From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [git pull] vfs.git mount.part1
Date: Sat, 5 Jan 2019 20:45:53 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190105204552.GR2217@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87ef9qdhpy.fsf@xmission.com>
On Sat, Jan 05, 2019 at 01:31:21PM -0600, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Not having had a chance to review this code I can't really comment on
> the quality of this code. What I do know from a glance is that
> you have not removed FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA. Which is the root cause
> of some of the crazy security mount option processing, and is an if
> not greater mess than what the security options have been doing with
> mount options.
>
> The FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA flag is only relevant for coda and for nfs
> backwards compatiblity. The FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA flag is only set on
> btrfs to allow calling mount_subtree.
... and thus it can't be killed without having dragged the NFS pile
into the entire thing.
> I have a set of patches that is finally reasonablly stable and cleans up
> all of the mess in the current internal mount apis that should allow
> implementing the new mount api to be much less error prone.
Quick question: how do you deal with the differences in quoting for selinux
options and for everything else?
I've no problem with working with you, now that you've resurfaced.
Fair warning: no promises of accepting your solutions. Along with
a promise to reject anything that breaks existing setups, which your
earlier proposals did. With NFS among the victims, IIRC.
prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-01-05 20:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20190104192648.GO2217@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
2019-01-05 19:31 ` [git pull] vfs.git mount.part1 Eric W. Biederman
2019-01-05 20:45 ` Al Viro [this message]
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