memset(dst, 0, size);
-
 	return ret;
 }
 
+BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_user, void *, dst, u32, size,
+	   const void __user *, unsafe_ptr)
+{
+	return bpf_probe_read_user_common(dst, size, unsafe_ptr);
+}
+
 const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_read_user_proto = {
 	.func		= bpf_probe_read_user,
 	.gpl_only	= true,
@@ -156,17 +162,24 @@ const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_re
 	.arg3_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
 };
 
-BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_user_str, void *, dst, u32, size,
-	   const void __user *, unsafe_ptr)
+static __always_inline int
+bpf_probe_read_user_str_common(void *dst, u32 size,
+			       const void __user *unsafe_ptr)
 {
-	int ret = strncpy_from_user_nofault(dst, unsafe_ptr, size);
+	int ret;
 
+	ret = strncpy_from_user_nofault(dst, unsafe_ptr, size);
 	if (unlikely(ret < 0))
 		memset(dst, 0, size);
-
 	return ret;
 }
 
+BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_user_str, void *, dst, u32, size,
+	   const void __user *, unsafe_ptr)
+{
+	return bpf_probe_read_user_str_common(dst, size, unsafe_ptr);
+}
+
 const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_read_user_str_proto = {
 	.func		= bpf_probe_read_user_str,
 	.gpl_only	= true,
@@ -177,25 +190,25 @@ const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_re
 };
 
 static __always_inline int
-bpf_probe_read_kernel_common(void *dst, u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr,
-			     const bool compat)
+bpf_probe_read_kernel_common(void *dst, u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr)
 {
 	int ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ);
 
 	if (unlikely(ret < 0))
-		goto out;
-	ret = compat ? probe_kernel_read(dst, unsafe_ptr, size) :
-	      probe_kernel_read_strict(dst, unsafe_ptr, size);
+		goto fail;
+	ret = probe_kernel_read_strict(dst, unsafe_ptr, size);
 	if (unlikely(ret < 0))
-out:
-		memset(dst, 0, size);
+		goto fail;
+	return ret;
+fail:
+	memset(dst, 0, size);
 	return ret;
 }
 
 BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_kernel, void *, dst, u32, size,
 	   const void *, unsafe_ptr)
 {
-	return bpf_probe_read_kernel_common(dst, size, unsafe_ptr, false);
+	return bpf_probe_read_kernel_common(dst, size, unsafe_ptr);
 }
 
 const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_read_kernel_proto = {
@@ -207,50 +220,37 @@ const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_re
 	.arg3_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
 };
 
-BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_compat, void *, dst, u32, size,
-	   const void *, unsafe_ptr)
-{
-	return bpf_probe_read_kernel_common(dst, size, unsafe_ptr, true);
-}
-
-static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_read_compat_proto = {
-	.func		= bpf_probe_read_compat,
-	.gpl_only	= true,
-	.ret_type	= RET_INTEGER,
-	.arg1_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM,
-	.arg2_type	= ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO,
-	.arg3_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
-};
-
 static __always_inline int
-bpf_probe_read_kernel_str_common(void *dst, u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr,
-				 const bool compat)
+bpf_probe_read_kernel_str_common(void *dst, u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr)
 {
 	int ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ);
 
 	if (unlikely(ret < 0))
-		goto out;
+		goto fail;
+
 	/*
-	 * The strncpy_from_unsafe_*() call will likely not fill the entire
-	 * buffer, but that's okay in this circumstance as we're probing
+	 * The strncpy_from_kernel_nofault() call will likely not fill the
+	 * entire buffer, but that's okay in this circumstance as we're probing
 	 * arbitrary memory anyway similar to bpf_probe_read_*() and might
 	 * as well probe the stack. Thus, memory is explicitly cleared
 	 * only in error case, so that improper users ignoring return
 	 * code altogether don't copy garbage; otherwise length of string
 	 * is returned that can be used for bpf_perf_event_output() et al.
 	 */
-	ret = compat ? strncpy_from_unsafe(dst, unsafe_ptr, size) :
-	      strncpy_from_kernel_nofault(dst, unsafe_ptr, size);
+	ret = strncpy_from_kernel_nofault(dst, unsafe_ptr, size);
 	if (unlikely(ret < 0))
-out:
-		memset(dst, 0, size);
+		goto fail;
+
+	return 0;
+fail:
+	memset(dst, 0, size);
 	return ret;
 }
 
 BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_kernel_str, void *, dst, u32, size,
 	   const void *, unsafe_ptr)
 {
-	return bpf_probe_read_kernel_str_common(dst, size, unsafe_ptr, false);
+	return bpf_probe_read_kernel_str_common(dst, size, unsafe_ptr);
 }
 
 const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_read_kernel_str_proto = {
@@ -262,10 +262,34 @@ const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_re
 	.arg3_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
 };
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE
+BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_compat, void *, dst, u32, size,
+	   const void *, unsafe_ptr)
+{
+	if ((unsigned long)unsafe_ptr < TASK_SIZE) {
+		return bpf_probe_read_user_common(dst, size,
+				(__force void __user *)unsafe_ptr);
+	}
+	return bpf_probe_read_kernel_common(dst, size, unsafe_ptr);
+}
+
+static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_read_compat_proto = {
+	.func		= bpf_probe_read_compat,
+	.gpl_only	= true,
+	.ret_type	= RET_INTEGER,
+	.arg1_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM,
+	.arg2_type	= ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO,
+	.arg3_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
+};
+
 BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_compat_str, void *, dst, u32, size,
 	   const void *, unsafe_ptr)
 {
-	return bpf_probe_read_kernel_str_common(dst, size, unsafe_ptr, true);
+	if ((unsigned long)unsafe_ptr < TASK_SIZE) {
+		return bpf_probe_read_user_str_common(dst, size,
+				(__force void __user *)unsafe_ptr);
+	}
+	return bpf_probe_read_kernel_str_common(dst, size, unsafe_ptr);
 }
 
 static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_read_compat_str_proto = {
@@ -276,6 +300,7 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_p
 	.arg2_type	= ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO,
 	.arg3_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
 };
+#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE */
 
 BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_write_user, void __user *, unsafe_ptr, const void *, src,
 	   u32, size)
_


