From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
Platform Driver <platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
"Christopherson, Sean J" <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, "Ayoun,
Serge" <serge.ayoun@intel.com>,
shay.katz-zamir@intel.com,
Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@linux.intel.com>,
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Svahn, Kai" <kai.svahn@intel.com>,
mark.shanahan@intel.com, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>,
Andy Shevchenko <andy@infradead.org>,
"open list:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)"
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 18/23] platform/x86: Intel SGX driver
Date: Mon, 17 Dec 2018 21:55:08 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrX1XG1kCrVfx1athBaCWp4H0xoKnjoDjFOqR4nf_VqBrA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181116010412.23967-19-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
On Thu, Nov 15, 2018 at 5:08 PM Jarkko Sakkinen
<jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>
> Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a set of CPU instructions that
> can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code and
> data. The code outside the enclave is disallowed to access the memory
> inside the enclave by the CPU access control.
This is a very partial review.
> +int sgx_encl_find(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
> + struct vm_area_struct **vma)
> +{
> + struct vm_area_struct *result;
> + struct sgx_encl *encl;
> +
> + result = find_vma(mm, addr);
> + if (!result || result->vm_ops != &sgx_vm_ops || addr < result->vm_start)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + encl = result->vm_private_data;
> + *vma = result;
> +
> + return encl ? 0 : -ENOENT;
> +}
I realize that this function may go away entirely but, if you keep it:
what are the locking rules? What, if anything, prevents another
thread from destroying the enclave after sgx_encl_find() returns?
> +static int sgx_validate_secs(const struct sgx_secs *secs,
> + unsigned long ssaframesize)
> +{
...
> + if (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT) {
> + if (secs->size > sgx_encl_size_max_64)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + } else {
> + /* On 64-bit architecture allow 32-bit encls only in
> + * the compatibility mode.
> + */
> + if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_ADDR32))
> + return -EINVAL;
> + if (secs->size > sgx_encl_size_max_32)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
Why do we need the 32-bit-on-64-bit check? In general, anything that
checks per-task or per-mm flags like TIF_ADDR32 is IMO likely to be
problematic. You're allowing 64-bit enclaves in 32-bit tasks, so I'm
guessing you could just delete the check.
> +
> + if (!(secs->xfrm & XFEATURE_MASK_FP) ||
> + !(secs->xfrm & XFEATURE_MASK_SSE) ||
> + (((secs->xfrm >> XFEATURE_BNDREGS) & 1) !=
> + ((secs->xfrm >> XFEATURE_BNDCSR) & 1)) ||
> + (secs->xfrm & ~sgx_xfrm_mask))
> + return -EINVAL;
Do we need to check that the enclave doesn't use xfeatures that the
kernel doesn't know about? Or are they all safe by design in enclave
mode?
> +static int sgx_encl_pm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb,
> + unsigned long action, void *data)
> +{
> + struct sgx_encl *encl = container_of(nb, struct sgx_encl, pm_notifier);
> +
> + if (action != PM_SUSPEND_PREPARE && action != PM_HIBERNATION_PREPARE)
> + return NOTIFY_DONE;
Hmm. There's an argument to made that omitting this would better
exercise the code that handles fully asynchronous loss of an enclave.
Also, I think you're unnecessarily killing enclaves when suspend is
attempted but fails.
> +
> +static int sgx_get_key_hash(const void *modulus, void *hash)
> +{
> + struct crypto_shash *tfm;
> + int ret;
> +
> + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
> + if (IS_ERR(tfm))
> + return PTR_ERR(tfm);
> +
> + ret = __sgx_get_key_hash(tfm, modulus, hash);
> +
> + crypto_free_shash(tfm);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
I'm so sorry you had to deal with this API. Once Zinc lands, you
could clean this up :)
> +static int sgx_encl_get(unsigned long addr, struct sgx_encl **encl)
> +{
> + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
> + struct vm_area_struct *vma;
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
> +
> + ret = sgx_encl_find(mm, addr, &vma);
> + if (!ret) {
> + *encl = vma->vm_private_data;
> +
> + if ((*encl)->flags & SGX_ENCL_SUSPEND)
> + ret = SGX_POWER_LOST_ENCLAVE;
> + else
> + kref_get(&(*encl)->refcount);
> + }
Hmm. This version has explicit refcounting.
