From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.5 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_MUTT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 83F6FC282CE for ; Mon, 22 Apr 2019 16:48:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5AD1B214AE for ; Mon, 22 Apr 2019 16:48:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727425AbfDVQsg (ORCPT ); Mon, 22 Apr 2019 12:48:36 -0400 Received: from mga05.intel.com ([192.55.52.43]:62086 "EHLO mga05.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728215AbfDVQsa (ORCPT ); Mon, 22 Apr 2019 12:48:30 -0400 X-Amp-Result: UNKNOWN X-Amp-Original-Verdict: FILE UNKNOWN X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga005.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.32]) by fmsmga105.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 22 Apr 2019 09:48:29 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.60,382,1549958400"; d="scan'208";a="339732309" Received: from sjchrist-coffee.jf.intel.com (HELO linux.intel.com) ([10.54.74.181]) by fmsmga005.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 22 Apr 2019 09:48:28 -0700 Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 09:48:27 -0700 From: Sean Christopherson To: "Dr. Greg" Cc: Thomas Gleixner , Jethro Beekman , Andy Lutomirski , Andy Lutomirski , Dave Hansen , Jarkko Sakkinen , Linus Torvalds , LKML , X86 ML , "linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org" , Andrew Morton , "nhorman@redhat.com" , "npmccallum@redhat.com" , "Ayoun, Serge" , "Katz-zamir, Shay" , "Huang, Haitao" , Andy Shevchenko , "Svahn, Kai" , Borislav Petkov , Josh Triplett , "Huang, Kai" , David Rientjes Subject: Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support Message-ID: <20190422164827.GC1236@linux.intel.com> References: <2AE80EA3-799E-4808-BBE4-3872F425BCF8@amacapital.net> <49b28ca1-6e66-87d9-2202-84c58f13fb99@fortanix.com> <444537E3-4156-41FB-83CA-57C5B660523F@amacapital.net> <5854e66a-950e-1b12-5393-d9cdd15367dc@fortanix.com> <20190420160247.GA17291@wind.enjellic.com> <20190422150119.GA1236@linux.intel.com> <20190422162411.GA27389@wind.enjellic.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20190422162411.GA27389@wind.enjellic.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30) Sender: linux-sgx-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 11:24:11AM -0500, Dr. Greg wrote: > On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 08:01:19AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote: > > Good morning to everyone, I hope the week is starting well. > > > On Sat, Apr 20, 2019 at 11:02:47AM -0500, Dr. Greg wrote: > > > We understand and support the need for the LSM to trap these > > > events, but what does LSM provenance mean if the platform is > > > compromised? That is, technically, the target application for SGX > > > technology. > > > No, it's not. Protecting the kernel/platform from a malicious > > entity is outside the scope of SGX. > > You must have misinterpreted my statement, providing security > guarantees in the face of a compromised platform is exactly what SGX > was designed to do and is how Intel is marketing the technology. Right, and loading a malicious enclave doesn't change those guarantees (for other enclaves). Ergo, restricting which enclaves can execute is orthogonal to the security provided by SGX.