From: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com>
To: KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org>
Cc: "open list" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
"Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@kernel.org>,
"Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Thomas Garnier" <thgarnie@chromium.org>,
"Michael Halcrow" <mhalcrow@google.com>,
"Paul Turner" <pjt@google.com>,
"Brendan Gregg" <brendan.d.gregg@gmail.com>,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
"Matthew Garrett" <mjg59@google.com>,
"Christian Brauner" <christian@brauner.io>,
"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Florent Revest" <revest@chromium.org>,
"Brendan Jackman" <jackmanb@chromium.org>,
"Martin KaFai Lau" <kafai@fb.com>,
"Song Liu" <songliubraving@fb.com>, "Yonghong Song" <yhs@fb.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Mauro Carvalho Chehab" <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Nicolas Ferre" <nicolas.ferre@microchip.com>,
"Stanislav Fomichev" <sdf@google.com>,
"Quentin Monnet" <quentin.monnet@netronome.com>,
"Andrey Ignatov" <rdna@fb.com>, "Joe Stringer" <joe@wand.net.nz>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v2 05/10] bpf: lsm: BTF API for LSM hooks
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2020 16:28:03 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAEf4BzYJy40csmwfBgtD+UZY3X+hjqpQ=NwjUQ-cwy+RPF8VHA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200115171333.28811-6-kpsingh@chromium.org>
On Wed, Jan 15, 2020 at 9:14 AM KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> From: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
>
> The BTF API provides information required by the BPF verifier to
> attach eBPF programs to the LSM hooks by using the BTF information of
> two types:
>
> - struct security_hook_heads: This type provides the offset which
> a new dynamically allocated security hook must be attached to.
> - union security_list_options: This provides the information about the
> function prototype required by the hook.
>
> When the program is loaded:
>
> - The verifier receives the index of a member in struct
> security_hook_heads to which a program must be attached as
> prog->aux->lsm_hook_index. The index is one-based for better
> verification.
> - bpf_lsm_type_by_index is used to determine the func_proto of
> the LSM hook and updates prog->aux->attach_func_proto
> - bpf_lsm_head_by_index is used to determine the hlist_head to which
> the BPF program must be attached.
>
> Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
> ---
> include/linux/bpf_lsm.h | 12 +++++
> security/bpf/Kconfig | 1 +
> security/bpf/hooks.c | 104 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 117 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h b/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h
> index 9883cf25241c..a9b4f7b41c65 100644
> --- a/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h
> +++ b/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h
> @@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ extern struct security_hook_heads bpf_lsm_hook_heads;
>
> int bpf_lsm_srcu_read_lock(void);
> void bpf_lsm_srcu_read_unlock(int idx);
> +const struct btf_type *bpf_lsm_type_by_index(struct btf *btf, u32 offset);
> +const struct btf_member *bpf_lsm_head_by_index(struct btf *btf, u32 id);
>
> #define CALL_BPF_LSM_VOID_HOOKS(FUNC, ...) \
> do { \
> @@ -65,6 +67,16 @@ static inline int bpf_lsm_srcu_read_lock(void)
> return 0;
> }
> static inline void bpf_lsm_srcu_read_unlock(int idx) {}
> +static inline const struct btf_type *bpf_lsm_type_by_index(
> + struct btf *btf, u32 index)
> +{
> + return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
> +}
> +static inline const struct btf_member *bpf_lsm_head_by_index(
> + struct btf *btf, u32 id)
> +{
> + return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
> +}
>
> #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_BPF */
>
> diff --git a/security/bpf/Kconfig b/security/bpf/Kconfig
> index 595e4ad597ae..9438d899b618 100644
> --- a/security/bpf/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/bpf/Kconfig
> @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ config SECURITY_BPF
> depends on SECURITY
> depends on BPF_SYSCALL
> depends on SRCU
> + depends on DEBUG_INFO_BTF
> help
> This enables instrumentation of the security hooks with
> eBPF programs.
> diff --git a/security/bpf/hooks.c b/security/bpf/hooks.c
> index b123d9cb4cd4..82725611693d 100644
> --- a/security/bpf/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/bpf/hooks.c
> @@ -5,6 +5,8 @@
> */
>
> #include <linux/bpf_lsm.h>
> +#include <linux/bpf.h>
> +#include <linux/btf.h>
> #include <linux/srcu.h>
>
> DEFINE_STATIC_SRCU(security_hook_srcu);
> @@ -18,3 +20,105 @@ void bpf_lsm_srcu_read_unlock(int idx)
> {
> return srcu_read_unlock(&security_hook_srcu, idx);
> }
> +
> +static inline int validate_hlist_head(struct btf *btf, u32 type_id)
> +{
> + s32 hlist_id;
> +
> + hlist_id = btf_find_by_name_kind(btf, "hlist_head", BTF_KIND_STRUCT);
> + if (hlist_id < 0 || hlist_id != type_id)
> + return -EINVAL;
This feels backwards and expensive. You already have type_id you want
to check. Do a quick look up, check type and other attributes, if you
want. There is no need to do linear search for struct named
"hlist_head".
But in reality, you should trust kernel BTF, you already know that you
found correct "security_hook_heads" struct, so its member has to be
hlist_head, no?
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/* Find the BTF representation of the security_hook_heads member for a member
> + * with a given index in struct security_hook_heads.