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-06-09  4:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 101+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-06-09  4:29 incoming Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:29 ` [patch 01/93] kallsyms/printk: add loglvl to print_ip_sym() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:30 ` [patch 02/93] alpha: add show_stack_loglvl() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:30 ` [patch 03/93] arc: " Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:30 ` [patch 04/93] arm/asm: add loglvl to c_backtrace() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:30 ` [patch 05/93] arm: add loglvl to unwind_backtrace() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:30 ` [patch 06/93] arm: add loglvl to dump_backtrace() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:30 ` [patch 07/93] arm: wire up dump_backtrace_{entry,stm} Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:30 ` [patch 08/93] arm: add show_stack_loglvl() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:30 ` [patch 09/93] arm64: add loglvl to dump_backtrace() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:30 ` [patch 10/93] arm64: add show_stack_loglvl() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:30 ` [patch 11/93] c6x: " Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:30 ` [patch 12/93] csky: " Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:30 ` [patch 13/93] h8300: " Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:30 ` [patch 14/93] hexagon: " Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:30 ` [patch 15/93] ia64: pass log level as arg into ia64_do_show_stack() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:30 ` [patch 16/93] ia64: add show_stack_loglvl() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:30 ` [patch 17/93] m68k: " Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:30 ` [patch 18/93] microblaze: add loglvl to microblaze_unwind_inner() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:30 ` [patch 19/93] microblaze: add loglvl to microblaze_unwind() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:30 ` [patch 20/93] microblaze: add show_stack_loglvl() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:30 ` [patch 21/93] mips: " Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:31 ` [patch 22/93] nds32: " Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:31 ` [patch 23/93] nios2: " Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:31 ` [patch 24/93] openrisc: " Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:31 ` [patch 25/93] parisc: " Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:31 ` [patch 26/93] powerpc: " Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:31 ` [patch 27/93] riscv: " Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:31 ` [patch 28/93] s390: " Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:31 ` [patch 29/93] sh: add loglvl to dump_mem() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:31 ` [patch 30/93] sh: remove needless printk() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:31 ` [patch 31/93] sh: add loglvl to printk_address() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:31 ` [patch 32/93] sh: add loglvl to show_trace() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:31 ` [patch 33/93] sh: add show_stack_loglvl() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:31 ` [patch 34/93] sparc: " Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:31 ` [patch 35/93] um/sysrq: remove needless variable sp Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:31 ` [patch 36/93] um: add show_stack_loglvl() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:31 ` [patch 37/93] unicore32: remove unused pmode argument in c_backtrace() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:31 ` [patch 38/93] unicore32: add loglvl to c_backtrace() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:31 ` [patch 39/93] unicore32: add show_stack_loglvl() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:31 ` [patch 40/93] x86: add missing const qualifiers for log_lvl Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:32 ` [patch 41/93] x86: add show_stack_loglvl() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:32 ` [patch 42/93] xtensa: add loglvl to show_trace() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:32 ` [patch 43/93] xtensa: add show_stack_loglvl() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:32 ` [patch 44/93] sysrq: use show_stack_loglvl() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:32 ` [patch 45/93] x86/amd_gart: print stacktrace for a leak with KERN_ERR Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:32 ` [patch 46/93] power: use show_stack_loglvl() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:32 ` [patch 47/93] kdb: don't play with console_loglevel Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:32 ` [patch 48/93] sched: print stack trace with KERN_INFO Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:32 ` [patch 49/93] kernel: use show_stack_loglvl() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:32 ` [patch 50/93] kernel: rename show_stack_loglvl() => show_stack() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:32 ` [patch 51/93] mm: don't include asm/pgtable.h if linux/mm.h is already included Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:32 ` [patch 52/93] mm: introduce include/linux/pgtable.h Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:32 ` [patch 53/93] mm: reorder includes after introduction of linux/pgtable.h Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:32 ` [patch 54/93] csky: replace definitions of __pXd_offset() with pXd_index() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:32 ` [patch 55/93] m68k/mm/motorola: move comment about page table allocation funcitons Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:32 ` [patch 56/93] m68k/mm: move {cache,nocahe}_page() definitions close to their user Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:33 ` [patch 57/93] x86/mm: simplify init_trampoline() and surrounding logic Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:33 ` [patch 58/93] mm: pgtable: add shortcuts for accessing kernel PMD and PTE Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:33 ` [patch 59/93] mm: consolidate pte_index() and pte_offset_*() definitions Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:33 ` [patch 60/93] mmap locking API: initial implementation as rwsem wrappers Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:33 ` [patch 61/93] MMU notifier: use the new mmap locking API Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:33 ` [patch 62/93] DMA reservations: " Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:33 ` [patch 63/93] mmap locking API: use coccinelle to convert mmap_sem rwsem call sites Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:33 ` [patch 64/93] mmap locking API: convert mmap_sem call sites missed by coccinelle Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:33 ` [patch 65/93] mmap locking API: convert nested write lock sites Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:33 ` [patch 66/93] mmap locking API: add mmap_read_trylock_non_owner() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:33 ` [patch 67/93] mmap locking API: add MMAP_LOCK_INITIALIZER Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:33 ` [patch 68/93] mmap locking API: add mmap_assert_locked() and mmap_assert_write_locked() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:33 ` [patch 69/93] mmap locking API: rename mmap_sem to mmap_lock Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:33 ` [patch 70/93] mmap locking API: convert mmap_sem API comments Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:33 ` [patch 71/93] mmap locking API: convert mmap_sem comments Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:33 ` [patch 72/93] maccess: unexport probe_kernel_write() Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:34 ` [patch 73/93] maccess: remove various unused weak aliases Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:34 ` [patch 74/93] maccess: remove duplicate kerneldoc comments Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:34 ` [patch 75/93] maccess: clarify " Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:34 ` [patch 76/93] maccess: update the top of file comment Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:34 ` [patch 77/93] maccess: rename strncpy_from_unsafe_user to strncpy_from_user_nofault Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:34 ` [patch 78/93] maccess: rename strncpy_from_unsafe_strict to strncpy_from_kernel_nofault Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:34 ` [patch 79/93] maccess: rename strnlen_unsafe_user to strnlen_user_nofault Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:34 ` [patch 80/93] maccess: remove probe_read_common and probe_write_common Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:34 ` [patch 81/93] maccess: unify the probe kernel arch hooks Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:34 ` [patch 82/93] bpf: factor out a bpf_trace_copy_string helper Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:34 ` [patch 83/93] bpf: handle the compat string in bpf_trace_copy_string better Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:34 ` [patch 84/93] bpf:bpf_seq_printf(): handle potentially unsafe format string better Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:34 ` Andrew Morton [this message]
2020-06-09  4:34 ` [patch 86/93] tracing/kprobes: handle mixed kernel/userspace probes better Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:34 ` [patch 87/93] maccess: remove strncpy_from_unsafe Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:34 ` [patch 88/93] maccess: always use strict semantics for probe_kernel_read Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:34 ` [patch 89/93] maccess: move user access routines together Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:34 ` [patch 90/93] maccess: allow architectures to provide kernel probing directly Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:35 ` [patch 91/93] x86: use non-set_fs based maccess routines Andrew Morton
2020-06-09 18:01   ` Linus Torvalds
2020-06-09 18:06     ` Linus Torvalds
2020-06-10  6:57       ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-06-09  4:35 ` [patch 92/93] maccess: return -ERANGE when probe_kernel_read() fails Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  4:35 ` [patch 93/93] include/linux/cache.h: expand documentation over __read_mostly Andrew Morton
2020-06-17 15:51   ` Christopher Lameter
2020-06-09  5:34 ` mmotm 2020-06-08-22-33 uploaded Andrew Morton
2020-06-09  5:36 ` mmotm 2020-06-08-22-35 uploaded Andrew Morton
2020-06-09 16:58 ` incoming Linus Torvalds

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