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From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>,
	Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
	Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Sandeep Patil <sspatil@android.com>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Marco Elver <elver@google.com>, Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>,
	Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options
Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 15:17:00 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAG_fn=WM_x9wUQNCwGB7BnKJqSpTMZGcf1Jxae-PHij8E9igjg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190626162835.0947684d36ef01639f969232@linux-foundation.org>

On Thu, Jun 27, 2019 at 1:28 AM Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
>
> On Wed, 26 Jun 2019 14:19:42 +0200 Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> wrote:
>
> >  v8:
> >   - addressed comments by Michal Hocko: revert kernel/kexec_core.c and
> >     apply initialization in dma_pool_free()
> >   - disable init_on_alloc/init_on_free if slab poisoning or page
> >     poisoning are enabled, as requested by Qian Cai
> >   - skip the redzone when initializing a freed heap object, as requested
> >     by Qian Cai and Kees Cook
> >   - use s->offset to address the freeptr (suggested by Kees Cook)
> >   - updated the patch description, added Signed-off-by: tag
>
> v8 failed to incorporate
>
> https://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmots/broken-out/mm-security-introduce-init_on_alloc=1-and-init_on_free=1-boot-options-fix.patch
> and
> https://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmots/broken-out/mm-security-introduce-init_on_alloc=1-and-init_on_free=1-boot-options-fix-2.patch
>
> it's conventional to incorporate such fixes when preparing a new
> version of a patch.
>
v9 contains these patches (I've also exported init_on_free), so should
now be fine to drop them.

-- 
Alexander Potapenko
Software Engineer

Google Germany GmbH
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  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-06-27 13:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-06-26 12:19 [PATCH v8 0/3] add init_on_alloc/init_on_free boot options Alexander Potapenko
2019-06-26 12:19 ` [PATCH v8 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 " Alexander Potapenko
2019-06-26 14:49   ` Michal Hocko
2019-06-26 15:00     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-06-26 15:42       ` Michal Hocko
2019-06-27 13:09         ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-06-26 18:15   ` Qian Cai
2019-06-26 20:23     ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27  6:15       ` Michal Hocko
2019-06-27 16:23         ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27  8:18     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-06-26 23:28   ` Andrew Morton
2019-06-27 10:05     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-06-27 13:17     ` Alexander Potapenko [this message]
2019-06-26 12:19 ` [PATCH v8 2/2] mm: init: report memory auto-initialization features at boot time Alexander Potapenko
2019-06-26 12:26 ` [PATCH v8 0/3] add init_on_alloc/init_on_free boot options Alexander Potapenko

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