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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>,
	Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
	Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Sandeep Patil <sspatil@android.com>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	Michal Marek <michal.lkml@markovi.net>,
	Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 3/3] security: Implement Clang's stack initialization
Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 11:01:17 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190411180117.27704-4-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190411180117.27704-1-keescook@chromium.org>

CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL turns on stack initialization based on
-ftrivial-auto-var-init in Clang builds, which has greater coverage
than CONFIG_GCC_PLUGINS_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL.

-ftrivial-auto-var-init Clang option provides trivial initializers for
uninitialized local variables, variable fields and padding.

It has three possible values:
  pattern - uninitialized locals are filled with a fixed pattern
    (mostly 0xAA on 64-bit platforms, see https://reviews.llvm.org/D54604
    for more details, but 0x000000AA for 32-bit pointers) likely to cause
    crashes when uninitialized value is used;
  zero (it's still debated whether this flag makes it to the official
    Clang release) - uninitialized locals are filled with zeroes;
  uninitialized (default) - uninitialized locals are left intact.

This patch uses only the "pattern" mode when CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL is
enabled.

Developers have the possibility to opt-out of this feature on a
per-variable basis by using __attribute__((uninitialized)), but such
use should be well justified in comments.

Co-developed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 Makefile                   |  5 +++++
 security/Kconfig.hardening | 15 ++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index c0a34064c574..a7d9c6cd0267 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -745,6 +745,11 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= -fomit-frame-pointer
 endif
 endif
 
+# Initialize all stack variables with a pattern, if desired.
+ifdef CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL
+KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= -ftrivial-auto-var-init=pattern
+endif
+
 DEBUG_CFLAGS	:= $(call cc-option, -fno-var-tracking-assignments)
 
 ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
index 3dd7a28c3822..5dd61770d3f0 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
+++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
@@ -18,9 +18,12 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
 
 menu "Memory initialization"
 
+config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT
+	def_bool $(cc-option,-ftrivial-auto-var-init=pattern)
+
 choice
 	prompt "Initialize kernel stack variables at function entry"
-	depends on GCC_PLUGINS
+	depends on CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT || GCC_PLUGINS
 	default INIT_STACK_NONE
 	help
 	  This option enables initialization of stack variables at
@@ -76,6 +79,16 @@ choice
 		  of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
 		  exposures.
 
+	config INIT_STACK_ALL
+		bool "0xAA-init everything on the stack (strongest)"
+		depends on CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT
+		help
+		  Initializes everything on the stack with a 0xAA
+		  pattern. This is intended to eliminate all classes
+		  of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
+		  exposures, even variables that were warned to have been
+		  left uninitialized.
+
 endchoice
 
 config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE
-- 
2.17.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-04-11 18:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-04-11 18:01 [PATCH v2 0/3] Refactor memory initialization hardening Kees Cook
2019-04-11 18:01 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] security: Create "kernel hardening" config area Kees Cook
2019-04-12  1:38   ` Masahiro Yamada
2019-04-23 19:36     ` Kees Cook
2019-04-24  4:05       ` Masahiro Yamada
2019-04-15 16:44   ` Alexander Popov
2019-04-16  4:02     ` Kees Cook
2019-04-16 13:55       ` Alexander Popov
2019-04-16 13:56         ` Kees Cook
2019-04-19 19:15           ` Alexander Popov
2019-04-11 18:01 ` [PATCH v2 2/3] security: Move stackleak config to Kconfig.hardening Kees Cook
2019-04-11 18:01 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2019-04-12 11:36   ` [PATCH v2 3/3] security: Implement Clang's stack initialization Alexander Potapenko

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