From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Idan Yaniv <idan.yaniv@ibm.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.o rg,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2020 14:05:18 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e5738841-c673-13d6-a632-a6413ec94c43@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200819114244.GT752365@kernel.org>
On 19.08.20 13:42, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 19, 2020 at 12:47:54PM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>> On 18.08.20 16:15, Mike Rapoport wrote:
>>> From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
>>>
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
>>>
>>> v4 changes:
>>> * rebase on v5.9-rc1
>>> * Do not redefine PMD_PAGE_ORDER in fs/dax.c, thanks Kirill
>>> * Make secret mappings exclusive by default and only require flags to
>>> memfd_secret() system call for uncached mappings, thanks again Kirill :)
>>>
>>> v3 changes:
>>> * Squash kernel-parameters.txt update into the commit that added the
>>> command line option.
>>> * Make uncached mode explicitly selectable by architectures. For now enable
>>> it only on x86.
>>>
>>> v2 changes:
>>> * Follow Michael's suggestion and name the new system call 'memfd_secret'
>>> * Add kernel-parameters documentation about the boot option
>>> * Fix i386-tinyconfig regression reported by the kbuild bot.
>>> CONFIG_SECRETMEM now depends on !EMBEDDED to disable it on small systems
>>> from one side and still make it available unconditionally on
>>> architectures that support SET_DIRECT_MAP.
>>>
>>>
>>> The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a
>>> dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the
>>> memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap()
>>> of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret"
>>> memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in
>>> the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page
>>> table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings.
>>>
>>> Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users,
>>> such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is
>>> trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants
>>> mappings.
>>>
>>> Additionally, the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect guest
>>> memory in a virtual machine host.
>>>
>>
>> Just a general question. I assume such pages (where the direct mapping
>> was changed) cannot get migrated - I can spot a simple alloc_page(). So
>> essentially a process can just allocate a whole bunch of memory that is
>> unmovable, correct? Is there any limit? Is it properly accounted towards
>> the process (memctl) ?
>
> The memory as accounted in the same way like with mlock(), so normal
> user won't be able to allocate more than RLIMIT_MEMLOCK.
Okay, thanks. AFAIU the difference to mlock() is that the pages here are
not movable, fragment memory, and limit compaction. Hm.
--
Thanks,
David / dhildenb
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-08-19 12:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-08-18 14:15 [PATCH v4 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Mike Rapoport
2020-08-18 14:15 ` [PATCH v4 1/6] mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER Mike Rapoport
2020-08-18 14:15 ` [PATCH v4 2/6] mmap: make mlock_future_check() global Mike Rapoport
2020-08-18 14:15 ` [PATCH v4 3/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Mike Rapoport
2020-08-18 14:15 ` [PATCH v4 4/6] arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevant Mike Rapoport
2020-08-18 14:15 ` [PATCH v4 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation Mike Rapoport
2020-08-18 14:15 ` [PATCH v4 6/6] mm: secretmem: add ability to reserve memory at boot Mike Rapoport
2020-08-19 10:49 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-08-19 11:53 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-08-19 12:10 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-08-19 17:33 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-08-19 17:45 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-08-20 15:52 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-08 9:09 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-08 12:31 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-08-19 10:47 ` [PATCH v4 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas David Hildenbrand
2020-08-19 11:42 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-08-19 12:05 ` David Hildenbrand [this message]
2020-08-26 11:01 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-03 7:46 ` Mike Rapoport
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