> +static int sgx_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> +{
> + vma->vm_ops = &sgx_vm_ops;
> + vma->vm_flags |= VM_PFNMAP | VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP | VM_IO |
> + VM_DONTCOPY;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static unsigned long sgx_get_unmapped_area(struct file *file,
> + unsigned long addr,
> + unsigned long len,
> + unsigned long pgoff,
> + unsigned long flags)
> +{
> + if (len < 2 * PAGE_SIZE || (len & (len - 1)))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (len > sgx_encl_size_max_64)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (len > sgx_encl_size_max_32 && test_thread_flag(TIF_ADDR32))
> + return -EINVAL;
Generally speaking, this type of check wants to be
in_compat_syscall(). But I'm not sure I understand why you need it at
all.
> +static void sgx_ipi_cb(void *info)
> +{
> +}
> +
> +void sgx_flush_cpus(struct sgx_encl *encl)
> +{
> + on_each_cpu_mask(mm_cpumask(encl->mm), sgx_ipi_cb, NULL, 1);
> +}
Please add a comment explaining what this promises to do.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-12-18 5:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 161+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20181116010412.23967-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
2018-11-16 1:01 ` [PATCH v17 01/23] x86/sgx: Update MAINTAINERS Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 14:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-16 15:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 20:24 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-18 8:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 1:01 ` [PATCH v17 02/23] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel-defined SGX feature bit Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 14:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-16 15:13 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 15:18 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 20:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-16 1:01 ` [PATCH v17 03/23] x86/cpufeatures: Add SGX sub-features (as Linux-defined bits) Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 14:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-16 15:38 ` Sean Christopherson
2018-11-16 23:31 ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-18 8:36 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 1:01 ` [PATCH v17 04/23] x86/msr: Add IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL.SGX_ENABLE definition Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 1:01 ` [PATCH v17 05/23] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel-defined SGX_LC feature bit Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 1:01 ` [PATCH v17 06/23] x86/cpu/intel: Detect SGX support and update caps appropriately Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 23:32 ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-18 8:37 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-21 18:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-24 13:54 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 1:01 ` [PATCH v17 07/23] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Add new 'PF_SGX' page fault error code bit Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 23:33 ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-18 8:38 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 1:01 ` [PATCH v17 08/23] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV for userspace #PFs w/ PF_SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 1:01 ` [PATCH v17 09/23] x86/sgx: Define SGX1 and SGX2 ENCLS leafs Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 1:01 ` [PATCH v17 10/23] x86/sgx: Add ENCLS architectural error codes Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 1:01 ` [PATCH v17 11/23] x86/sgx: Add SGX1 and SGX2 architectural data structures Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 1:01 ` [PATCH v17 12/23] x86/sgx: Add definitions for SGX's CPUID leaf and variable sub-leafs Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 1:01 ` [PATCH v17 13/23] x86/msr: Add SGX Launch Control MSR definitions Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 17:29 ` Sean Christopherson
2018-11-18 8:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 1:01 ` [PATCH v17 14/23] x86/sgx: Add wrappers for ENCLS leaf functions Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 1:01 ` [PATCH v17 15/23] x86/sgx: Enumerate and track EPC sections Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 1:01 ` [PATCH v17 16/23] x86/sgx: Add functions to allocate and free EPC pages Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 1:01 ` [PATCH v17 17/23] x86/sgx: Add sgx_einit() for initializing enclaves Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 1:01 ` [PATCH v17 18/23] platform/x86: Intel SGX driver Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 1:37 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-11-16 11:23 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-19 15:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-19 16:22 ` Jethro Beekman
2018-11-19 17:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-19 17:39 ` Jethro Beekman
2018-11-20 10:58 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-21 15:24 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-19 18:18 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20 11:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-19 15:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 16:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-19 16:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20 12:04 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-22 11:12 ` Dr. Greg
2018-11-22 15:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-24 17:21 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-24 20:13 ` Dr. Greg
2018-11-26 21:15 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-25 14:53 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-25 16:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-25 18:55 ` Dr. Greg
