From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.5 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_MUTT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 65458C43381 for ; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 14:55:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 35E7C20811 for ; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 14:55:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729172AbfCYOzJ (ORCPT ); Mon, 25 Mar 2019 10:55:09 -0400 Received: from mga04.intel.com ([192.55.52.120]:9887 "EHLO mga04.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727238AbfCYOzJ (ORCPT ); Mon, 25 Mar 2019 10:55:09 -0400 X-Amp-Result: UNKNOWN X-Amp-Original-Verdict: FILE UNKNOWN X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga007.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.52]) by fmsmga104.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 25 Mar 2019 07:55:09 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.60,269,1549958400"; d="scan'208";a="137265209" Received: from jsakkine-mobl1.tm.intel.com (HELO localhost) ([10.237.50.97]) by fmsmga007.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 25 Mar 2019 07:55:04 -0700 Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 16:55:03 +0200 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Andy Lutomirski Cc: X86 ML , linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, Andrew Morton , Dave Hansen , "Christopherson, Sean J" , nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, "Ayoun, Serge" , "Katz-zamir, Shay" , "Huang, Haitao" , Andy Shevchenko , Thomas Gleixner , "Svahn, Kai" , Borislav Petkov , Josh Triplett , "Huang, Kai" , David Rientjes , James Morris , "Serge E . Hallyn" , LSM List Subject: Re: [PATCH v19 17/27] x86/sgx: Add provisioning Message-ID: <20190325145503.GB29989@linux.intel.com> References: <20190317211456.13927-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> <20190317211456.13927-18-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> <20190322112938.GJ3122@linux.intel.com> <20190322114325.GA10165@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Organization: Intel Finland Oy - BIC 0357606-4 - Westendinkatu 7, 02160 Espoo User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) Sender: linux-sgx-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 11:20:30AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 4:43 AM Jarkko Sakkinen > wrote: > > > > On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 01:29:38PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 09:50:41AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > > > > On Sun, Mar 17, 2019 at 2:18 PM Jarkko Sakkinen > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > In order to provide a mechanism for devilering provisoning rights: > > > > > > > > > > 1. Add a new file to the securityfs file called sgx/provision that works > > > > > as a token for allowing an enclave to have the provisioning privileges. > > > > > 2. Add a new ioctl called SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE that accepts the > > > > > following data structure: > > > > > > > > > > struct sgx_enclave_set_attribute { > > > > > __u64 addr; > > > > > __u64 token_fd; > > > > > }; > > > > > > > > Here's a potential issue: > > > > > > > > For container use, is it reasonable for a container manager to > > > > bind-mount a file into securityfs? Or would something in /dev make > > > > this easier? > > > > > > I guess that is a valid point given that the securityfs contains the LSM > > > (e.g. SELinux or AppArmor) policy. So yeah, I think your are right what > > > you say. > > > > > > I propose that we create /dev/sgx/enclave to act as the enclave manager > > > and /dev/sgx/provision for provisioning. Is this sustainable for you? > > > > Hmm.. on 2nd thought the LSM policy or even DAC policy would restrict > > that the container manager can only access specific files inside > > securityfs. With this conclusion I still think it is probably the best > > place for seurity policy like things even for SGX. It is meant for that > > anyway. > > > > LSM or DAC policy can certainly *restrict* it, but I suspect that most > container runtimes don't mount securityfs at all. OTOH, the runtime > definitely needs to have a way to pass /dev/sgx/enclave (or whatever > it's called) through, so using another device node will definitely > work. OK, I can cope with this argument. I go with the device names above for v20. /Jarkko