From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from kanga.kvack.org (kanga.kvack.org [205.233.56.17]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2D1C1C4828F for ; Sat, 3 Feb 2024 12:26:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) id 4CF216B006E; Sat, 3 Feb 2024 07:26:51 -0500 (EST) Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 40) id 47EA46B0071; Sat, 3 Feb 2024 07:26:51 -0500 (EST) X-Delivered-To: int-list-linux-mm@kvack.org Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 63042) id 36DDF6B0072; Sat, 3 Feb 2024 07:26:51 -0500 (EST) X-Delivered-To: linux-mm@kvack.org Received: from relay.hostedemail.com (smtprelay0016.hostedemail.com [216.40.44.16]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 23AEF6B006E for ; Sat, 3 Feb 2024 07:26:51 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpin14.hostedemail.com (a10.router.float.18 [10.200.18.1]) by unirelay06.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AB020A1D40 for ; Sat, 3 Feb 2024 12:26:50 +0000 (UTC) X-FDA: 81750416580.14.61AF3A9 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [139.178.84.217]) by imf16.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D64AC18000B for ; Sat, 3 Feb 2024 12:26:48 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: imf16.hostedemail.com; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.s=k20201202 header.b=Bpwo12yg; spf=pass (imf16.hostedemail.com: domain of broonie@kernel.org designates 139.178.84.217 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=broonie@kernel.org; dmarc=pass (policy=none) header.from=kernel.org ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=hostedemail.com; s=arc-20220608; t=1706963209; h=from:from:sender:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding:in-reply-to: references:dkim-signature; bh=zfOA4VitSC9BCFCzkbMHpT2iqJgX/iRo4UxswDFtbK4=; b=0Cf0i2yl6lsePcCsmhEPfFs3iavUy7rMv2d9C64n/GN58Y180xpDzOUK0na8+CjteqAm8g yPmL25Xuqgels8meS9WckzDWuEtSUfmYezKuVIMxSTgRrCshPc11B8qeCGW84Xsyd0135p seZTdPHfkQSoKmYaSG3GwtQ97mABjww= ARC-Seal: i=1; s=arc-20220608; d=hostedemail.com; t=1706963209; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; b=Ru2uQO7HzbLCEALQgPCqgzvKWWTp23NB9ydd6lvXd1bWrcPIVWAJMkj0Flnw364j2wirf9 MZSEAkNI308HXKlTPXw2o0F36IdF1ICLU/R2CKuyU1oyTQjQndzn99NFUtyZo+Z1T3KDJy 2a9wzBbvYIGFhjtY+fCUOr3R42ESLis= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; imf16.hostedemail.com; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.s=k20201202 header.b=Bpwo12yg; spf=pass (imf16.hostedemail.com: domain of broonie@kernel.org designates 139.178.84.217 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=broonie@kernel.org; dmarc=pass (policy=none) header.from=kernel.org Received: from smtp.kernel.org (transwarp.subspace.kernel.org [100.75.92.58]) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AA1DC60A13; Sat, 3 Feb 2024 12:26:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C9153C433F1; Sat, 3 Feb 2024 12:26:25 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1706963207; bh=7nikwRMXxkQI47PI5LgYYAnwr0ud1PE/qnSuV6BlNNQ=; h=From:Subject:Date:To:Cc:From; b=Bpwo12ygZ5lTkKkhrnag39/wbwpIbasf2rem32bJpz7MvZLuFAZc7msdfo9ZHRR+K 1nsBfEi6kNPm4U8Yahu0QEhqZk5aFwEZ+/+GLMl+Z2kgbxVhNFb2fDS5XQRxSvS7kk RiX9O489iHzhxiMJovSvOM8aeGotksdcJxF+cG+28zVeTdCbthqcR6rWYpClCZoGOb GYSdgNM2rDjtqppbPJYgsAY0lgml6FPtA6H3voHqcCfFQE8gDHkS1sEzhnH4wRlugL ZBSpNpq1KhRN/nHECU0Cpfg0HdD32cbml2wJLH7QLW2kQRG/4mEt38XReROVckx7xS Lqkt9F4v+Rk6A== From: Mark Brown Subject: [PATCH v8 00/38] arm64/gcs: Provide support for GCS in userspace Date: Sat, 03 Feb 2024 12:25:26 +0000 Message-Id: <20240203-arm64-gcs-v8-0-c9fec77673ef@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-B4-Tracking: v=1; b=H4sIALgwvmUC/2XOy2rDMBAF0F8JWldF70dW/Y/ShaQZOaaNHaRgW oL/vXIKjYLR6g46c+dGKpYRKzkebqTgMtZxnlpwLweSTmEakI7QMhFMSNYeDeVsFB1SpSg5D5G