From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=1.0 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,FSL_HELO_FAKE,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5AD54C7618E for ; Mon, 29 Jul 2019 19:58:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: from bombadil.infradead.org (bombadil.infradead.org [198.137.202.133]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2E838204EC for ; Mon, 29 Jul 2019 19:58:47 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=lists.infradead.org header.i=@lists.infradead.org header.b="cpeysk9q"; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="iS8QBHsm" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 2E838204EC Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-mtd-bounces+linux-mtd=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=bombadil.20170209; h=Sender: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-Type:Cc:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post: List-Archive:List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:In-Reply-To:MIME-Version:References: Message-ID:Subject:To:From:Date:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description: Resent-Date:Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID: List-Owner; bh=Od8O5/e5f/cA2s99eAsT7S9CHPPfvdVc3DShpdkvrFg=; b=cpeysk9qVPRZo0 4OMyz4KaZzTdWkmjqvaw2eUoz/33nD+tTdkRgZ5dqpFbljEE0N0TcNh94NVuTfgAKAWsONlLX1Hdw vTyQJVBlZLhyltlO81Xd1EHcNaA7dFeQdicT7KhmSM/fa24HmPHuEXcNs5OnY75rRTBK7JJsvjFh7 vZP1NueMTzIbSxkbK825y/LwvhdvGqZtFjVuNDtfX5PMp63yqIWF1kIdRfd4v3LeDrtTiwer2M+Wa S5vMSsF3DsOXQSbaiCh/n36l852SXMoq8tWgZ9FbLeA3bBlHkFmOIeqSAfaK2CXDeMZWfsw+Zfx3Y t3Y5bmTuYcFSb5gZeLfg==; Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=bombadil.infradead.org) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1hsBmz-0007ga-5g; Mon, 29 Jul 2019 19:58:33 +0000 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.92 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1hsBmw-0007ft-C4 for linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org; Mon, 29 Jul 2019 19:58:31 +0000 Received: from gmail.com (unknown [104.132.1.77]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B93BB204EC; Mon, 29 Jul 2019 19:58:29 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1564430310; bh=MUgzS0F8d9HlQcIKk/AeINedk5YvM3Io6WjGyuY8L/w=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=iS8QBHsmz86M34KZIw9nisCR2fm0L+w7kPLmRgKBgKMY9InqdG7s5arcER6e70Hiv 1m2j+mTH3W8YpqEW3EcAFnbX72omhY6EUmca5vAe644L7pPOodpSDNlZw9817U4/I8 NeTf0yKRDUJxPPPBQRoViELwNkQzTSRuae1WjtFI= Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2019 12:58:28 -0700 From: Eric Biggers To: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 07/16] fscrypt: add FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl Message-ID: <20190729195827.GF169027@gmail.com> Mail-Followup-To: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" , linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Paul Crowley , Satya Tangirala References: <20190726224141.14044-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> <20190726224141.14044-8-ebiggers@kernel.org> <20190728192417.GG6088@mit.edu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20190728192417.GG6088@mit.edu> User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20190729_125830_428789_5C6241B9 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 14.10 ) X-BeenThere: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Linux MTD discussion mailing list List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Satya Tangirala , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, Paul Crowley Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "linux-mtd" Errors-To: linux-mtd-bounces+linux-mtd=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org On Sun, Jul 28, 2019 at 03:24:17PM -0400, Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote: > > + > > +/* > > + * Try to remove an fscrypt master encryption key. If other users have also > > + * added the key, we'll remove the current user's usage of the key, then return > > + * -EUSERS. Otherwise we'll continue on and try to actually remove the key. > > Nit: this should be moved to patch #11 > > Also, perror(EUSERS) will display "Too many users" which is going to > be confusing. I understand why you chose this; we would like to > distinguish between there are still inodes using this key, and there > are other users using this key. > > Do we really need to return EUSERS in this case? It's actually not an > *error* that other users are using the key. After all, the unlink(2) > system call doesn't return an advisory error when you delete a file > which has other hard links. And an application which does care about > this detail can always call FS_IOC_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS() and check > user_count. > Returning 0 when the key wasn't fully removed might also be confusing. But I guess you're right that returning an error doesn't match how syscalls usually work. It did remove the current user's usage of the key, after all, rather than completely fail. And as you point out, if someone cares about other users having added the key, they can use FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS. So I guess I'll change it to 0. Thanks! - Eric ______________________________________________________ Linux MTD discussion mailing list http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mtd/