From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@intel.com>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
nhorman@redhat.com, pmccallum@redhat.com, "Ayoun,
Serge" <serge.ayoun@intel.com>,
"Katz-zamir, Shay" <shay.katz-zamir@intel.com>,
"Huang, Haitao" <haitao.huang@intel.com>,
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
"Svahn, Kai" <kai.svahn@intel.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>,
"Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
"Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@intel.com>,
Philip Tricca <philip.b.tricca@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:08:26 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrW9Mt70UY3NWGQq3rpxCxSpR4GfsBgt0jTib3bNDMTXkw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190617164915.GA25085@linux.intel.com>
On Mon, Jun 17, 2019 at 9:49 AM Sean Christopherson
<sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> wrote:
>
> On Sun, Jun 16, 2019 at 03:14:51PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > On Fri, Jun 14, 2019 at 8:38 AM Sean Christopherson
> > <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> wrote:
> > > > Andy and/or Cedric, can you please weigh in with a concrete (and practical)
> > > > use case that will break if we go with #1? The auditing issues for #2/#3
> > > > are complex to say the least...
> >
> > The most significant issue I see is the following. Consider two
> > cases. First, an SGX2 enclave that dynamically allocates memory but
> > doesn't execute code from dynamic memory. Second, an SGX2 enclave
> > that *does* execute code from dynamic memory. In #1, the untrusted
> > stack needs to decide whether to ALLOW_EXEC when the memory is
> > allocated, which means that it either needs to assume the worst or it
> > needs to know at allocation time whether the enclave ever intends to
> > change the permission to X.
>
> I'm just not convinced that folks running enclaves that can't communicate
> their basic functionality will care one whit about SELinux restrictions,
> i.e. will happily give EXECMOD even if it's not strictly necessary.
At least when permissions are learned, if there's no ALLOW_EXEC for
EAUG, then EXECMOD won't get learned if there's no eventual attempt to
execute the memory.
>
> > I suppose there's a middle ground. The driver could use model #1 for
> > driver-filled pages and model #2 for dynamic pages. I haven't tried
> > to fully work it out, but I think there would be the ALLOW_READ /
> > ALLOW_WRITE / ALLOW_EXEC flag for EADD-ed pages but, for EAUG-ed
> > pages, there would be a different policy. This might be as simple as
> > internally having four flags instead of three:
> >
> > ALLOW_READ, ALLOW_WRITE, ALLOW_EXEC: as before
> >
> > ALLOW_EXEC_COND: set implicitly by the driver for EAUG.
> >
> > As in #1, if you try to mmap or protect a page with neither ALLOW_EXEC
> > variant, it fails (-EACCES, perhaps). But, if you try to mmap or
> > mprotect an ALLOW_EXEC_COND page with PROT_EXEC, you ask LSM for
> > permission. There is no fancy DIRTY tracking here, since it's
> > reasonable to just act as though *every* ALLOW_EXEC_COND page is
> > dirty. There is no real auditing issue here, since LSM can just log
> > what permission is missing.
> >
> > Does this seem sensible? It might give us the best of #1 and #2.
>
> It would work and is easy to implement *if* SELinux ties permissions to
> the process, as the SIGSTRUCT vma/file won't be available at
> EAUG+mprotect(). I already have a set of patches to that effect, I'll
> send 'em out in a bit.
I'm okay with that.
>
> FWIW, we still need to differentiate W->X from WX on SGX1, i.e. declaring
> ALLOW_WRITE + ALLOW_EXEC shouldn't imply WX. This is also addressed in
> the forthcoming updated RFC.
Sounds good.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-06-17 17:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 67+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-06-06 2:11 [RFC PATCH v2 0/5] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM Sean Christopherson
2019-06-06 2:11 ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect() Sean Christopherson
2019-06-10 15:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-10 15:55 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-10 17:47 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-10 19:49 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-10 22:06 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-06 2:11 ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits Sean Christopherson
2019-06-10 15:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-10 16:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-10 17:45 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-10 18:17 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-12 19:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-10 18:29 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-10 19:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-10 22:28 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-12 0:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-12 14:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-12 18:20 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-06 2:11 ` [RFC PATCH v2 3/5] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves Sean Christopherson
2019-06-10 16:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-10 16:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-11 17:21 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-06 2:11 ` [RFC PATCH v2 4/5] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX Sean Christopherson
2019-06-07 19:58 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-10 16:21 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-10 16:05 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-06 2:11 ` [RFC PATCH v2 5/5] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation Sean Christopherson
2019-06-07 21:16 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-10 16:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 16:38 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-10 7:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks Cedric Xing
2019-06-10 7:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 1/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Add " Cedric Xing
2019-06-10 7:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux Cedric Xing
2019-06-11 13:40 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-11 22:02 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-12 9:32 ` Dr. Greg
2019-06-12 14:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-13 7:25 ` Dr. Greg
2019-06-12 19:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-12 22:02 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-13 0:10 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-13 1:02 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-13 17:02 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-13 23:03 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-13 23:17 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-14 0:31 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-14 0:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-14 15:38 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-16 22:14 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-17 16:49 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 17:08 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2019-06-18 15:40 ` Dr. Greg
2019-06-14 17:16 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-14 17:45 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-14 17:53 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-14 20:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-16 22:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-14 23:19 ` Dr. Greg
2019-06-11 22:55 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-13 18:00 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-13 19:48 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-13 21:09 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-13 21:02 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-14 0:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-10 7:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 3/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Call new LSM hooks from SGX subsystem Cedric Xing
2019-06-10 17:36 ` [RFC PATCH v1 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks Jarkko Sakkinen
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=CALCETrW9Mt70UY3NWGQq3rpxCxSpR4GfsBgt0jTib3bNDMTXkw@mail.gmail.com \
--to=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=cedric.xing@intel.com \
--cc=dave.hansen@intel.com \
--cc=eparis@parisplace.org \
--cc=haitao.huang@intel.com \
--cc=jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=jethro@fortanix.com \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=josh@joshtriplett.org \
--cc=kai.huang@intel.com \
--cc=kai.svahn@intel.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=nhorman@redhat.com \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=philip.b.tricca@intel.com \
--cc=pmccallum@redhat.com \
--cc=rientjes@google.com \
--cc=sds@tycho.nsa.gov \
--cc=sean.j.christopherson@intel.com \
--cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=serge.ayoun@intel.com \
--cc=serge@hallyn.com \
--cc=shay.katz-zamir@intel.com \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=william.c.roberts@intel.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).