Bs8KT9j+GijSWMKXTJq7nyza9FMzj973h/aPl01ivc/m5Fy58m/7tttx0uxdOGY1ZG5u9jDGYt 08sE369zmUg25pFdFSonopGIYnEQakkMO6o7KjkPZWNJoDss3cMvNtR9aCO2Z6qRo1LOch2MjN +R3VHheipbtRj5o4DGCnUjpp/yhnzPTWNWodaA4agAHbUPih/brWNCsaTcjKCtfqJruv6C9hLr MAbAgAA To: Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Jonathan Corbet , Andrew Morton , Marc Zyngier , Oliver Upton , James Morse , Suzuki K Poulose , Arnd Bergmann , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Shuah Khan , "Rick P. Edgecombe" , Deepak Gupta , Ard Biesheuvel , Szabolcs Nagy Cc: "H.J. Lu" , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Florian Weimer , Christian Brauner , Thiago Jung Bauermann , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Mark Brown X-Mailer: b4 0.13-dev-a684c X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=openpgp-sha256; l=13867; i=broonie@kernel.org; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=7nikwRMXxkQI47PI5LgYYAnwr0ud1PE/qnSuV6BlNNQ=; b=owEBbQGS/pANAwAKASTWi3JdVIfQAcsmYgBlvjDQoBalVfXKKuVphS9ChRtnCrPuzfbmaFImAUeW TuPe27SJATMEAAEKAB0WIQSt5miqZ1cYtZ/in+ok1otyXVSH0AUCZb4w0AAKCRAk1otyXVSH0JKiB/ 9o+bqb/Kpz9R739LlYAPWX7me6reQZOppuOdFLjLttI34e2l0TvtntwBYxc1qwXJZ5G7/9YJIdFiEb sYhd2soedUwQNjU2K9mfPQYy3iNEsUqwqlrHAFmd45BIiOhXdepUS9J392UljJy0jvRa2YBGZU2quZ K/90cbfzgzhx56x16YDhxep2zkEPFMXzOXoWgCYIQa7ptZdib7g+Cb2xcsMxpzl2kSNAhaxBinhi1s 9QudGxKdUVeLWf94jvZ+jB3Idp8MBaPi7TysZ+BDJCZoGO/qN9tnUayj3D2uu2+yw3p4AM/Sz4TkEW Qgb0bw66ARkiIagCW+2Cn9Xj0zI2Ag X-Developer-Key: i=broonie@kernel.org; a=openpgp; fpr=3F2568AAC26998F9E813A1C5C3F436CA30F5D8EB X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: D64AC18000B X-Rspam-User: X-Rspamd-Server: rspam11 X-Stat-Signature: eh7e9fqfq3a5esf5jf8qz14umw1cwi8j X-HE-Tag: 1706963208-103002 X-HE-Meta: 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 FDd6Ua3v nIDS6Y0dAXPZyIfIHFjYxmNkJQyTU9TwL5eyHa219tmMn193Nh/PRXI4XEGEDHQQJX4HDkLVZlU8N7JpUorfHWPvsKZ1giwEJX66Q77BOQ9r5R+FGD9HttlbzGcrqQ0g9xGlTHLukIyi1pxkylpGi5bqaorH9k2X5TEAye6ithpkH8tfnPTr9mGScl0bx2RsqJJ7bg5qQUzBG/hOUtCc4Gv0eieYq2oWTLLEILVKvKfuXtJur/6u9cVrf52pinxqiEQIjw4HXGlk1uk3lRY0+ozaBldgIhSaZFpT78F5QOOgSV2/qhWNg8Z+PM3prAV8Ef0s94JIy48+KAmOhQg+Xerd5caxL01qwRz3puTdxp4bKwEAhlkQgG3bRgaDn53DiClNy X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: The arm64 Guarded Control Stack (GCS) feature provides support for hardware protected stacks of return addresses, intended to provide hardening against return oriented programming (ROP) attacks and to make it easier to gather call stacks for applications such as profiling. When GCS is active a secondary stack called the Guarded Control Stack is maintained, protected with a memory attribute which means that it can only be written with specific GCS operations. The current GCS pointer can not be directly written to by userspace. When a BL is executed the value stored in LR is also pushed onto the GCS, and when a RET is executed the top of the GCS is popped and compared to LR with a fault being raised if the values do not match. GCS operations may only be performed on GCS pages, a data abort is generated if they are not. The combination of hardware enforcement and lack of extra instructions in the function entry and exit paths should result in something which has less overhead and is more difficult to attack than a purely software implementation like clang's shadow stacks. This series implements support for use of GCS by userspace, along with support for use of GCS within KVM guests. It does not enable use of GCS by either EL1 or EL2, this will be implemented separately. Executables are started without GCS and must use a prctl() to enable it, it is expected that this will be done very early in application execution by the dynamic linker or other startup code. For dynamic linking this will be done by checking that