From: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>,
linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 14/20] fscrypt: allow unprivileged users to add/remove keys for v2 policies
Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2019 20:14:07 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190813001406.GI28705@mit.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190805162521.90882-15-ebiggers@kernel.org>
On Mon, Aug 05, 2019 at 09:25:15AM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
>
> Allow the FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY and FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY
> ioctls to be used by non-root users to add and remove encryption keys
> from the filesystem-level crypto keyrings, subject to limitations.
>
> Motivation: while privileged fscrypt key management is sufficient for
> some users (e.g. Android and Chromium OS, where a privileged process
> manages all keys), the old API by design also allows non-root users to
> set up and use encrypted directories, and we don't want to regress on
> that. Especially, we don't want to force users to continue using the
> old API, running into the visibility mismatch between files and keyrings
> and being unable to "lock" encrypted directories.
>
> Intuitively, the ioctls have to be privileged since they manipulate
> filesystem-level state. However, it's actually safe to make them
> unprivileged if we very carefully enforce some specific limitations.
>
> First, each key must be identified by a cryptographic hash so that a
> user can't add the wrong key for another user's files. For v2
> encryption policies, we use the key_identifier for this. v1 policies
> don't have this, so managing keys for them remains privileged.
>
> Second, each key a user adds is charged to their quota for the keyrings
> service. Thus, a user can't exhaust memory by adding a huge number of
> keys. By default each non-root user is allowed up to 200 keys; this can
> be changed using the existing sysctl 'kernel.keys.maxkeys'.
>
> Third, if multiple users add the same key, we keep track of those users
> of the key (of which there remains a single copy), and won't really
> remove the key, i.e. "lock" the encrypted files, until all those users
> have removed it. This prevents denial of service attacks that would be
> possible under simpler schemes, such allowing the first user who added a
> key to remove it -- since that could be a malicious user who has
> compromised the key. Of course, encryption keys should be kept secret,
> but the idea is that using encryption should never be *less* secure than
> not using encryption, even if your key was compromised.
>
> We tolerate that a user will be unable to really remove a key, i.e.
> unable to "lock" their encrypted files, if another user has added the
> same key. But in a sense, this is actually a good thing because it will
> avoid providing a false notion of security where a key appears to have
> been removed when actually it's still in memory, available to any
> attacker who compromises the operating system kernel.
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Looks good. I'd probably would have used either "mk_secret_sem" or
"mk->mk_secret_sem" in the comments, instead of "->mk_securet_sem",
but that's just a personal style preference. Since you consistently
used the latter, I assume that's a deliberate choice, which is fine.
Feel free to add:
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-08-13 0:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-08-05 16:25 [PATCH v8 00/20] fscrypt: key management improvements Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 01/20] fs, fscrypt: move uapi definitions to new header <linux/fscrypt.h> Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 02/20] fscrypt: use FSCRYPT_ prefix for uapi constants Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 03/20] fscrypt: use FSCRYPT_* definitions, not FS_* Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 04/20] fscrypt: add ->ci_inode to fscrypt_info Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 05/20] fscrypt: rename fscrypt_master_key to fscrypt_direct_key Eric Biggers
2019-08-12 22:20 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 06/20] fscrypt: refactor key setup code in preparation for v2 policies Eric Biggers
2019-08-12 22:38 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 07/20] fscrypt: move v1 policy key setup to keysetup_v1.c Eric Biggers
2019-08-12 22:53 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 08/20] fscrypt: rename keyinfo.c to keysetup.c Eric Biggers
2019-08-12 22:53 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 09/20] fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 10/20] fscrypt: add FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl Eric Biggers
2019-08-13 0:06 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-14 22:35 ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 11/20] fscrypt: add FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS ioctl Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 12/20] fscrypt: add an HKDF-SHA512 implementation Eric Biggers
2019-08-06 20:43 ` Paul Crowley
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 13/20] fscrypt: v2 encryption policy support Eric Biggers
2019-08-06 20:44 ` Paul Crowley
2019-08-13 0:39 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 14/20] fscrypt: allow unprivileged users to add/remove keys for v2 policies Eric Biggers
2019-08-13 0:14 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o [this message]
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 15/20] fscrypt: add FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ALL_USERS ioctl Eric Biggers
2019-08-13 0:15 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 16/20] fscrypt: require that key be added when setting a v2 encryption policy Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 17/20] ext4: wire up new fscrypt ioctls Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 18/20] f2fs: " Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 19/20] ubifs: " Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 20/20] fscrypt: document the new ioctls and policy version Eric Biggers
2019-08-13 0:49 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-14 22:37 ` [PATCH v8 00/20] fscrypt: key management improvements Eric Biggers
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