From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@intel.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
"linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org" <linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
"jmorris@namei.org" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"luto@kernel.org" <luto@kernel.org>,
"jethro@fortanix.com" <jethro@fortanix.com>,
"greg@enjellic.com" <greg@enjellic.com>,
"jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com"
<jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
"Christopherson, Sean J" <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Subject: RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2019 18:02:01 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <960B34DE67B9E140824F1DCDEC400C0F6551D5AD@ORSMSX116.amr.corp.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAB9W1A3Xusf77LZ44HjNYuuFPHv=vditqJZLu6yrStFG3OwHXQ@mail.gmail.com>
> From: Stephen Smalley [mailto:stephen.smalley@gmail.com]
> Sent: Friday, June 28, 2019 6:22 PM
>
> On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 5:54 PM Xing, Cedric <cedric.xing@intel.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > > From: linux-sgx-owner@vger.kernel.org [mailto:linux-sgx-
> > > owner@vger.kernel.org] On Behalf Of Stephen Smalley
> > > Sent: Friday, June 28, 2019 9:37 AM
> > >
> > > > lsm.ema.cache_decisions is on by default and could be turned off
> > > > by appending “lsm.ema.cache_decisions=0” or
> > > > “lsm.ema.cache_decisions=off” to the kernel command line.
> > >
> > > This seems problematic on a few fronts:
> > >
> > > - Specifying it as a boot parameter requires teaching admins /
> > > policy developers to do something in addition to what they are
> > > already doing when they want to create policy,
> > >
> > > - Limiting it to a boot parameter requires a reboot to change the
> > > mode of operation, whereas SELinux offers runtime toggling of
> > > permissive mode and even per-process (domain) permissive mode (and
> > > so does AppArmor),
> >
> > How about making a variable tunable via sysctl?
>
> Better than a boot parameter but still not amenable to per-domain
> permissive and still requires admins to remember and perform an extra
> step before collecting denials.
>
> >
> > >
> > > - In the cache_decisions=1 case, do we get any auditing at all? If
> > > not, that's a problem. We want auditing not only when we are
> > > generating/learning policy but also in operation.
> >
> > Currently it doesn't generate audit log, but I could add it, except it
> couldn't point to the exact file. But I can use the sigstruct file
> instead so administrators can at least tell which enclave violates the
> policy. Do you think it acceptable?
>
> Seems prone to user confusion and lacks precision in why the denial
> occurred.
>
> >
> > >
> > > - There is the potential for inconsistencies to arise between the
> > > enforcement applied with different cache_decisions values.
> >
> > The enforcement will be consistent. The difference only lies in the
> logs.
> >
> > >
> > > I would suggest that we just never cache the decision and accept the
> > > cost if we are going to take this approach.
> >
> > This will also be a viable option. I don't think any enclaves would be
> comprised of a large number of files anyway. When SGX2 comes up, I think
> most enclaves will be instantiated from only one file and defer loading
> libraries at runtime. So in practice we are looking to keeping only one
> file open per enclave, which seems totally acceptable.
> >
> > Stephen (and everyone having an opinion on this), which way do you
> prefer? sysctl variable? Or never cache decisions?
>
> I'd favor never caching decisions.
Alright, I'll remove the boot parameter and never cache decisions.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-07-01 18:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 156+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-06-19 22:23 [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 01/12] x86/sgx: Use mmu_notifier.release() instead of per-vma refcounting Sean Christopherson
2019-06-20 21:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-08 14:57 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-09 16:18 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 02/12] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address Sean Christopherson
2019-06-20 21:09 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-20 22:09 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 03/12] selftests: x86/sgx: Mark the enclave loader as not needing an exec stack Sean Christopherson
2019-06-20 21:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21 1:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-21 1:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-21 16:42 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-08 16:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-08 17:29 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 18:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-01 19:22 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 05/12] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21 1:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-07 19:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 06/12] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect() Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21 1:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21 2:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-21 16:54 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-25 20:48 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-27 20:29 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-07 18:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_MAPWX to map enclave page WX Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21 17:09 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-25 21:05 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-27 20:26 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-25 20:19 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-26 12:49 ` Dr. Greg
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21 17:05 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-25 21:01 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-25 21:49 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-27 19:38 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21 21:22 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-25 21:09 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-27 20:19 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-28 16:16 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-28 21:20 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-29 1:15 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-07-01 18:14 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-29 23:41 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-01 17:46 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 17:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-01 18:54 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 19:03 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 19:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-01 20:03 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-07 18:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-25 20:34 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-19 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v4 11/12] security/apparmor: " Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v4 12/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Show line of sight to LSM support SGX2's EAUG Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21 17:18 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-08 14:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21 1:32 ` [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-27 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks Cedric Xing
2019-07-03 23:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-03 23:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-03 23:23 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-06 5:04 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-08 14:46 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-07 23:41 ` [RFC PATCH v3 0/4] " Cedric Xing
2019-07-08 15:55 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-08 17:49 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-08 18:49 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-08 22:26 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-07 23:41 ` [RFC PATCH v3 1/4] x86/sgx: Add " Cedric Xing
2019-07-07 23:41 ` [RFC PATCH v3 2/4] x86/64: Call LSM hooks from SGX subsystem/module Cedric Xing
2019-07-09 1:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-07 23:41 ` [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module Cedric Xing
2019-07-08 16:26 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-08 17:16 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-08 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-09 22:13 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-10 0:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-10 0:55 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-10 21:14 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-11 13:51 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-07-11 15:12 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-11 16:11 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-07-11 16:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-11 16:32 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-07-11 23:41 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-07 23:41 ` [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux Cedric Xing
2019-07-09 1:33 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-09 21:26 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-10 15:49 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-10 16:08 ` Jethro Beekman
2019-07-10 18:16 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-10 17:54 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-27 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks Cedric Xing
2019-06-27 22:06 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-27 22:52 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-27 23:37 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-28 0:47 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-28 17:22 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-28 22:29 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-29 1:37 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-29 21:35 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-01 17:57 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 19:53 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-01 21:45 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 23:11 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-02 7:42 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-02 15:44 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-03 9:46 ` Dr. Greg
2019-07-03 15:32 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-07 13:30 ` Dr. Greg
2019-07-09 0:02 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-09 1:52 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-09 21:16 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-11 10:22 ` Dr. Greg
2019-07-15 22:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-28 16:37 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-28 21:53 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-29 1:22 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-07-01 18:02 ` Xing, Cedric [this message]
2019-06-29 23:46 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-01 17:11 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 17:58 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-01 18:31 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 19:36 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-01 19:56 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-02 2:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-02 6:35 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-27 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] x86/sgx: Call LSM hooks from SGX subsystem/module Cedric Xing
2019-06-27 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH v2 3/3] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux Cedric Xing
2019-07-05 16:05 ` [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-08 17:29 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-08 17:33 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-09 16:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-09 17:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-09 20:41 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-09 22:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-09 23:11 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-10 16:57 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-10 20:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-10 20:31 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-11 9:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-10 22:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-10 22:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-10 23:16 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-11 9:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-11 14:32 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-07-11 17:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-12 0:08 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-10 1:28 ` Dr. Greg
2019-07-10 2:04 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-10 3:21 ` Jethro Beekman
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