everything in the executable is marked as GCS compatible. x86 has an equivalent feature called shadow stacks, this series depends on the x86 patches for generic memory management support for the new guarded/shadow stack page type and shares APIs as much as possible. As there has been extensive discussion with the wider community around the ABI for shadow stacks I have as far as practical kept implementation decisions close to those for x86, anticipating that review would lead to similar conclusions in the absence of strong reasoning for divergence. The main divergence I am concious of is that x86 allows shadow stack to be enabled and disabled repeatedly, freeing the shadow stack for the thread whenever disabled, while this implementation keeps the GCS allocated after disable but refuses to reenable it. This is to avoid races with things actively walking the GCS during a disable, we do anticipate that some systems will wish to disable GCS at runtime but are not aware of any demand for subsequently reenabling it. x86 uses an arch_prctl() to manage enable and disable, since only x86 and S/390 use arch_prctl() a generic prctl() was proposed[1] as part of a patch set for the equivalent RISC-V Zicfiss feature which I initially adopted fairly directly but following review feedback has been revised quite a bit. We currently maintain the x86 pattern of implicitly allocating a shadow stack for threads started with shadow stack enabled, there has been some discussion of removing this support and requiring the use of clone3() with explicit allocation of shadow stacks instead. I have no strong feelings either way, implicit allocation is not really consistent with anything else we do and creates the potential for errors around thread exit but on the other hand it is existing ABI on x86 and minimises the changes needed in userspace code. There is an open issue with support for CRIU, on x86 this required the ability to set the GCS mode via ptrace. This series supports configuring mode bits other than enable/disable via ptrace but it needs to be confirmed if this is sufficient. The series depends on support for shadow stacks in clone3(), that series includes the addition of ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK. https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231120-clone3-shadow-stack-v3-0-a7b8ed3e2acc@kernel.org It also depends on the addition of more waitpid() flags to nolibc: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231023-nolibc-waitpid-flags-v2-1-b09d096f091f@kernel.org You can see a branch with the full set of dependencies against Linus' tree at: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/misc.git arm64-gcs [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230213045351.3945824-1-debug@rivosinc.com/ Signed-off-by: Mark Brown --- Changes in v8: - Invalidate signal cap token on stack when consuming. - Typo and other trivial fixes. - Don't try to use process_vm_write() on GCS, it intentionally does not work. - Fix leak of thread GCSs. - Rebase onto latest clone3() series. - Link to v7: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231122-arm64-gcs-v7-0-201c483bd775@kernel.org Changes in v7: - Rebase onto v6.7-rc2 via the clone3() patch series. - Change the token used to cap the stack during signal handling to be compatible with GCSPOPM. - Fix flags for new page types. - Fold in support for clone3(). - Replace copy_to_user_gcs() with put_user_gcs(). - Link to v6: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231009-arm64-gcs-v6-0-78e55deaa4dd@kernel.org Changes in v6: - Rebase onto v6.6-rc3. - Add some more gcsb_dsync() barriers following spec clarifications. - Due to ongoing discussion around clone()/clone3() I've not updated anything there, the behaviour is the same as on previous versions. - Link