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From: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
To: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	<x86@kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, <linux_dti@icloud.com>,
	<linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 09/14] x86/kprobes: Instruction pages initialization enhancements
Date: Thu, 6 Dec 2018 22:09:23 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181206220923.20e5b0593fa1a8038eb710fd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181205013408.47725-10-namit@vmware.com>

On Tue, 4 Dec 2018 17:34:03 -0800
Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> wrote:

> This patch is a preparatory patch for a following patch that makes
> module allocated pages non-executable. The patch sets the page as
> executable after allocation.
> 
> In the future, we may get better protection of executables. For example,
> by using hypercalls to request the hypervisor to protect VM executable
> pages from modifications using nested page-tables. This would allow
> us to ensure the executable has not changed between allocation and
> its write-protection.

Sounds interesting!

> 
> While at it, do some small cleanup of what appears to be unnecessary
> masking.

Looks good to me.

Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>


Thanks!

> 
> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
>  1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
> index c33b06f5faa4..ca0118d3b3e8 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
> @@ -431,8 +431,20 @@ void *alloc_insn_page(void)
>  	void *page;
>  
>  	page = module_alloc(PAGE_SIZE);
> -	if (page)
> -		set_memory_ro((unsigned long)page & PAGE_MASK, 1);
> +	if (page == NULL)
> +		return NULL;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * First make the page read-only, and then only then make it executable
> +	 * to prevent it from being W+X in between.
> +	 */
> +	set_memory_ro((unsigned long)page, 1);
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * TODO: Once additional kernel code protection mechanisms are set, ensure
> +	 * that the page was not maliciously altered and it is still zeroed.
> +	 */
> +	set_memory_x((unsigned long)page, 1);
>  
>  	return page;
>  }
> @@ -440,8 +452,12 @@ void *alloc_insn_page(void)
>  /* Recover page to RW mode before releasing it */
>  void free_insn_page(void *page)
>  {
> -	set_memory_nx((unsigned long)page & PAGE_MASK, 1);
> -	set_memory_rw((unsigned long)page & PAGE_MASK, 1);
> +	/*
> +	 * First make the page non-executable, and then only then make it
> +	 * writable to prevent it from being W+X in between.
> +	 */
> +	set_memory_nx((unsigned long)page, 1);
> +	set_memory_rw((unsigned long)page, 1);
>  	module_memfree(page);
>  }
>  
> -- 
> 2.17.1
> 


-- 
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>

  reply	other threads:[~2018-12-06 13:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-12-05  1:33 [PATCH v7 00/14] x86/alternative: text_poke() enhancements Nadav Amit
2018-12-05  1:33 ` [PATCH v7 01/14] Fix "x86/alternatives: Lockdep-enforce text_mutex in text_poke*()" Nadav Amit
2018-12-05  1:33 ` [PATCH v7 02/14] x86/jump_label: Use text_poke_early() during early init Nadav Amit
2018-12-05  1:33 ` [PATCH v7 03/14] x86/mm: temporary mm struct Nadav Amit
2018-12-05  1:33 ` [PATCH v7 04/14] fork: provide a function for copying init_mm Nadav Amit
2018-12-05  1:33 ` [PATCH v7 05/14] x86/alternative: initializing temporary mm for patching Nadav Amit
2018-12-05  1:34 ` [PATCH v7 06/14] x86/alternative: use temporary mm for text poking Nadav Amit
2018-12-05  1:34 ` [PATCH v7 07/14] x86/kgdb: avoid redundant comparison of patched code Nadav Amit
2018-12-05  1:34 ` [PATCH v7 08/14] x86/ftrace: Use text_poke_*() infrastructure Nadav Amit
2018-12-06  0:06   ` Nadav Amit
2018-12-06 16:28     ` Ingo Molnar
2018-12-05  1:34 ` [PATCH v7 09/14] x86/kprobes: Instruction pages initialization enhancements Nadav Amit
2018-12-06 13:09   ` Masami Hiramatsu [this message]
2018-12-05  1:34 ` [PATCH v7 10/14] x86: avoid W^X being broken during modules loading Nadav Amit
2018-12-05  1:34 ` [PATCH v7 11/14] x86/jump-label: remove support for custom poker Nadav Amit
2018-12-05  1:34 ` [PATCH v7 12/14] x86/alternative: Remove the return value of text_poke_*() Nadav Amit
2018-12-05  1:34 ` [PATCH v7 13/14] module: Do not set nx for module memory before freeing Nadav Amit
2018-12-06  9:57   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-06 17:28     ` Nadav Amit
2018-12-06 11:13   ` Andrea Parri
2018-12-06 18:52   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-06 18:56     ` Nadav Amit
2018-12-06 20:21     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2018-12-06 20:29       ` Nadav Amit
2018-12-13 14:10   ` Jessica Yu
2018-12-13 17:25     ` Nadav Amit
2018-12-05  1:34 ` [PATCH v7 14/14] module: Prevent module removal racing with text_poke() Nadav Amit
2018-12-06 10:01   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-06 10:03 ` [PATCH v7 00/14] x86/alternative: text_poke() enhancements Peter Zijlstra
2018-12-10  1:06   ` Nadav Amit

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