From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Aleksa Sarai" <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
"Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@kernel.org>,
"Al Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Christian Heimes" <christian@python.org>,
"Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
"Deven Bowers" <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>,
"Eric Chiang" <ericchiang@google.com>,
"Florian Weimer" <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>, "Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Lakshmi Ramasubramanian" <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>,
"Matthew Garrett" <mjg59@google.com>,
"Matthew Wilcox" <willy@infradead.org>,
"Michael Kerrisk" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
"Mickaël Salaün" <mickael.salaun@ssi.gouv.fr>,
"Mimi Zohar" <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
"Philippe Trébuchet" <philippe.trebuchet@ssi.gouv.fr>,
"Scott Shell" <scottsh@microsoft.com>,
"Sean Christopherson" <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
"Shuah Khan" <shuah@kernel.org>,
"Steve Dower" <steve.dower@python.org>,
"Steve Grubb" <sgrubb@redhat.com>,
"Thibaut Sautereau" <thibaut.sautereau@ssi.gouv.fr>,
"Vincent Strubel" <vincent.strubel@ssi.gouv.fr>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 6/6] ima: add policy support for the new file open MAY_OPENEXEC flag
Date: Tue, 5 May 2020 17:31:56 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200505153156.925111-7-mic@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200505153156.925111-1-mic@digikod.net>
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The kernel has no way of differentiating between a file containing data
or code being opened by an interpreter. The proposed O_MAYEXEC
openat2(2) flag bridges this gap by defining and enabling the
MAY_OPENEXEC flag.
This patch adds IMA policy support for the new MAY_OPENEXEC flag.
Example:
measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=^MAY_OPENEXEC
appraise func=FILE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig mask=^MAY_OPENEXEC
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1588167523-7866-3-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
---
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 3 ++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 15 +++++++++++----
3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index cd572912c593..caca46125fe0 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Description:
[KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK]
[KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK]
mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND]
- [[^]MAY_EXEC]
+ [[^]MAY_EXEC] [[^]MAY_OPENEXEC]
fsmagic:= hex value
fsuuid:= file system UUID (e.g 8bcbe394-4f13-4144-be8e-5aa9ea2ce2f6)
uid:= decimal value
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 9d0abedeae77..c80cdaf13626 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -438,7 +438,8 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
- mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
+ mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE |
+ MAY_EXEC | MAY_OPENEXEC |
MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index c334e0dc6083..f54cbc55498d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -406,7 +406,8 @@ static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
* @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation
* @secid: the secid of the task to be validated
* @func: LIM hook identifier
- * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
+ * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC |
+ * MAY_OPENEXEC)
* @keyring: keyring name to check in policy for KEY_CHECK func
*
* Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
@@ -527,7 +528,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
* being made
* @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated
* @func: IMA hook identifier
- * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
+ * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC |
+ * MAY_OPENEXEC)
* @pcr: set the pcr to extend
* @template_desc: the template that should be used for this rule
* @keyring: the keyring name, if given, to be used to check in the policy.
@@ -1089,6 +1091,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
entry->mask = MAY_READ;
else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0)
entry->mask = MAY_APPEND;
+ else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_OPENEXEC") == 0)
+ entry->mask = MAY_OPENEXEC;
else
result = -EINVAL;
if (!result)
@@ -1420,14 +1424,15 @@ const char *const func_tokens[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
enum {
- mask_exec = 0, mask_write, mask_read, mask_append
+ mask_exec = 0, mask_write, mask_read, mask_append, mask_openexec
};
static const char *const mask_tokens[] = {
"^MAY_EXEC",
"^MAY_WRITE",
"^MAY_READ",
- "^MAY_APPEND"
+ "^MAY_APPEND",
+ "^MAY_OPENEXEC"
};
void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
@@ -1516,6 +1521,8 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_read) + offset);
if (entry->mask & MAY_APPEND)
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_append) + offset);
+ if (entry->mask & MAY_OPENEXEC)
+ seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_openexec) + offset);
seq_puts(m, " ");
}
--
2.26.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-05-05 15:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-05-05 15:31 [PATCH v5 0/6] Add support for O_MAYEXEC Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-05 15:31 ` [PATCH v5 1/6] fs: Add support for an O_MAYEXEC flag on openat2(2) Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-12 21:05 ` Kees Cook
2020-05-12 21:40 ` Christian Heimes
2020-05-12 22:56 ` Kees Cook
2020-05-13 10:13 ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-05 15:31 ` [PATCH v5 2/6] fs: Add a MAY_EXECMOUNT flag to infer the noexec mount property Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-12 21:09 ` Kees Cook
2020-05-14 8:14 ` Lev R. Oshvang .
2020-05-14 15:48 ` Kees Cook
2020-05-17 16:57 ` Lev R. Oshvang .
2020-05-05 15:31 ` [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-05 15:44 ` Randy Dunlap
2020-05-05 16:55 ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-05 17:40 ` Randy Dunlap
2020-05-12 21:48 ` Kees Cook
2020-05-13 11:09 ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-13 15:37 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-05-13 23:27 ` Kees Cook
2020-05-14 3:05 ` Kees Cook
2020-05-14 10:12 ` David Laight
2020-05-14 12:22 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-05-14 14:41 ` Kees Cook
2020-05-14 15:52 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-05-14 15:45 ` Kees Cook
2020-05-14 16:10 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-05-14 19:16 ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-15 0:58 ` Tetsuo Handa
2020-05-15 8:01 ` How about just O_EXEC? (was Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC) Kees Cook
2020-05-15 8:43 ` Florian Weimer
2020-05-15 14:37 ` Kees Cook
2020-05-15 14:43 ` Florian Weimer
2020-05-15 15:50 ` Kees Cook
2020-05-18 7:26 ` Florian Weimer
2020-05-19 2:23 ` Aleksa Sarai
2020-05-19 10:13 ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-15 11:04 ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-15 15:46 ` Kees Cook
2020-05-15 18:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-14 19:21 ` [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-05 15:31 ` [PATCH v5 4/6] selftest/openat2: Add tests for O_MAYEXEC enforcing Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-12 21:57 ` Kees Cook
2020-05-13 11:18 ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-05 15:31 ` [PATCH v5 5/6] doc: Add documentation for the fs.open_mayexec_enforce sysctl Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-12 22:00 ` Kees Cook
2020-05-13 11:20 ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-05 15:31 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2020-05-05 15:36 ` [PATCH v5 0/6] Add support for O_MAYEXEC Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-06 13:58 ` Lev R. Oshvang .
2020-05-06 15:41 ` Aleksa Sarai
2020-05-07 8:30 ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-07 8:05 ` David Laight
2020-05-07 8:36 ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-07 9:00 ` David Laight
2020-05-07 9:30 ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-07 9:44 ` David Laight
2020-05-07 13:38 ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-08 7:15 ` Lev R. Oshvang .
2020-05-08 14:01 ` Mimi Zohar
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