From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
To: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>,
Gavin Hindman <gavin.hindman@intel.com>,
Linuxarm <linuxarm@huawei.com>,
"Weiny, Ira" <ira.weiny@intel.com>,
Linux PCI <linux-pci@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org, CHUCK_LEVER <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/1] DOE usage with pcie/portdrv
Date: Wed, 18 May 2022 06:43:39 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <YoT4C77Yem37NUUR@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220514135521.GB14833@wunner.de>
On Sat, May 14, 2022 at 03:55:21PM +0200, Lukas Wunner wrote:
> Circling back to the SPDM/IDE topic, while NVMe is now capable of
> reliably recovering from errors, it does expect the kernel to handle
> recovery within a few seconds. I'm not sure we can continue to
> guarantee that if the kernel depends on user space to perform
> re-authentication with SPDM after reset. That's another headache
> that we could avoid with in-kernel SPDM authentication.
I wonder if we need kernel bundled and tightly controlled userspace
code for these kinds of things (also for NVMe/NFS TLS). That is,
bundle a userspace ELF file or files with a module which is unpacked
to or accessible by a ramfs-style file systems. Then allow executing
it without any interaction with the normal userspace, and non-pagable
memory. That way we can reuse existing userspace code, have really
nice address space isolation but avoid all the deadlock potential
of normal userspace code. And I don't think it would be too hard to
implement either.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-05-18 13:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-05-03 15:34 [RFC PATCH 0/1] DOE usage with pcie/portdrv Jonathan Cameron
2022-05-03 15:34 ` [RFC PATCH 1/1] pcie/portdrv: Hack in DOE and CDAT support Jonathan Cameron
2022-05-06 22:40 ` [RFC PATCH 0/1] DOE usage with pcie/portdrv Dan Williams
2022-05-07 10:18 ` Lukas Wunner
2022-05-09 9:48 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-05-11 19:13 ` Lukas Wunner
2022-05-11 19:19 ` Lukas Wunner
2022-05-11 19:43 ` Dan Williams
2022-05-14 13:55 ` Lukas Wunner
2022-05-16 17:01 ` Dan Williams
2022-05-27 9:39 ` Lukas Wunner
2022-05-18 13:43 ` Christoph Hellwig [this message]
2022-05-18 15:08 ` Dan Williams
2022-05-20 5:42 ` Lukas Wunner
2022-05-20 15:37 ` Dan Williams
2022-05-20 15:42 ` Chuck Lever III
2022-05-11 19:42 ` Dan Williams
2022-05-11 20:22 ` Hindman, Gavin
2022-05-11 21:04 ` Dan Williams
2022-05-14 13:31 ` Lukas Wunner
2022-05-16 16:53 ` Dan Williams
2022-05-09 9:33 ` Jonathan Cameron
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