to v5: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230822-arm64-gcs-v5-0-9ef181dd6324@kernel.org Changes in v5: - Don't map any permissions for user GCSs, we always use EL0 accessors or use a separate mapping of the page. - Reduce the standard size of the GCS to RLIMIT_STACK/2. - Enforce a PAGE_SIZE alignment requirement on map_shadow_stack(). - Clarifications and fixes to documentation. - More tests. - Link to v4: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230807-arm64-gcs-v4-0-68cfa37f9069@kernel.org Changes in v4: - Implement flags for map_shadow_stack() allowing the cap and end of stack marker to be enabled independently or not at all. - Relax size and alignment requirements for map_shadow_stack(). - Add more blurb explaining the advantages of hardware enforcement. - Link to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230731-arm64-gcs-v3-0-cddf9f980d98@kernel.org Changes in v3: - Rebase onto v6.5-rc4. - Add a GCS barrier on context switch. - Add a GCS stress test. - Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230724-arm64-gcs-v2-0-dc2c1d44c2eb@kernel.org Changes in v2: - Rebase onto v6.5-rc3. - Rework prctl() interface to allow each bit to be locked independently. - map_shadow_stack() now places the cap token based on the size requested by the caller not the actual space allocated. - Mode changes other than enable via ptrace are now supported. - Expand test coverage. - Various smaller fixes and adjustments. - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230716-arm64-gcs-v1-0-bf567f93bba6@kernel.org --- Mark Brown (38): arm64/mm: Restructure arch_validate_flags() for extensibility prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for shadow stack mman: Add map_shadow_stack() flags arm64: Document boot requirements for Guarded Control Stacks arm64/gcs: Document the ABI for Guarded Control Stacks arm64/sysreg: Add definitions for architected GCS caps arm64/gcs: Add manual encodings of GCS instructions arm64/gcs: Provide put_user_gcs() arm64/cpufeature: Runtime detection of Guarded Control Stack (GCS) arm64/mm: Allocate PIE slots for EL0 guarded control stack mm: Define VM_SHADOW_STACK for arm64 when we support GCS arm64/mm: Map pages for guarded control stack KVM: arm64: Manage GCS registers for guests arm64/gcs: Allow GCS usage at EL0 and EL1 arm64/idreg: Add overrride for GCS arm64/hwcap: Add hwcap for GCS arm64/traps: Handle GCS exceptions arm64/mm: Handle GCS data aborts arm64/gcs: Context switch GCS state for EL0 arm64/gcs: Ensure that new threads have a GCS arm64/gcs: Implement shadow stack prctl() interface arm64/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack() arm64/signal: Set up and restore the GCS context for signal handlers arm64/signal: Expose GCS state in signal frames arm64/ptrace: Expose GCS via ptrace and core files arm64: Add Kconfig for Guarded Control Stack (GCS) kselftest/arm64: Verify the GCS hwcap kselftest/arm64: Add GCS as a detected feature in the signal tests kselftest/arm64: Add framework support for GCS to signal handling tests kselftest/arm64: Allow signals tests to specify an expected si_code kselftest/arm64: Always run signals tests with GCS enabled kselftest/arm64: Add very basic GCS test program kselftest/arm64: Add a GCS test program built with the system libc kselftest/arm64: Add test coverage for GCS mode locking selftests/arm64: Add GCS signal tests kselftest/arm64: Add a GCS stress test kselftest/arm64: Enable GCS for the FP stress tests kselftest: Provide shadow stack enable helpers for arm64 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 + Documentation/arch/arm64/booting.rst | 22 + Documentation/arch/arm64/elf_hwcaps.rst | 3 + Documentation/arch/arm64/gcs.rst | 233 +++++++ Documentation/arch/arm64/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst | 2 +- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 20 + arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 6 + arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h | 17 + arch/arm64/include/asm/esr.h | 28 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h | 2 + arch/arm64/include/asm/gcs.h | 107 +++ arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h | 4 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 12 + arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h | 23 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h | 14 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 7 + arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h | 20 + arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 40 ++ arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h | 8 + arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h | 9 + arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 19 + arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c | 23 + arch/arm64/kernel/idreg-override.c | 2 + arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 85 +++ arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 59 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c | 242 ++++++- arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c | 11 + arch/arm64/kvm/emulate-nested.c | 4 + arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/sysreg-sr.h | 17 + arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c | 22 + arch/arm64/mm/Makefile | 1 + arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 79 ++- arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c | 300 +++++++++ arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c | 13 +- arch/arm64/tools/cpucaps | 1 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 3 - fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 + include/linux/mm.h | 16 +- include/uapi/asm-generic/mman.h | 4 + include/uapi/linux/elf.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 22 + kernel/sys.c | 30 + tools/testing/selftests/arm64/Makefile | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/hwcap.c | 19 + tools/testing/selftests/arm64/fp/assembler.h | 15 + tools/testing/selftests/arm64/fp/fpsimd-test.S | 2 + tools/testing/selftests/arm64/fp/sve-test.S | 2 + tools/testing/selftests/arm64/fp/za-test.S | 2 + tools/testing/selftests/arm64/fp/zt-test.S | 2 + tools/testing/selftests/arm64/gcs/.gitignore | 5 + tools/testing/selftests/arm64/gcs/Makefile | 24 + tools/testing/selftests/arm64/gcs/asm-offsets.h | 0 tools/testing/selftests/arm64/gcs/basic-gcs.c | 428 ++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/arm64/gcs/gcs-locking.c | 200 ++++++ .../selftests/arm64/gcs/gcs-stress-thread.S | 311 +++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/arm64/gcs/gcs-stress.c | 532 +++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/arm64/gcs/gcs-util.h | 100 +++ tools/testing/selftests/arm64/gcs/libc-gcs.c | 736 +++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/arm64/signal/.gitignore | 1 + .../testing/selftests/arm64/signal/test_signals.c | 17 +- .../testing/selftests/arm64/signal/test_signals.h | 6 + .../selftests/arm64/signal/test_signals_utils.c | 32 +- .../selftests/arm64/signal/test_signals_utils.h | 39 ++ .../arm64/signal/testcases/gcs_exception_fault.c | 62 ++ .../selftests/arm64/signal/testcases/gcs_frame.c | 88 +++ .../arm64/signal/testcases/gcs_write_fault.c | 67 ++ .../selftests/arm64/signal/testcases/testcases.c | 7 + .../selftests/arm64/signal/testcases/testcases.h | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/ksft_shstk.h | 37 ++ 73 files changed, 4241 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-) --- base-commit: 50abefbf1bc07f5c4e403fd28f71dcee855100f7 change-id: 20230303-arm64-gcs-e311ab0d8729 Best regards, -- Mark Brown