2018-11-25 23:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
[not found] ` <D45BC005-5064-4C75-B486-4E43C454E2F6@amacapital.net>
2018-11-26 0:37 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-26 11:00 ` Dr. Greg
2018-11-26 18:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-26 22:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-26 21:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-26 23:04 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-27 8:55 ` Dr. Greg
2018-11-27 16:41 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-27 17:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-28 10:49 ` Dr. Greg
2018-11-28 19:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-10 10:49 ` Dr. Greg
2018-12-12 18:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-14 23:59 ` Dr. Greg
2018-12-15 0:06 ` Sean Christopherson
2018-12-15 23:22 ` Dr. Greg
2018-12-17 14:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2018-12-17 13:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-17 13:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-17 14:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-17 14:13 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-17 16:34 ` Dr. Greg
2018-12-17 17:31 ` Sean Christopherson
2018-12-17 17:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-17 18:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2018-12-17 18:23 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-17 18:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2018-12-17 19:36 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-27 16:46 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-28 21:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-27 7:46 ` Jethro Beekman
2018-11-27 16:36 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-22 20:56 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-23 10:39 ` Dr. Greg
2018-11-24 16:45 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-28 5:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-28 5:38 ` Jethro Beekman
2018-12-09 17:01 ` Pavel Machek
2018-11-20 11:15 ` Dr. Greg
2018-11-24 16:15 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-24 19:24 ` Dr. Greg
2018-11-26 19:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-09 17:01 ` Pavel Machek
2018-12-10 14:46 ` Dr. Greg
2018-12-17 17:45 ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-17 18:01 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-17 18:07 ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-17 18:31 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-17 18:36 ` Sean Christopherson
2018-12-17 18:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-17 18:47 ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-17 19:12 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-17 19:17 ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-17 19:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-17 19:54 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-17 19:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-17 19:53 ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-17 19:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-17 20:03 ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-17 20:10 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-17 20:15 ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-17 22:36 ` Sean Christopherson
2018-12-18 1:40 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-17 22:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2018-12-18 1:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-18 3:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-18 5:02 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-18 13:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-18 4:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-18 13:18 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-18 4:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-18 13:11 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-18 15:44 ` Sean Christopherson
2018-12-18 18:53 ` Sean Christopherson
2018-12-19 5:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-19 5:13 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-21 18:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2018-12-22 0:01 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-19 4:47 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-19 5:24 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-18 1:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-18 1:31 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-17 18:48 ` Sean Christopherson
2018-12-17 19:09 ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-17 19:37 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-17 19:40 ` Dave Hansen
2018-12-17 19:33 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-17 20:21 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-18 13:13 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-18 15:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2018-12-18 5:55 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2018-12-19 5:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 1:01 ` [PATCH v17 19/23] platform/x86: sgx: Add swapping functionality to the " Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 1:01 ` [PATCH v17 20/23] x86/sgx: Add a simple swapper for the EPC memory manager Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 1:01 ` [PATCH v17 21/23] platform/x86: ptrace() support for the SGX driver Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 1:01 ` [PATCH v17 22/23] x86/sgx: SGX documentation Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-03 3:28 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-12-03 9:32 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 1:01 ` [PATCH v17 23/23] selftests/x86: Add a selftest for SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-16 11:17 ` [PATCH v17 00/23] Intel SGX1 support Jarkko Sakkinen
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