From: dhowells@redhat.com (David Howells)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 04/30] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2017 17:31:08 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <151024866805.28329.10437019941463042267.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <151024863544.28329.2436580122759221600.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid
signatures that we can verify or that IMA can validate the file.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
---
kernel/module.c | 19 ++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index de66ec825992..0ce29c8aa75a 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
#include <linux/bsearch.h>
#include <linux/dynamic_debug.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <uapi/linux/module.h>
#include "module-internal.h"
@@ -2757,7 +2758,8 @@ static inline void kmemleak_load_module(const struct module *mod,
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
-static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
+static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags,
+ bool can_do_ima_check)
{
int err = -ENOKEY;
const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
@@ -2781,13 +2783,16 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
}
/* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */
- if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce)
+ if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce &&
+ (!can_do_ima_check || !is_ima_appraise_enabled()) &&
+ !kernel_is_locked_down("Loading of unsigned modules"))
err = 0;
return err;
}
#else /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */
-static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
+static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags,
+ bool can_do_ima_check)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -3630,13 +3635,13 @@ static int unknown_module_param_cb(char *param, char *val, const char *modname,
/* Allocate and load the module: note that size of section 0 is always
zero, and we rely on this for optional sections. */
static int load_module(struct load_info *info, const char __user *uargs,
- int flags)
+ int flags, bool can_do_ima_check)
{
struct module *mod;
long err;
char *after_dashes;
- err = module_sig_check(info, flags);
+ err = module_sig_check(info, flags, can_do_ima_check);
if (err)
goto free_copy;
@@ -3830,7 +3835,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(init_module, void __user *, umod,
if (err)
return err;
- return load_module(&info, uargs, 0);
+ return load_module(&info, uargs, 0, false);
}
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(finit_module, int, fd, const char __user *, uargs, int, flags)
@@ -3857,7 +3862,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(finit_module, int, fd, const char __user *, uargs, int, flags)
info.hdr = hdr;
info.len = size;
- return load_module(&info, uargs, flags);
+ return load_module(&info, uargs, flags, true);
}
static inline int within(unsigned long addr, void *start, unsigned long size)
--
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-11-09 17:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-11-09 17:30 [PATCH 00/30] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-11-09 17:30 ` [PATCH 01/30] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells
2017-11-09 17:30 ` [PATCH 02/30] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` [PATCH 03/30] ima: require secure_boot rules in lockdown mode David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` David Howells [this message]
2017-11-09 17:31 ` [PATCH 05/30] Restrict /dev/{mem, kmem, port} when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` [PATCH 06/30] kexec: Disable at runtime if " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` [PATCH 07/30] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` [PATCH 08/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2018-01-11 11:59 ` Jiri Bohac
2018-01-11 12:01 ` [PATCH 08a/30] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Jiri Bohac
2018-01-11 12:02 ` [PATCH 08b/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Jiri Bohac
2018-01-16 16:31 ` [PATCH 08a/30] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE David Howells
2018-01-16 19:39 ` Jiri Bohac
2018-01-17 16:34 ` David Howells
2018-01-19 12:54 ` Jiri Bohac
2018-02-21 16:20 ` David Howells
2018-01-11 12:43 ` [PATCH 08/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2018-01-11 12:47 ` David Howells
2018-01-11 15:44 ` Jiri Bohac
2018-01-17 16:16 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` [PATCH 09/30] hibernate: Disable when " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` [PATCH 10/30] uswsusp: " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 11/30] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 12/30] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 13/30] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 14/30] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 15/30] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 16/30] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 17/30] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 18/30] acpi: Disable APEI error injection " David Howells
2019-11-07 8:21 ` Joey Lee
2022-05-28 0:11 ` joeyli
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 19/30] scsi: Lock down the eata driver David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 20/30] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 21/30] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 22/30] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 23/30] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 24/30] debugfs: Disallow use of debugfs files when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 25/30] Lock down /proc/kcore David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 26/30] Lock down ftrace David Howells
2017-11-10 9:23 ` Jiri Kosina
2017-11-10 10:07 ` David Howells
2017-11-10 10:15 ` Jiri Kosina
2017-11-10 10:21 ` David Howells
2017-11-10 10:23 ` Jiri Kosina
2017-11-10 11:06 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:34 ` [PATCH 27/30] Lock down kprobes David Howells
2017-11-09 17:34 ` [PATCH 28/30] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-11-09 17:34 ` [PATCH 29/30] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure boot mode David Howells
2017-11-09 17:34 ` [PATCH 30/30] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in " David Howells
2018-02-22 13:07 ` [PATCH 04/30] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2018-02-22 18:44 ` Jiri Bohac
2018-02-22 14:20 ` [PATCH 08/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime " David Howells
2018-02-22 19:08 ` Jiri Bohac
2018-02-22 14:21 ` David Howells
2018-02-22 19:14 ` Jiri Bohac
2018-03-03 1:18 ` [PATCH 00/30] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown Andrew Morton
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