From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH security-next v4 23/32] selinux: Remove boot parameter
Date: Tue, 2 Oct 2018 12:47:53 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <125243f2-8532-c0c0-0b0e-d28b3ecb910e@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jJtC1gkJ0ZKDFroL8UzvjiPfmC+6EsrzyB0j0oETdSQQg@mail.gmail.com>
On 10/02/2018 12:17 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 2, 2018 at 11:57 AM, John Johansen
> <john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
>> Under the current scheme
>>
>> lsm.enabled=selinux
>>
>> could actually mean selinux,yama,loadpin,something_else are
>> enabled. If we extend this behavior to when full stacking lands
>>
>> lsm.enabled=selinux,yama
>>
>> might mean selinux,yama,apparmor,loadpin,something_else
>>
>> and what that list is will vary from kernel to kernel, which I think
>> is harder for the user than the lsm.enabled list being what is
>> actually enabled at boot
>
> Ah, I think I missed this in your earlier emails. What you don't like
> here is that "lsm.enable=" is additive. You want it to be explicit.
>
> Are you okay with lsm.order= having fallback?
>
yeah, if we are going to separate order, fallbacks are fine for
anything that isn't specified.
I am still not convinced that separating order from enablement is
right, but its generally something a user should care about so I can
live with it.
> The situation we were trying to solve was with new LSMs getting
> implicitly disabled if someone is booting with an explicit list. For
> example:
>
> lsm.enable=yama,apparmor
>
> means when "landlock" gets added to the kernel, it will be implicitly disabled.
>
And here is the point of contention, I wouldn't call that implicitly
disabled. The user explicitly selected a set of LSMs to enable. Having
other LSMs enable when they aren't specified is confusing to a user,
as now they have to consider what is enabled by default in the
Kconfig.
I think requiring distros/builders to consider Kconfig options is
fine, but its a lot higher hurdle for regular users.
>> If we have to have multiple kernel parameter, I prefer a behvior where
>> if you hav conflicting kernel parameters specified
>>
>> apparmor=0 lsm.enabled=apparmor
>>
>> that the conflict is logged and the lsm is left disabled, as I think
>> it is easier for users to understand than the overrides scheme of v3,
>> and sans logging of the conflict is effectively what we had in the
>> past
>>
>> apparmor=0 security=apparmor
>> or
>> apparmor=1 security=selinux
>>
>> would result in apparmor being disabed
>
> Okay, so for this part you want per-LSM boot param to have priority
> (which seems to match SELinux's concerns), possibly logging the
hrmmm I wouldn't call it priority :)
If you look at the above logic its a boolean AND operation. The LSM is
only enabled if $LSM=1 AND security=$LSM all other combinations result
in $LSM being disabled
> conflict, but still accepting the apparmor= and selinux= state.
logging is nice for the user but certainly isn't required and is more
than we are doing today
> security= would still driving initialization ordering (so I think the
> behavior I have in the series would be correct).
>
>> That being said I get we have a mess currently, and there really
>> doesn't seem to be a good way to fix it. I think getting this right
>> for the user is important enough that I am willing to break current
>> apparmor userspace api. While apparmor=0 is documented we have also
>> documented security=X for years and apparmor=0 isn't used too often
>> so I think we can drop it to help clean this mess up abit.
>>
>> I am not going to Nak, or block on v3 behavior if that is considered
>> the best path forward after this discussion/rant.
>
> I could define CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE as being "additive" to
> SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE and
> SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE?
>
Oh sure lets deal with my complaint about too many ways to configure
this beast by adding yet another config option :P
seriously though, please no. That just adds another layer of confusion
even if it is only being foisted on the distro/builder
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-02 19:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 92+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-02 0:54 [PATCH security-next v4 00/32] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 01/32] LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 02/32] vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 03/32] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 04/32] LSM: Remove initcall tracing Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:14 ` James Morris
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 05/32] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 06/32] vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:15 ` James Morris
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 07/32] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:16 ` James Morris
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 08/32] LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 09/32] LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:17 ` James Morris
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 10/32] LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:20 ` James Morris
2018-10-02 21:38 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 11/32] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 12/32] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 13/32] LoadPin: Rename "enable" to "enforce" Kees Cook
2018-10-02 1:06 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-02 4:47 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 14/32] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 15/32] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 16/32] LSM: Prepare for arbitrary LSM enabling Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 17/32] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 18/32] LSM: Introduce lsm.enable= and lsm.disable= Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 19/32] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 20/32] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 21/32] LSM: Finalize centralized LSM enabling logic Kees Cook
2018-10-02 1:18 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-02 4:49 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 22/32] apparmor: Remove boot parameter Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 23/32] selinux: " Kees Cook
2018-10-02 12:12 ` Paul Moore
2018-10-02 13:42 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-02 14:44 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 14:58 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-02 16:33 ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-02 16:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 18:33 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-02 19:02 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 18:57 ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 19:17 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 19:47 ` John Johansen [this message]
2018-10-02 20:29 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:11 ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 22:06 ` James Morris
2018-10-02 23:06 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 23:46 ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 23:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 0:05 ` John Johansen
2018-10-03 0:12 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 13:15 ` John Johansen
2018-10-03 13:39 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-03 17:26 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 19:43 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-04 5:38 ` John Johansen
2018-10-04 16:02 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-08 14:25 ` Paul Moore
2018-10-03 18:17 ` James Morris
2018-10-03 18:20 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 18:28 ` James Morris
2018-10-03 20:10 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 20:36 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 21:19 ` James Morris
2018-10-04 5:56 ` John Johansen
2018-10-04 16:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-04 17:40 ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-04 17:42 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 21:34 ` James Morris
2018-10-03 23:55 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 23:59 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-04 0:03 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-04 6:22 ` John Johansen
2018-10-04 6:18 ` John Johansen
2018-10-04 17:49 ` James Morris
2018-10-05 0:05 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-05 4:58 ` James Morris
2018-10-05 16:29 ` James Morris
2018-10-05 16:35 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 23:28 ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 16:34 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 24/32] LSM: Build ordered list of ordered LSMs for init Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 25/32] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ORDER Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 26/32] LSM: Introduce "lsm.order=" for boottime ordering Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 27/32] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 28/32] Yama: " Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 29/32] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 30/32] capability: Initialize as LSM_ORDER_FIRST Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 31/32] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 32/32] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization Kees Cook
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