From: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
To: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, broonie@kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-next@vger.kernel.org, mhocko@suse.cz,
mm-commits@vger.kernel.org, sfr@canb.auug.org.au
Subject: Re: mmotm 2019-08-27-20-39 uploaded (objtool: xen)
Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2019 06:10:56 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CA+icZUVEAJziiuuQ2vzzjYbDrzUMVd+-pkJnmJkt8PPQ6szdPQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190829233735.yp3mwhg6er353qw5@treble>
On Fri, Aug 30, 2019 at 1:38 AM Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Aug 29, 2019 at 10:24:45AM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > On Wed, Aug 28, 2019 at 03:01:34PM -0500, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> > > On Wed, Aug 28, 2019 at 10:56:25AM -0700, Randy Dunlap wrote:
> > > > >> drivers/xen/gntdev.o: warning: objtool: gntdev_copy()+0x229: call to __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds() with UACCESS enabled
> > > > >
> > > > > Easy one :-)
> > > > >
> > > > > diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c
> > > > > index 0c8e17f946cd..6a935ab93149 100644
> > > > > --- a/tools/objtool/check.c
> > > > > +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
> > > > > @@ -483,6 +483,7 @@ static const char *uaccess_safe_builtin[] = {
> > > > > "ubsan_type_mismatch_common",
> > > > > "__ubsan_handle_type_mismatch",
> > > > > "__ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1",
> > > > > + "__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds",
> > > > > /* misc */
> > > > > "csum_partial_copy_generic",
> > > > > "__memcpy_mcsafe",
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > then I get this one:
> > > >
> > > > lib/ubsan.o: warning: objtool: __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds()+0x5d: call to ubsan_prologue() with UACCESS enabled
> > >
> > > And of course I jinxed it by calling it easy.
> > >
> > > Peter, how do you want to handle this?
> > >
> > > Should we just disable UACCESS checking in lib/ubsan.c?
> >
> > No, that is actually unsafe and could break things (as would you patch
> > above).
>
> Oops. -EFIXINGTOOMANYOBJTOOLISSUESATONCE
>
> > I'm thinking the below patch ought to cure things:
> >
> > ---
> > Subject: x86/uaccess: Don't leak the AC flags into __get_user() argument evalidation
>
> s/evalidation/evaluation
>
> > Identical to __put_user(); the __get_user() argument evalution will too
> > leak UBSAN crud into the __uaccess_begin() / __uaccess_end() region.
> > While uncommon this was observed to happen for:
> >
> > drivers/xen/gntdev.c: if (__get_user(old_status, batch->status[i]))
> >
> > where UBSAN added array bound checking.
> >
> > This complements commit:
> >
> > 6ae865615fc4 ("x86/uaccess: Dont leak the AC flag into __put_user() argument evaluation")
> >
> > Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
> > Cc: luto@kernel.org
> > ---
> > arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 4 +++-
> > 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > index 9c4435307ff8..35c225ede0e4 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > @@ -444,8 +444,10 @@ __pu_label: \
> > ({ \
> > int __gu_err; \
> > __inttype(*(ptr)) __gu_val; \
> > + __typeof__(ptr) __gu_ptr = (ptr); \
> > + __typeof__(size) __gu_size = (size); \
> > __uaccess_begin_nospec(); \
> > - __get_user_size(__gu_val, (ptr), (size), __gu_err, -EFAULT); \
> > + __get_user_size(__gu_val, __gu_ptr, __gu_size, __gu_err, -EFAULT); \
> > __uaccess_end(); \
> > (x) = (__force __typeof__(*(ptr)))__gu_val; \
> > __builtin_expect(__gu_err, 0); \
>
> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
>
Tested-by Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
- Sedat -
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-08-30 4:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-08-28 3:40 mmotm 2019-08-27-20-39 uploaded akpm
2019-08-28 16:58 ` mmotm 2019-08-27-20-39 uploaded (objtool: xen) Randy Dunlap
2019-08-28 17:19 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-08-28 17:56 ` Randy Dunlap
2019-08-28 20:01 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-08-29 8:24 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-08-29 23:37 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-08-30 4:10 ` Sedat Dilek [this message]
2019-08-28 17:59 ` mmotm 2019-08-27-20-39 uploaded (gpu/drm/amd/display/) Randy Dunlap
2019-08-28 18:53 ` Alex Deucher
2019-08-28 18:30 ` mmotm 2019-08-27-20-39 uploaded (sound/hda/intel-nhlt.c) Randy Dunlap
2019-08-28 19:28 ` Pierre-Louis Bossart
2019-08-28 21:06 ` Randy Dunlap
2019-08-28 22:20 ` Pierre-Louis Bossart
2019-08-28 22:45 ` Pierre-Louis Bossart
2019-08-28 22:59 ` Randy Dunlap
2019-08-29 2:26 ` Randy Dunlap
2019-08-29 15:08 ` [alsa-devel] " Takashi Iwai
2019-08-29 16:22 ` Pierre-Louis Bossart
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