> + */
> +const struct btf_member *bpf_lsm_head_by_index(struct btf *btf, u32 index)
> +{
> + const struct btf_member *member;
> + const struct btf_type *t;
> + u32 off, i;
> + int ret;
> +
> + t = btf_type_by_name_kind(btf, "security_hook_heads", BTF_KIND_STRUCT);
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(IS_ERR(t)))
> + return ERR_CAST(t);
> +
> + for_each_member(i, t, member) {
> + /* We've found the id requested and need to check the
> + * the following:
> + *
> + * - Is it at a valid alignment for struct hlist_head?
> + *
> + * - Is it a valid hlist_head struct?
> + */
> + if (index == i) {
Also not efficient. Check index to be < vlen(t), then member =
btf_type_member(t) + index;
> + off = btf_member_bit_offset(t, member);
> + if (off % 8)
> + /* valid c code cannot generate such btf */
> + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> + off /= 8;
> +
> + if (off % __alignof__(struct hlist_head))
> + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> +
> + ret = validate_hlist_head(btf, member->type);
> + if (ret < 0)
> + return ERR_PTR(ret);
> +
> + return member;
This feels a bit over-cautious to double-check this. If
security_hook_heads definition is controlled by kernel sources, then
we could just trust vmlinux BTF?
> + }
> + }
> +
> + return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
> +}
> +
> +/* Given an index of a member in security_hook_heads return the
> + * corresponding type for the LSM hook. The members of the union
> + * security_list_options have the same name as the security_hook_heads which
> + * is ensured by the LSM_HOOK_INIT macro defined in include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> + */
> +const struct btf_type *bpf_lsm_type_by_index(struct btf *btf, u32 index)
> +{
> + const struct btf_member *member, *hook_head = NULL;
> + const struct btf_type *t, *hook_type = NULL;
> + u32 i;
> +
> + hook_head = bpf_lsm_head_by_index(btf, index);
> + if (IS_ERR(hook_head))
> + return ERR_PTR(PTR_ERR(hook_head));
> +
> + t = btf_type_by_name_kind(btf, "security_list_options", BTF_KIND_UNION);
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(IS_ERR(t)))
> + return ERR_CAST(t);
btf_type_by_name_kind() is a linear search (at least right now), so it
might be a good idea to cache found type_id's of security_list_options
and security_hook_heads?
> +
> + for_each_member(i, t, member) {
> + if (hook_head->name_off == member->name_off) {
> + /* There should be only one member with the same name
> + * as the LSM hook. This should never really happen
> + * and either indicates malformed BTF or someone trying
> + * trick the LSM.
> + */
> + if (WARN_ON(hook_type))
> + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> +
> + hook_type = btf_type_by_id(btf, member->type);
> + if (unlikely(!hook_type))
> + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> +
> + if (!btf_type_is_ptr(hook_type))
> + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> + }
> + }
> +
> + if (!hook_type)
> + return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
> +
> + t = btf_type_by_id(btf, hook_type->type);
> + if (unlikely(!t))
> + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
why not do this inside the loop when you find correct member and not
continue processing all the fields?
> +
> + return t;
> +}
> --
> 2.20.1
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-01-17 0:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-01-15 17:13 [PATCH bpf-next v2 00/10] MAC and Audit policy using eBPF (KRSI) KP Singh
2020-01-15 17:13 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 01/10] bpf: btf: Make some of the API visible outside BTF KP Singh
2020-01-18 12:44 ` kbuild test robot
2020-01-20 11:00 ` KP Singh
2020-01-15 17:13 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 02/10] bpf: lsm: Add a skeleton and config options KP Singh
2020-01-16 7:04 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-01-16 12:52 ` KP Singh
2020-01-15 17:13 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 03/10] bpf: lsm: Introduce types for eBPF based LSM KP Singh
2020-01-15 17:13 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 04/10] bpf: lsm: Add mutable hooks list for the BPF LSM KP Singh
2020-01-15 17:30 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-16 9:48 ` KP Singh
2020-01-16 6:33 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-01-16 10:19 ` KP Singh
2020-01-15 17:13 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 05/10] bpf: lsm: BTF API for LSM hooks KP Singh
2020-01-17 0:28 ` Andrii Nakryiko [this message]
2020-01-20 11:10 ` KP Singh
2020-01-15 17:13 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 06/10] bpf: lsm: Implement attach, detach and execution KP Singh
2020-01-15 17:24 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-01-16 9:45 ` KP Singh
2020-01-15 17:13 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 07/10] bpf: lsm: Make the allocated callback RO+X KP Singh
2020-01-15 17:13 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 08/10] tools/libbpf: Add support for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM KP Singh
2020-01-15 21:19 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2020-01-15 21:37 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2020-01-16 12:49 ` KP Singh
2020-01-16 17:26 ` KP Singh
2020-01-16 19:10 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2020-01-17 22:16 ` KP Singh
2020-01-15 17:13 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 09/10] bpf: lsm: Add selftests " KP Singh
2020-01-15 17:13 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 10/10] bpf: lsm: Add Documentation KP Singh
2020-01-15 22:12 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 00/10] MAC and Audit policy using eBPF (KRSI) Andrii Nakryiko
2020-01-20 11:12 ` KP Singh
2020-01-16 10:03 ` Brendan Jackman
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